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Appendix No. 4.

SINGAPORE.

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276

Inclosure 2 in No. 76.

Reasons for and against the Construction of a Battery at Blakang Mati South.

[See Inclosure 9 in No. 74, and Inclosure 6 in No. 74, paragraph 14.]

Inclosuse 3 in No. 76.

Submarine Mining Defence of Singapore.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 74.]

Special Report on the Employment of Natives in connection with the Submarine Mining Defence of Singapore.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 74.]

No. 77.

War Office Memorandum on the Defence of Singapore.

SINGAPORE offers unusual attractions to an enemy; its position, both strategically and commercially, is of such importance that he would make more than ordinary efforts to obtain possession of it. No considerations of economy should induce us to curtail the works necessary for its defence.

Strategically, its position half-way between Ceylon and Hong Kong renders it an important link in the line of communication connecting these two naval stations, while its situation at the extremity of a narrow strait-the narrowest part of the main route to the China seas--enables a naval force stationed there to interpose with effect between France and her military Settlements in Cambodia and Cochin China, to block the Straits of Sunda, and to cut off approach to Eastern Asia.

Commercially, its position is, in its way, no less important; the passing traffic which has already assumed very large, and is daily assuming still larger, proportions, has led to the accumulation of great stocks of coal, and to the construction of commodious private docks and naval establishments.

Sir W. Jervois, reporting in 1876, wrote:- "The capture and destruction of these naval establishments would be fatal to Imperial commercial interests;" but the importance of dock accommodation has considerably increased since he wrote, for though improvements in marine engines have so reduced the consumption of fuel that already there are fast-going ocean steamers capable, at reduced rates of speed, of keeping the sea for months; still, in tropical waters, at low rates of speed, the growth of weed on the bottoms of ships is so rapid, that they require more frequent docking.

If, then, the Government enter into arrangements, and it is understood that they have such arrangements in contemplation, by which such steamers shall be able to carry an armament suitable for swift unarmoured cruizers, a war may find us with a cloud of auxiliary cruizers of this description in every sea, and the importance of commodious dock accommodation cannot be overlooked.

At present Singapore may be regarded as of less importance than Hong Kong, but its importance is increasing rapidly, and as it is menaced by the same combinations, we cannot, with due regard to it future, avoid allotting to it armaments of equal power.

Its heaviest guns, therefore, should be 10-inch muzzle-loading rifled guns of 18 tons, or, better still, 104-inch breech-loading rifled guns of 26 tons, if they can be obtained; the choice of positions is not affected by the alternative, the expenditure on works will be the same whichever gun is used. The cost, however, of the guns will increase with the increase of weight, and this will be noted in the estimates.

Singapore is an island of moderate size, separated from the mainland by a narrow and not very deep channel, which washes three-fourths of its circumference. The island is nowhere more than 14 miles wide, and is traversed by four main roads, all leading from the town to this channel.

The harbour is an open roadstead, and though the town, which stands upon its edge, cannot be secured from distant shell fire, except at an expense which we do not feel justified in recommending, the roadstead may be denied to an enemy, and the inner harbour, with its docks and naval establishments, may be placed in security, by a very moderate expenditure.

At the time the Colonial Defence Committee entered upon the consideration of the defences of Singapore, the works in existence were insignificant, and had been constructed without reference to the importance of the place, as an Imperial naval station. Their armament consisted of twenty-nine smooth-bore guns of various calibres, and five smooth- bore 13-inch mortars, but a large portion of these were unserviceable.

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