CAB7-4 — Page 66

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COALING-STATIONS in War. The route to North America and West Indies, also Brazils.

Stations.

England to Halifax

Halifax to Bermuda

Bermuda to Antigua

Antigua to Barbadoes Antigua to Jamaica

:::::

Statute Miles.

About

3,200 900 1,050

290 1,200

England to Gibraltar

1,250

Gibraltar to Sierra Leone

2,300

Sierra Leone to Ascension

Ascension to Brazil*

1,200 2,800

In this route we lose the means of obtaining coal at Porta Praya, Madeira, in the Atlantic, and in the West Indies, St. Thomas', Colon, Havanah, and other local harbours, also at Vera Cruz, and ports of the United States.

In this route we lose the means of obtaining coal at Madeira, St. Vincent, the ports of Brazil, Bahia, Rio Janeiro, also at Monte Video; also in the Straits of Magellan, and all the ports of Chile and Peru, and Mexico, also on the coast of the United States, until we reach Vancouver. The nearest coaling-station from thence is St. Helena, viâ Cape Horn, and the Fiji Islands.

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In considering this large question of coal supply abroad, it must be clearly understood that unless all and each of the coaling places or stations mentioned above and in the final Table are kept fully stocked and supplied with coal or patent fuel, the services of Her Majesty's ships would be paralyzed, coal being as essential for Her Majesty's service as ammunition; and it must be borne in mind that squadrons employed in the Mediterranean or elsewhere could not leave or be withdrawn from their several stations, and return to a distant harbour to obtain or replenish their coal supply; hence the necessity for screw colliers, capable of carrying 800 to 1,000 tons of coal, being attached to the prin- cipal coaling-depôts, as Malta, Aden, Trincomalee, Hong Kong, or to the squadrons. Unless some such system is adopted, it will be most difficult to conduct naval operations during war.

It is, no doubt, true that belligerent ships of war could, by possibility, obtain some coal`at neutral ports, as during the Civil War in the United States, and also during the last war between France and Germany.

"The Order in Council admitting that the ship of any belligerent could receive a sufficient coal- supply to take her to the nearest port of her own country, or some nearer port, but no further supply could be again given at any port until after a period of three months."

It is, therefore, obvious our ships could not depend on any such casual supply to conduct opera- tions of war, and this raises the question---

How our coaling-stations are to be supplied with coal on the outbreak of war to meet the actual requirements of an increased squadron on all foreign stations?

The only immediate course would be for our Consuls abroad to be directed to purchase coal in their own localities, and ship it to such stations as the Admiralty might direct by telegraph, or to ship supplies from Australia to Singapore, Labuan, and China, as the present supply of coal to Hong Kong from the mines of Takasima, in Japan, would cease during war.

That large fast steamers should convey supplies from England to Gibraltar, and Malta, Aden, Sierra Leone, St. Helena, the Cape, Mauritius, and Ceylon.

In North America, Halifax and Bermuda would obtain supplies from Pictou or Cape Breton mines if they are protected, or perhaps more quickly from England. In the West Indies, Barbadoes, Antigua, Jamaica, or any other requisite port, including Nassau, could only obtain a certainty of supply from England, and New Zealand from Sydney.

Whatever arrangements may be adopted under an emergency of war, the supply of coal, not only to meet the demands of single ships, but those from unexpected squadrons and troop-ships, will, no doubt, be a most responsible and heavy duty, and one which will not admit of one hour's delay if our ships are to keep the sea, and looking to the difficulties which may probably arise for want of coal for our cruizing ships, and the great distance between the coaling-stations, it would appear to be a necessity that those cruizers should retain their full sail-power, only using coal in cases of emergency.

The protection to our coaling-depôts, or places where coal is to be obtained by Her Majesty's ships, is as much a military as a naval question

1. Coal is an absolute necessity for Her Majesty's navy.

2. Depôts for coal abroad are, consequently, a national requirement.

3. Coal, if not to some extent protected, may be attacked and destroyed by an enemy.

4. To prevent our squadrons and ships being rendered useless, they must be certain of obtain- ing supplies of coal at our depôts; if these are not protected, our national interests might be sacrificed.

5. Hence defence is a question of national importance, and it is more reasonable to defend than to render our navy inefficient.

Bearing to some extent on this question is the requisite supply of stores and provisions to our foreign stations and garrisons. Malta and Gibraltar are now supplied with cattle from Tripoli and Tangier; Malta, for its inhabitants and garrison, with grain from the Black Sea; Bermuda with cattle and other articles from the United States; and it would become a necessity, in the prospect of war, to look to an immediate supply of salt provisions, preserved meats, biscuits, and other requisites being dispatched, not only for the navy, but for our garrisons abroad.

ALEX. MILNE.

June 12, 1882.

(Signed)

* No stations on this coast, nor any station from Brazil viâ Cape Horn to Vancouver.

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