CAB7-4 — Page 559

Page 559

Page 559

282

Page 559

531

General Remarks.

Before making a few remarks on the general principles involved in the attack and defence of Batavia, it will be advisable briefly to sketch the immediate neighbourhood and the principal lines of communication.

All along the coast the country resembles that close to the town, a low-lying land intersected by numerous unfordable streams; the coast itself everywhere shelving renders landing tedious and uncertain in bad weather, but it can be effected at several points close to Batavia, both eastward and westward, and, in fact, took place in the English invasion of Java in the Bay of Batavia itself.

The great post road runs more or less parallel to the coast from Anjer; at Tangerang, 15 miles from Batavia, it is about 10 miles from the coast, here it crosses the Tangerang River, enters Batavia, makes a bend to the south, passes through Meister Cornelis and passes on eastward through Tjakong, where it crosses the Tjilitjing; here again the road is about 8 miles from the shore.

Several roads perpendicular to the coast-line connect with this main road; the chief are, the road leading from the shore through Tangerang and on into the interior through Parong without passing through Batavia, and the main road from Batavia through Meister Cornelis to Buitenzorg, to which the country gradually slopes up. But there are several intermediate roads; Parong and Makassar may be mentioned as important points between Batavia and Buitenzorg.

The railway runs from the old port, after passing under the ramparts of the fort Prinz Hendrik, through Meister Cornelis, keeping to the west of the post road, to Buitenzorg.

Although the certainty of a successful landing may be assured by selecting a point at a consider- able distance from Batavia, it is considered probable that, taking into consideration the disadvantage of long marches in a tropical climate, and the desirability of trying conclusions with the enemy's forces as early as possible, and before they have received reinforcements, the point selected for an attack on Batavia will be near Batavia.

In the English invasion, early in the century, the landing did, in fact, actually take place at a point in the Batavia Bay; from which two columns advanced-one along the shore, one more directly inland--and after crossing unopposed an unfordable stream, and encountering little resistance in Batavia itself, a battle was finally fought at Meister Cornelis which broke the Dutch power.

The Dutch writers acknowledge that a landing cannot be opposed with certainty, but they hold that greater resistance should have been made by Batavia itself, sufficient to render a siege of some kind necessary, and that the point selected for the final stand was not removed sufficiently far inland.

The mistakes made will probably be avoided in the future, and the general plan will be the defence of Batavia itself by a moderate selected garrison, in more or less fortified positions, while the field army will hover near to attack or defend as opportunity offers; but rash enterprises involving a crushing defeat will be avoided, as a defeat where the ruling Power are Europeans outnumbered by the natives produces such fatal political effects.

Many writers also recommend the removal of all the chief arsensals, establishments, and bureaux to some place in the interior; whatever happens to the main army, however, the attraction of the port will probably keep many of these in Batavia, even if the stores are removed when war actually breaks out.

The following are some of the proposals made for measures of defence, some or all of which an enemy's force landing near Batavia must be prepared to encounter.

It should be remarked that much the ablest discussion was written before the creation of the new port; but the general situation is only modified, not radically altered, by this change.

We commence with the most distant defences, and gradually close in on the town :---

Proposals.

1. That positions for small bodies of light troops, with horse artillery batteries, should be prepared east of the town near Tjilitjing, mouth of that river where the English landed before, and west near Tanjong-kaik, where a landing might be effected and whence a good road leads to Tangerang.

2. That within the area of defence all roads and causeways not required by the defenders should be destroyed or reduced to footpaths. Under present circumstances, landings at the distant points named would probably be only feints, or at least subsidiary to a serious effort to gain possession of the new port at Tanjong Priok.

3. That an entrenchment should be made at Tjakong, to close the Bekassie-Batavia road.

4. That a storm-proof fort should be erected at Tangerang, to dispute the road from the beach to Parong or Batavia.

5. That as much of the country as possible immediately to the east and west of Batavia should be inundated, and any supplementary batteries needed to maintain and extend this inundation to the latest possible moment added to those existing. It is said this measure can be carried out without seriously injuring the health of Batavia; the serious sickness would begin when the inundations were in process of being drained when the works had fallen.

6. That the old and Chinese towns should be cut off from the new town by the erection of a strong fort in the open space Prinsenlaan, the various canals being utilized to protect the works and inundate the intermediate space. Even supposing this measure not carried out precisely as suggested, it is evident that the existing fort Prinz Hendrik, if repairable, and the military buildings of Weltewreden might for a time act as a substitute.

Let us pause here for a moment to examine the position in which an assailant would be placed.

For the sake of argument, let it be supposed that the new port has no formidable defences, and that, either by naval attack or by a landing at Tjilitjing, it has fallen into the invader's hands.

Appendix No. 9.

NETHERLANDS.

Page 559

Page 559