CAB7-4 — Page 639

Page 639

Page 639

In war, such communication would be indispensable, and should extend to Halifax (2325-2331).

Docks.-Malta, Hong Kong, and Bermuda have docks large enough to take in any of Her Majesty's ships (1782). The Indian Ocean is deficient in dock accommodation, and the " Euryalus" was lately sent from the East Indian Station to Malta for repair (1627, 1628, 1781), as the Aberdeen Dock at Hong Kong was too far off (1632, 1785, 1786), and the docks at Singapore, Mauritius, and Bombay, too small (1681, 1632, 1783). There should be a dock at Trincomalee for the large ships in the East Indies (1781). The dock at Cape Town will be a good one when com- pleted (1787-1789).

Protection of Commerce.-War with two strong maritime Powers combined would tax our resources to the utmost (1720, 1722). British commerce would be best secured by a strong force at the entrance of the English Channel and at the ports of destination, with cruizers on the tracks of trade, which would be pre- scribed by the Admiralty and thoroughly protected (2209, 2214). Ships would run individually, and although a few would probably be lost, the system would be better than convoy, which is out of the question for fast mercantile steamers (1719, 1720, 1726, 1729, 2211, 2216).

Convoy. Ship-owners would rather be left to their own resources than submit to the inconvenience of coll- voy, even if they had to give up running (1727). Con- voys would not be carried out in future (2203), except, perhaps, in such places as the China Sea, which might be infested with cruizers (2211). The narrow straits leading to the China Sea, e.g., the Straits of Malacca, would have to be thoroughly guarded (2203-2206), and we should be able to do this without much diffi- culty (2207). Coal, ammunition, and stores for Her Majesty's ships, as well as troops and specie, must be convoyed (1716, 1717, 1720, 1727, 1728). The diffi- culty of convoy in this case would be less, as the ships would be under orders, and need not proceed at great speed, punctuality being more important than rapidity (1719, 1730). A convoy in the present day would be very different from the convoys of sixty years ago. Steamers are more difficult to convoy than sailing-ships (1730). A fleet of steamers could easily be thrown into confusion at night by at- tempts to ram and sink them (1731, 1732). Steam has also increased the facilities of attack. A fleet of merchantmen of any importance should be ac- companied by an armoured ship. The protection required would depend upon the strength and position of the enemy (1719). The organization and handling of a fleet under convoy is a very important question, which, for want of recent experience, has not been considered at the Admiralty. A system would be quickly arranged when the necessity arose (1734, 1735). Convoys would add much to the demand for ships of war in all parts of the world (1718, 1733, 1736).

Food Supply-In a war with France the food supply from the East through the Mediterranean could hardly

609

the Atlantic faster than the White Star ships, which average under 14 knots (1758-1763, 1766).

Merchant Cruizers.-To assist Her Majesty's ships in protecting trade armed merchant-steamers would be very valuable (1733, 1756, 1768). During the alarm of war with Russia in 1878 all vessels offered for purchase or hire, as likely to be useful for war pur- poses, were examined by the Controller's Department of the Admiralty. Guns, carriages, fittings, magazines, &c., were prepared for thirty or forty of these ships, and stored in the dockyards, where they remain (1737, 1738). The guns were 64-pounders of an earlier type than those now in use (1739). In time we shall have guns, perhaps, not heavier than the present 64-pounders, which will penetrate the lower class of iron-clads, but such guns are at present only under trial (1741-1743). It is of the highest importance that guns of the new type should be ready to put on board ships taken up for cruizing purposes (1740). One heavy gun is not so useful as a number of smaller guns, and an ordinary merchant-ship could not carry a gun of 25 tons without very expensive strengthening and fitting. Armour- piercing guns are not required for merchant cruizers, which ought never to come within range of an iron- clad. They should be able to defend themselves or others against ships of the same type (1740, 1757). Guns and fittings should be kept at some of the distant dockyards, such as Halifax, the Cape of Good Hope, Esquimalt, Hong Kong, and Trincomalee (1744, 1748- 1750), ready to arm ships which might be on those stations (1744, 1745). They should be kept only at defended dockyards, where the necessary trained labour and supervision is available (1746, 1747). Extem- porized cruizers would have to be commanded and manned from the Royal Navy, and crews would have to be sent out from home for the purpose (1751, 1752). Men of the Naval Reserve should not be employed on this duty, but should be distributed among Her Majesty's ships (1751). Fifteen of the ships on the Admiralty List have ocean speeds of from 14 to 16 knots (1754, 1755). It would be of supreme impor- tance that we should secure these ships in war time for our own use, and prevent their falling into the hands of a hostile Power (1768, 1769, 1774). A few of these swift steamers in the hands of an enemy would be very difficult to capture, and would do much injury to our commerce. Their speed, and consequently their power to do mischief, would, however, rapidly diminish, from the fouling of their bottoms, especially in warm lati- tudes, unless they were regularly docked (1775-1780). The value of swift steamers in war time is so great that owners would be greatly tempted to sell, especially if war risks made legitimate trade unprofitable. Some means of retaining a hold on these ships ought to be devised (1770-1773). The French have a number of fast cruizers, many of which are built of wood, of over 14 knots speed, but they have not all good coal-carrying capacity (1757).

the Admiralty.

March 9, 1880.

be carried on, but American and Canadian sources of Captain F. J. O. EVANS, C.B., R.N., Hydrographer to supply would remain open (1723, 1724). Even war with the United States ought not to stop our supplies of food from Canada (1725). Convoy for food supplies might be necessary, but only in the last resort (1717, 1720). Private enterprise would do much, and neutral Powers would doubtless supply us for the sake of profit. The loss of a few ships would scarcely affect our food supply, though such loss would be very serious for merchants and ship-owners (1720-1722).

Cruizers.-Ships are now being built which would be specially suited for convoy duties. Vessels of the "Comus" class have their vital parts protected, either by armour or by a steel deck below the water-line. They may be called 12-knot ships, and could convoy merchautmen at moderate speed (1719). Steel-built ships are being laid down which will have an ocean speed of 15, and probably 16 knots.

The " Mercury

"

and "Iris" could steam 9,780 miles at 8.3 knots, or 1,610 miles at full speed. They could probably cross

[1108]

The Cape de Verde Islands lie almost in the track of commerce coming round the Cape of Good Hope and from South America (2561). St. Vincent, though less valuable than formerly to commerce, owing to th increased coal capacity of steamers, is important for our cruizers, and would be more so were it not for the proximity of Sierra Leone (2562). St. Vincent has no barbour, but a sheltered anchorage during the greater part of the year (2563–2565).

Sierra Leone.-If St. Vincent belonged to Great Britain it might serve as a station in time of war (2568), but the commerce which goes to St. Vincent could as conveniently, or nearly so, go to Sierra Leone, except during the three months rainy season when the approaches require very careful navigation (2566-2568, 2570). Coaling at Sierra Leone instead of at St. Vincent would not add much to the voyage between

7 Q

Page 639

322

Page 639

Page 639