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Large sums have been expended in recent Budgets on strand batteries, but whether these sums have been disbursed in the improvement of the old sites or in the creation of new batteries we do not know, nor is the arınament known; but we may presume that modern batteries exist, armed, or to be armed, with rifled guns, in front of Samarang, and, with the shelving shore and bad landing, rendering a lodgment difficult.

Garrison of Samarang.

Infantry. The 5th Field Battalion.

Schutterij: 221 Europeans, 212 natives.

Artillery-One-fourth 7th company Fortress Artillery.

Samarang has no ship permanently stationed there.

Referring for miscellaneous troops to the account of the army, we may now consider what assist- ance from other stations may be expected at Samarang.

Batavia is distant about a day's steaming, but, if the command of the sea is lost, the Batavia and subsidiary troops could not reach Samarang for weeks, nor by land at all, except with the utmost difficulty, if Cheribon was occupied. In the English invasion, the troops retreating from Batavia were cut off at this point on the coast road. There is no good interior road. On the other hand, all the troops of the Samarang and Soerabaia systems are being made gradually available. Soerabaia is about a day's steaming from Samarang, but, even supposing the command of the sea lost to the Dutch, Samarang is connected directly by rail with most of its own affiliated garrisons, and a few days' march only, every day decreasing as the railway advances, divides the Samarang from the Soerabaia railway systems. When all the lines, bridges, &c., actually in progress are completed, all the garrisons on the railway— and the most of them are-of the Samarang and Soerabaia groups will be within twenty-four hours' railway journey of each other, and the whole available field army of Middle and East Java might be assembled at Samarang before any considerable force could effect its landing.

General Remarks.

Many of the general principles involved in the attack or defence of Samarang, with one important exception-the comparatively superior healthiness of the climate-are similar to those discussed in connection with Batavia; and the measures proposed for taking advantage of them are very much alike. Such are the difficulties of landing at Samarang itself, and the danger of leaving it on the flank or rear; the proposed employment of horse artillery to check the landing, the use of inundations, the breaking-up of causeways, the combined defence by a special garrison acting in concert with a field army and partizan irregulars, the retreat to entrenched hill positions, leaving the abandoned town open on the south side, &c., &c.; these need not be again gone over in detail, and we pass at once to certain points specially affecting the Samarang position.

It is presumed that, if the assailant lands to the west of Samarang, he will select Kendal, where large supplies are obtainable, as a suitable spot. In this case, the importance of Bodjong, where the post-road divides, is pointed out in the Dutch Memoirs. It may not be uninteresting to repeat a calculation made in one of them on a Kendal landing.

For the landing of 25,000 men, taking into consideration the shelving shore and necessity of employing lighters, &c. :—

Landing

March to Bodjong

...

Fighting from Bodjong to main road

5 days. 1 day. 1

Appendix No. 9.

NETHERLANDS.

Fighting on the main road

...

March to Oenarang

1

1

دو

""

Oenarang to Marak Mattie

1

Marak Mattie to Bawen

1

22

Bawen to Toentang; selected position at Willem I Halts, &c.

1

,,

Total

13 days.

The places mentioned are all more or less defensible positions. It may be added that no good direct roads lead from Kendal, and a passage through Samarang seems more or less unavoidable.

The old Memoirs point out the necessity of dealing with the good second-class road via Goeboek, thence through the hills. These remarks still hold good, and are, indeed, emphasized by the creation of the railway, which follows, more or less, the same line. Both the old road and the new railway ultimately unite at the Kedong Djati Junction, and, when this is seized, the railway connection between Middle and East Java is severed.

As regards a landing east of Samarang, it is generally presumed that Japara would be selected. Japara is, however, a place of sufficient importance to be separately discussed.

It may be as well to mention that, in the English invasion, after the victory of Meister Cornelis, and after more of the Dutch army had surrendered at Cheribon, it was still found necessary to attack both Samarang and Soerabaia. A detachment was landed at the former place, which defeated a superior Dutch force posted in an entrenched defile about 4 miles south of it, owing to the superior morale of the English, elated by success, and the panic of the native troops, demoralized by the knowledge of it. The expedition against Soerabaia was not carried out, as Java capitulated.

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