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patch to reinforce our China Squadron; guns and submarine mining stores came out by quick Appendix No. 4. steamers; and money was granted for temporary defences to be at once constructed to beat off wooden cruizers, and defend the coal stores, the design and immediate execution of the works being intrusted

to the officers on the spot. Hence the present defences of Singapore.

SINGAPORE.

6. In the event of hostilities having broken out, these would, in all probability, have proved of Probable action of the service, for it was generally reported from information acquired whilst the Siberian squadron was at Russian squadron. Nagasaki-that the Russian Admiral proposed to avoid Hong Kong, and to stand for Singapore and the Straits of Malacca, previous to attacking our valuable line of traders passing to and from our Australian Colonies. Nor did it seem extraordinary that such should be his intention.

7. Singapore, both strategically and politically, is of greater importance to us than Hong Kong. Relative importance By this I do not intend to imply that Hong Kong is not a valuable station, but only that it is of of Singapore com- secondary importance to Singapore. Vessels proceeding to Shanghae, the Yangtze, and Foochow, may g

pared with Hong Kong. or may not coal at Hong Kong, and we hold it essentially as a convenient base of operations in case of complications with China, and as a point d'appui for the operations of our merchants in that country.

8. Singapore, on the other hand, holds a strategical position second to none eastward of Perim, at Strategical import- the entrance of the Red Sea. Situated at the southern extremity of a long peninsula, and sepa-

ance of Singapore. rated by a narrow strait-4,500 yards wide only-from a mass of islands which form part of the Malay Archipelago (the navigation through which by large vessels is most difficult, if not impossible, on account of the many dangers of reef and tide), Singapore forms a point by which must pass all the mercantile marine trading to China, Japan, Cambodia, Siam, the Philippines, and a great part of Netherlands India, and Queensland on the East; and India, Europe, and even America, on the west, unless, indeed, it passes through the Straits of Sunda, between Java and Sumatra-a passage further Straits of Sunda south, much more circuitous and intricate. Given, then, the presence of a blockading squadron of fast passage. corvettes in the Straits of Sunda, the Straits of Singapore is the only practicable avenue between the east and west.

9. I have no data at hand to show the immense tonnage that this passing trade amounts to, but Passing traffic. the importance of it may be gauged when I mention that serious propositions have been made to cut a ship canal, as a speculation, through the Isthmus of Kraw, at the neck of the Malay Peninsula, to save a three days' extra passage only round the bend at Singapore.

and effect of their destruction,

10. Then, when every steamer of this large passing trade takes in coal to the extent of from 100 Area of coal stores, to 300 tons, the area of the coal stores lining the northern shores of the New Harbour may be well imagined. On the other hand, instead of our own steamers, imagine the advent of an enemy's war cruizers. Unless possessing the means of self-defence before referred to, on an adequate scale, Singapore would witness the destruction of those coals, wharves, and machine shops, which to her are of primary importance, whilst, before our pursuing squadrons could be summoned, the enemy, filled up with coal, would cruize away, satisfied with the blow struck at a point 1,500 miles away from our nearest coaling stations east and frost--at Hong Kong and Ceylon respectively. They would, moreover, be assured that, in all probability, our men-of-war, as well as merchantmen, would be detained there for want of coal, leaving them in a position to attack and get more coal from the vessels they fell in with on our mercantile routes.

11. On the other hand, the defence of our coal, and careful observation of any suspicious Effect of their being craft containing coal, would find the enemy in the same plight as the destruction of our coal stores defended. would find us, so that the mere presence of armed works would entail a chance of being beaten off with such injuries as, far from a friendly port, a belligerent would not like to risk, far less to receive. In the case of Singapore, therefore, batteries, guns, and men might have not only beaten off, but even deterred a Russian attack.

12. Thus, the threatening agent which gave rise to the defence works of Singapore was a squadron What the temporary consisting of a large corvette of some 2,000 tons and 14 guns; a couple of clippers, each of 1,100 tons works were provided

against. and eight guns; and two or three smaller craft. These would have been supplemented, possibly, by vessels fitted out at San Francisco and other American Western ports.

futura.

13. What we may have to contend with in the future would be a coalition of two or more Provision for the squadrons in the China and Pacific waters, supplemented, may be, by a military expedition fitted out at some port-say, at Saigon or Vladivostock-and conveyed in transports to the scene of operation.

14. The Russians themselves have withdrawn their old vessels, and augmented their squadron to Strength of foreign

squadrons. an extent demanded only for expeditionary purposes. Their flagship-the "Minim "—is, I believe, provided with 12 inches of armour over the central battery, whilst our flagship the "Iron Duke" has an 8-inch belt only, and the French flagship-the Armide' "-6 inches of armour. The French have, in addition, two corvettes of some 1,920 tons and 10 guns, two of 1,100 tons and 6 guns, and half- a-dozen smaller craft. The Japanese have a new iron-clad, as well as two old ones of small size and thin plating, and two or three new corvettes. The Dutch have a strong turret-vessel, and the Chinese the eight "Alphabet" gun-boats, each carrying a 38-ton gun, and a few small wooden craft. The Germans usually have a frigate, two corvettes, and a gun-vessel, all unarmoured. The Americans and the Italians are also represented by one or two vessels (corvettes).

15. Assuming that our navy in the waters under review is kept in such a state of efficiency that Nature of future hostile powers cannot denude their coasts of ships and men; that they cannot land the entire attacking squadron. crews of their war-vessels for fear of capture; and that some of their ships are watched and blockaded by us, the combined squadron which Singapore may, therefore, be called upon to resist might be one composed of a couple of iron-clads and six or seven corvettes and gun-vessels, convoying a possible expedition to aid in the attack from the land side. This squadron will have eluded us, or beaten a portion of our fleet; they will be heavily armed; they will be short of coal; and they will be anxious to make a certainty of their attack, for indecisive results will be fatal to them. If our coaling stations (especially the one we are particularly considering) were only defended in such a Importance of manner as to make certain of being able to beat off such an attack, the power of our navy in eastern

defensive works.

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