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Appendix No. 9.

NETHERLANDS.

522

While, in the event of danger at home ceasing to be dreaded, it does not appear improbable that an expedition numbering 20,000 men could be sent against say Penang or Singapore, equivalent in value to perhaps 15,000 of the mixed European and native troops of the ordinary Anglo-Indian army; of course this could not occur unless Hindostan were heavily engaged by other internal or external enemies.

It is easier to sum up the naval forces at the disposal of the Dutch East Indian Government. At present it consists of two formidable iron-clads, thirty other vessels of the war marine, mostly steamers, armed with from 100 to 120 rifled guns, eighteen less formidably armed sea and river steamers of the Government marine, and seventy or eighty steam-cutters, sailing-cutters, and other armed boats, supplemented by a merchant fleet of forty steamers permanently in Dutch East Indian waters, with about twenty more large steamers passing to and fro; besides a large number of sailing-vessels and native craft, armed and unarmed, difficult to estimate, but amounting to several hundreds.

Its importance has not Note.--No estimate of the speed of the ships enumerated has been given. heen ignored, but unfortunately this detail is not given in any of the Returns which have been made use of, but it can be to a certain extent inferred from draught and tonnage compared with horse-power, both of which are given.

The principal Inland Fortresses.

In dealing with this subject, it is proposed to pursue the same plan as in the case of the army and navy, giving a general view of the fortifications of the whole Dutch East Indies, reserving certain details of the description of the ports and outer islands, so that their garrisons, defences, and usual naval guard may be found united.

Our knowledge of the fortifications of the Dutch East Indies is still extremely limited. There are no English books or Reports, that we are aware of, that treat the whole of them in any detail, and the few Dutch works on the subject are mostly of rather old date; but there is some information to be gathered from them, as well as from the "Staatsblad" and Budgets.

Still, the present account is to be taken as an outline for future filling in, rather than as a complete guide in itself. The most satisfactory point of departure is the "Staatsblad," No. 115, of 1860, which names and classifies all the forts then existing in Java and dependencies. Although of Besides, although many of these old date, it is to this order that all subsequent orders are referred.

works have officially ceased to exist, they help us to a knowledge of what points have, from time to time, been considered worth defending, and also, under certain circumstances, the remains of an old work might be patched up, so as to block a road or support some portion of a position; and the knowledge that a fort did, and in some form does still, exist on a certain spot is not entirely valueless. Before discussing the contents of the 1860 List, it appears advisable to say a few words upon the general defence of Java. It is not necessary to enter into very great detail, for although many schemes have been from time to time proposed, and even commenced, none have been completely carried out ; but they have been nearly unanimous on two points: "that the loss of Java involves the loss of all the other dependencies, while the loss of Java is no necessary consequence of their fall; that, therefore, the defence of the outer islands should be limited to what is absolutely necessary, and even sacrificed altogether rather than risk the success of the great struggle to be carried out in Java itself;” and “that in Java that struggle should be finally fought out, under the protection of a great central fortress and depôt in the interior highlands, condemning the assailant, as long as possible, to the pestilential climate of the lower zones and coast." Although Willem I is a nominally first-class fortress, it cannot be considered to fulfil the conditions of such a fortress and depôt in the modern sense, although its natural position is locally very strong. The tendency, however, of late years has been to trust rather to the mobile forces of the army and navy, and to place less dependence upon strong places. Every year the official " Gazettes " announce that certain forts have been lowered in class or abolished-rarely that new ones have been created.

The standard of reference, List No. 115, "Staatsblad," 1860, gives--

Fortresses of the First Class :—

1. Soerabaia (of which more under “Ports"). 2. Willem I,

It is placed at a near Ambarawara, in the highlands above Samarang, 400 metres above the sea. point where the Samarang road branches to the south-east, towards Soerakarta, and to the south-west, to Tjilatjap. It protects the plateau of Banjoe-Biroe and the camp of that name; and the natural features of the country, the mountainous approach, with rivers and ravines, the lake and rice-fields in the immediate vicinity, render its position very strong, while it has around it and behind it, covered by the mountain barrier, fertile districts; but the most recent writers, and we think with justice, criticize the much-lauded Toentang position, of which Willem I forms the stronghold, as tactically defective, being commanded at modern ranges, and bad strategically, the lines of retreat running nearly parallel to the position.

We have no details of the present trace of Willem I or of its armament, but it is an old fortress, In the reductions and alterations of the which has not to any great extent been modernized. "Gazettes" since 1860 its name has not yet appeared; it is therefore still nominally a first-class fortress. In 1865, however, it was injured by an earthquake, which proved specially destructive to the central redoubt. In 1868-69 the damage was sufficiently repaired to render the barracks habitable. In 1872 another severe earthquake took place, and a Commission was appointed to inquire into the condition of the place and camp at Ambarawara. They reported that it was habitable, and, if certain In 1874 a Geological Commission examined precautions were taken, there was no imminent danger. the question; no further decision has been promulgated.

Willem I is distant 80 kilom. by rail from Samarang. At the latest available returns Willem I had the following garrison:-

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