CAB7-4 — Page 338

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Appendix No. 4.

HONG KONG

310

2. Supposing it is not the policy of our Government to countenance the organization of China's forces, can we be sure she will not organize them, in spite of us, and will not the same result-an armed China-result?

Again, could we afford to let Russia assume an ascendancy at Peking, which would be the issue of Russian military successes against China?

We have to consider this question once for all, and, of course, on the decision will depend the action I may take.

Were China not threatened by Russia, she had better be left weak. As she is threatened, it is better she were strong, even if we have to put up with her airs.

The question of Kuldja is of small import, and the Chinese, no doubt, if the war was localized there, would be a match for the Russians; but it is at Peking where China is exposed, and there only.

China did not care for us till we moved on Peking; we were welcome to stay at Canton or Shanghae as long as we wished.

In fact, China would be glad if Russia attacked those ports, for she would hope complications would arise with foreign Powers.

If you look at the map, you will see Russia has chosen a spot near the Corea; she will work up the Coreans against China, and then be able to approach Peking in alliance with the Coreans.

The place d'armes of Russia will be Vladivostok; and, if you look at the map, you will see how extremely disagreeable it will be for China to have a Sebastopol there, with Corea near, likely to be allied with Russia against her. If China can hold her own for some months, till October, or temporize till then, and then, without putting herself too much in the hands of Europeans, get in some 200,000 breech-loaders, it would be a tough job for Russia to defeat her, provided China prevents Corea joining Russia.

China is not bound by the Declaration of Paris against privateers, and she would, with her wealth, engage fast vessels which would even damage Russian trade in the Baltic!

There is a matter, your Excellency, which presses even more immediately than the relations of Russia and China, i. e., the state of defence of Hong Kong.

I do not know what has been done in this way, but, judging from the little that has been done at Singapore and Galle, I fear Hong Kong is also undefended.

Do not think I am intruding in stating what ought to be seen to, even if, by doing so, I am recommending faits accomplis.

The whole of the landing-places around the isle ought to be examined by a mixed naval and military party, and works designed for their defence, estimate of cost, &c., all worked out and so arranged that they could be executed at a moment's notice.

The tongues of land at A (vide sketch*), the Isles of Chunghuc, Tamtoo, Coweechow, and whether on Chinese territory or not, ought to be examined, works designed for them, &c., and the armaments sent from England.

In case of war China would not be considered, and these points, which defend the channel, would be occupied.

With respect to the force required for the defence of Hong Kong, a nucleus of Chinese troops ought to be now formed. They would be perfectly trustworthy, if under officers who have some tact; they ought to be under a stricter discipline than Europeans in some matters, and a laxer discipline in others; they, each man, ought to be obliged to supply two guarantees for their behaviour; they ought to be allowed their women, whether they are married or not.

My opinion would be dead against their being put under Generals commanding the troops, who only indirectly should oversee them. I have never found a regular General who was capable of com- manding foreign levies. Probyn and Fane's Horse succeeded because they were in a great measure free of Generals' interference. Nothing is more petty than the mind of the generality of General and staff officers when in contact, with a mercenary force.

I would begin with 250 Chinese. I would have but few European instructors, and those men who would not bully the poor devils because they do not understand English. The non-commissioned officers should be Chinese. I would so organize the force that it could be increased to 1,000. I would also put 100 or 200 in artillery.

All rubbish of "goose step, right face, left face," &c., which our regular drills delight in, ought to be left untaught.

I consider, if the nucleus was thus formed, you would be able to have, in a short time, any amount of good troops, who would take the place of those poor chocolate sepoys of India, with their castes, &c.

P.S.-This letter is entirely at your service.

No. 93.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed)

C. E. GORDON.

C. E. G.

Sir,

Colonial Office to Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad.

Downing Street, July 21, 1881.

I AM directed by the Earl of Kimberley to transmit to you, to be laid before the Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad, the accompanying extract

* Not printed.

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