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There would probably be little difficulty in this beyond providing the necessary funds, and in a short time, I believe, the men would become efficient gunners.

The number of white men that could be enrolled in addition to those in the active militia, should an emergency arise, and their services be required for the defence of the Colony, are as follows:-

At Victoria and Esquimalt, 700; New Westminster and Burrard Inlet, 350; Nanaimo, Cowichan, and Commox, 350.

These men are, however, without drill or discipline, and could not be relied on for some time after their enrolment.

A small number more might be obtained from the mining districts, but some weeks would expire before they could be brought to the coast.

The Acting Assistant Adjutant-General reports that if time admitted and arms were available, an auxiliary force of 1,000 Indians might be raised. These men are well-disposed towards the British people, and would doubtless fight well against a foreign enemy. It is a question whether it would be safe to trust them with arms in times of peace, in a community of which they form a great majority.

There are no railways or any other communication over the Rocky Mountains except Indian tracks, and therefore no assistance could be derived from the eastern part of the Dominion.

In the event of war, the active militia and the additional enrolment of white men at Nanaimo and Esquimalt would find full employment in their own district, and therefore all the local assistance that could be looked for in the defence of Esquimalt and Victoria would be-

Appendix No. 4.

VANCOUVER

ISLAND.

Militia Artillery

Rifles

"

New enrolment

Total ..

Rank and File.

85

84

700

869

Of this number, at least 354 would be required for serving the guns of the sea batteries, and about 500 would be available for infantry.

With regard to the manner in which the garrison should be constituted, I observe that it has been suggested by Lieutenant-General Sir E. Selby Smyth that, for the purpose of manning the batteries of Esquimalt and Victoria, " a small force of about 100 marine artillery should be maintained in Van- couver Island," and Admiral de Horsey proposes a nucleus of 100 marine artillery under naval autho- rity for the same purpose.

The objections to this scheme that present themselves to my mind are that, in time of war, the ships of the navy would be required chiefly at sea, and thence would necessarily result sometimes the entire absence of naval officers from the station, and at others frequent changes of the officers in command.

The forces under the navy would not be sufficient in themselves for the defence of the place, and would require to be supplemented by land forces, in which case the troublesome question of the right of command could not fail to arise and cause inconvenience and trouble, particularly with colonial militia, whose status in joint operations with the Imperial army and navy seems very undefined, or not clearly understood. It is also not beyond possibility that a naval officer, seeing what might appear to him a good opportunity for making an expedition against an enemy, might, if the troops were under his orders, take them or part of them for that purpose, the dockyard, &c., during the time being left exposed.

I have no hesitation in urging that if Esquimalt is fortified the garrison should be furnished from the Imperial army and supplemented by the local militia under an organization that will insure the two forces working harmoniously together.

It is impossible to estimate satisfactorily the strength of the garrison that should be maintained at Esquimalt without having any distinct instructions as to the degree of importance that is attached to the station. My own view is that Esquimalt, with regard to the Pacific Ocean, is as important, or more so, than Halifax with regard to the Atlantic, as the latter is not only supported by Bermuda, Nassau, Jamaica, &c., and is in the midst of a considerable population, from which she can draw all supplies, but has the mother-country within ten days' steaming; while Esquimalt is isolated, has to draw her supplies from a foreign country, and has comparatively no resources to fall back upon.

The expenditure and armament proposed by the Colonial Defence Committee would lead to the inference that the place is considered of very little importance. With all due deference to the Com- mittee, whose Report has been sent to me as a guide, I would submit that a weakly-fortified place, with an inadequate garrison, in an isolated position beyond reach of support, and open to an attack by a large force, courts its own destruction, and that of the interests it is supposed to protect, and leads to a useless sacrifice of men, money, &c., with a loss of honour and prestige.

Feeling, however, that the Committee, in proposing so limited a defence, must have acted under a conviction of the necessity for the utmost economy, I have reduced the armament of the sea defences to below what the importance of the station requires, and on the same principle, although I am of opinion that there should be not less than 1,500 Imperial infantry at the station to insure its efficient defence, I would confine myself to proposing not less than 900 rank and file.

The total garrison for the place would then stand as follows :---

Artillery .. Engineers

submarine miners.

و

Infantry

Totals

[103]

::::

Imperial.

Local.

Total.

118

354

472

100

100

20

20

900

500

1,400

1,138

851

1,902

5 U

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