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considerable stores of coal will generally be found, partly produced locally, partly conveyed from the great coal centres, for the use of their furnaces and mills. In the centre we find the most populous and wealthy commercial cities, such as New York and Philadelphia, engaged in every class of industry, but specially marked by being the chief coal ports.

We pause here for a moment to say that as an exhaustive analysis of this trade is certain to form one of the sections of the census publications, to enter upon the subject now would be a waste of time.

In the south and in the gulf the production, apart from lumber, &c., is chiefly agricultural, and the principal article cotton. The towns on the coast are less numerous, and therefore relatively of more importance; such are Charlestown, Savannah, New Orleans, Mobile, Galveston. In these southern cities a great proportion of the coal is used for domestic purposes, and there is not generally a great surplus supply.

In the event of our fleets venturing up the Mississippi and its tributaries, either with or without the connivance of the South, we come on quite a new region of wealthy and populous centres; but here we should be entering upon ground it has been agreed on to avoid.

On the Pacific coast there is, perhaps, only one place worthy of serious attention, San Francisco; but great as is its local and even national importance, it is so far removed from the Atlantic theatre, and the force, naval and military, employed there would be so entirely isolated from the main contest, that it is doubtful whether any successes on that seaboard would, by their effect upon the war, sufficiently compensate for the exertions they would demand; it is rather in self-defence of our Pacific trade than from any paramount advantage to be gained by attacking it that this coast would have to be dealt with.

Appendix No. 9.

UNITed States,

"Naval Prize Essay,"

Much has been written on our unfavourable position in this quarter of the globe. Our three stations, Falkland Islands, Fiji, and Vancouver, are very far apart; while between them and the Pacific 1878, &c. coast, and the mouth of the future canal, are stations possessed or more or less controlled by three Great Powers, France, Germany, and the United States.

Now, although as far as the last of these Powers is concerned, there is certainly no urgent necessity for the excitement of jealousy by immediate aggressive action, it is, no doubt, desirable to have clear ideas with regard to the situation, and to have our eyes upon the various central positions suitable for coal depôts, arsenals, and dockyards.

The following remarks may possibly prove useful in estimating the probability there is of our being able to make use of by seizure, loan, or purchase, such positions as Guayaquil, the Galapagos Islands, Guadaloupe in the Pacific, Fonseca Bay, and other places which will be mentioned, their special capabilities in detail are not entered into. In discussing the matter, our principal object is to deal with its bearing on a war with the United States, but much that is said is necessarily applicable to the larger question.

We may lay down the following general maxims, partly derived from what we ourselves have said on the subject of weak naval Powers coveting distant possessions, partly from the "Naval Prize Essay" already referred to :-

As soon as war is declared—

1. Every insufficiently protected harbour on the main soil of a hostile State can be used by the superior naval belligerent, subject to the land attack which the powerful military State, supposing it to be oue, may prosecute. We may, therefore, hope to utilize San Diego, San Francisco, and other Pacific harbours of the United States, if we are prepared to land troops enough to hold them; but the use of such harbours cannot be depended on, as they may at any time be fortified, and also the assailant may not have troops to spare for their defence on the landward fronts.

In the case of England, the safety of Esquimault has to be considered; it will assuredly be attacked from the United States' side if insufficiently garrisoned; a small force would, however, probably be enough for San Francisco, when once seized. An occupation of the Golden Horn forts, and the threat to bombard the town if guns were mounted elsewhere, would probably prove sufficient to secure the unmolested use of the harbour.

2. Every unfortified island, or other distant possession of a hostile State, becomes and remains absolutely at the disposal of the stronger naval Power, and its retention after the war is over is easy (a very important advantage), in spite of any purely military resources of the adversary.

There is nothing at present to prevent the occupation of one of the Santa Barbara Islands, and such proposed acquisitions as Carlo Dolce could, without difficulty, be wrested from the Americans. But the suitable positions, if there are any in the Santa Barbara Islands, can at any time be fortified, as could also Carlo Dolce.

Note.-Secure inlets or bays too wide to be commanded from the shore, positions from which the superior naval Power can in no conceivable circumstances be shut out, do not exist in the United States' portion of the Pacific coast; it is, therefore, possible to exclude England from every suitable station, which makes the following alternative propositions of the greater importance.

3. The harbours of a powerful neutral State near the scene of operations are usually forbidden water to the combatants, as neither can afford to add to the number of the adversaries by making forcible use of them. Valparaiso may be quoted as an example of this class of closed harbour, accepting Chile as now too powerful to be ignored, but Valparaiso is too far to the south. Callao, had Peru been victorious in the late war, would have been such a port, and in a greater degree harbours nearer the isthmus would become so if the weak Powers at present holding them are ever welded into larger States.

The United States' interest in guaranteeing the neutrality of Columbia is obviously connected with the above proposition, and it is equally obvious that until England has secured a harbour of her own on the Pacific side, it is contrary to her interests to allow powerful States to be consolidated in the immediate vicinity of the Canal.

4. The harbours and islands of weak States can almost always be used by a powerful naval belli-

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