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proportion of them before the British Government could stop the transfer (1308, 1309,-1325, 1326, 1364–1366). The temptation to sell ships might be great, especially if any particular line of trade were threatened (1311). A ship-owner was recently offered nearly 250,0001. for some of his ships (1310). We have no security that our swift ships would not be transferred to an enemy (1810). The process is extremely simple, and consists merely in a declaration of sale at a custom house. The transfer of a ship to a foreign Power would probably be made through a third person, and not direct (1312, 1313, 1369-1371). A few of our swift steamers employed against our commerce would be extremely difficult to capture (1314, 1315, 1318). We have less to fear from an "Alabama" than the United States, which, practically, had nothing to send against her, yet hostile cruizers might, in a few months, do great mischief (1359, 1362).

Mr. Barnaby's Proposal.-Mr. Barnaby considers that the use of our swift steamers might be secured, under all contingencies, by the payment of a retaining- fee to the owners. His views are expressed in his paper on Cruizing Ships of War" (1329, 1330). Since that paper was written, the Russian Govern- ment have proposed to adapt as cruizers ships having all the weaknesses of English merchant-ships, without their speed, and it has become the more important to utilize the English ships curselves (1332).

His sug- gestion is that owners should bind themselves not to part with their ships so long as the retaining-fee is paid (1334, 1336, 1337). If an owner, tempted by high price, sold a ship, he should be visited with heavy penalties (1335).

No pecuniary consideration has been offered to ship- owners to induce them to comply with the Admiralty requirements (1416). Owners of the swiftest steamers are not anxious to enter into engagements, though owners of slower ships might like some such connection with the State (1327) In England swift steamers have been built without State assistance, but in other countries though encouraged by heavy subsidies--the ships are inferior to ours (1427-1430).

Necessity of Coaling-stations.—It is to be anticipated that a few years hence there will be ships with a speed of 17 or 18 knots, immense coal capacity, and very small consumption (1354, 1355, 1357, 1358). Such ships are entirely dependent ou coal, and can only be stopped by cutting off their supply of fuel (1318). Cruizers might be supplied with coal at sea and to a limited extent in neutral ports (1385, 1387, 1390). We should endeavour to put our own coaling-stations in a perfect state of defence, and to prevent other Powers from defending their distant stations (1396). In a war with a European Power, cruizers would not greatly endanger British trade with America, on account of the difficulty of getting fuel, but it would be different on the more distant lines to India and

China (1382-1384). Coaling-stations are not only necessary for our crnizers, but indispensable for the Queen's ships, which have less coal capacity, and cannot do without intermediate stations (1338-1340).

Ship-building--There are many ship-building yards in England where merchant-steamers of the highest class can be rapidly produced (1431). In America, France, Germany, and Russia the number of such yards is very limited (1432-1436). In England a year would be required to build a first-class steamer with engines complete, but more time would be required in any other country (1437, 1438). In a war lasting more than a year, England would thus have an advantage (1439). It would take a good many years to double the British naval strength (1360).

February 24, 1880. GEORGE DUNCAN, Esq., ship-owner and merchant. Has experience principally of sailing-ships (1440, 1441).

Sailing ships.-Sailing-ships are almost exclusively built of iron; composite ships are obsolete. Iron ship- building is not confined to England. There are yards

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in America, Germany, and Holland which build in iron exclusively (1451, 1452). A few small wooden ships are built in this country for special trades, and wooden ships are still employed in the intercolonial and Baltic grain trades (1446-1449, 1453–1455). The large wooden ships of late years came chiefly from Canada, but few are built there now (1447–1449).

Supersession by Steamers.-Sailing-ships are being steadily pushed out by steamers. The following extract from Lloyd's Register-book shows the pre- ponderance of steamers (1442-1445): "Tonnage of steamers over 200 tons, 3,891,969; tonnage of sailing- ships over 200 tons, 3,262,147." Even coal is now taken as far as Bombay and Singapore in steamers (1488, 1489). Sailing-ships will, however, for some time to come, keep possession of the long voyage trades (1456). Grain from California and Chile is carried by sailing-vessels (1471). From 200,000 to 300,000 tons of wheat are annually so brought from San Francisco alone (1492).

Effects of War.-War with a Power capable of keeping at sea flects or armed cruizers would at once stop the sailing trade of this country, and paralyze for a time some of our most important industries (1457, 1467, 1481, 1508). No protection would serve to keep sailing-ships at sea (1468, 1469). Sailing-ships might perhaps find employment on some few routes, espe- cially in the supply of coal to distant stations. They would have to vary their routes to avoid capture (1470, 1509). Trade would be transferred to steamers and neutral bottoms (1457, 1463, 1474, 1481–1484, 1509), and many ships would be transferred-soli nominally to a foreign Power to gain the pro. tection of a neutral flag (1458, 1486, 1487). If the supply of powerful steamers were insufficient, our enormous powers of ship-building would soon make up the deficiency. Probably over 1,000,000 tons of steamers could be turned out of British yards in a year (1464). Our naval supremacy would probably secure us from a panic such as the "Alabama caused in America, but underwriters are easily scared, and war premiums might compel merchants to employ neutral bottoms. An extra premium of 4 or 5 per e ut. would probably bring this about (1461-1463, 1467). Owners of iron ships could afford to let them lie up longer than owners of wooden ships could do (1458).

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Insurance. - The rise in insurance would affect sailing ships far more than steamers. Much would depend on the Power with which we were at war. War with Russia might raise the rates to 1 per cent. on steamers, and 1 to 2 per cent. on sailing-ships bound to the East, while the rates would be about double on vessels bound to the Pacific. If Russia added powerful cruizers to her fleet, the additional premiums on steamers might be 2 to 4 per cent., and on sailing-ships 5 to 10 per cent. (1459). During the great war with France, premiums are said to have ranged from 5 to 20 and even 30 per cent. Rates fell after Trafalgar, but at that time many ships and cargoes were sent without insurance simply as an adventure (1496, 1497). Underwriters have made, and would probably again make, fortunes out of war insurance, as the premiums paid are more than the legitimate risks (1498-1502).

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Protection of Trade. The existence o fortified coaling-stations and ports of refuge would greatly affect the rates of insurance on steamers (1459). strong coaling-station at the Falkland Islands would be very important with reference to the route of the Australian grain trade to this country (1475-1477). There are certain points on the sailing tracks at which trade would be especially subject to interference, e.g., between England and Cape de Verde, and at certain seasons between the Cape de Verde Islands and the coast of Africa. Sailing-ships passing to the west of the Cape de Verde Islands cross the Equator on a range of 300 miles, which might be extended further in case of war (1493-1495). Convoys would not protect sailing-ships from the attacks of swift cruizers at night (1468).

Coal.-Hong Kong might be supplied with Japanese.

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