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Appendix No. 4.

SINGAPORE.

Armour-piercing

guns.

Arcs of lateral training.

Reverse fire on New Harbour.

Points kept in view

230

Inclosure 6 in No. 74.

Defences of Singapore.

BEFORE considering each work seriatim (which I propose to do in the order taken up in my Report of the 17th January, 1880,* viz., from Passir Panjang to Tanjong Katong) let me remark on a few points common to the different papers under review.

2. Considering the uncertainty which, at the present moment, surrounds the question of the best type of heavy ordnance, I quite concur that it is judicious of the Committee to state the power of gun required, and not the exact nature of gun now in the service. Since writing my Report, it has been recognized that more satisfactory results can be obtained out of the same piece of ordnance by lengthening its bore and chambering it. With such modifications, results will be obtained which will give higher figures for the penetration formulæ enunciated in paragraph 64 of my Report, and will make the 9-inch gun a more formidable weapon than has been hitherto assumed. The breech-loading system has, at length, pushed its way to the front, and by thus being able to reduce the calibre and lengthen the projectile, it is thought that small-bore advantages will be gained, and that, for a given weight of metal, higher penetration results will be obtained.

"" of

3. I am of opinion that the Committee should add after the words "Armour-piercing gun or about 12 tons in weight." I consider that, looking to the question of garrison, and the small pro- portion of trained artillerymen which will be available to fight the guns, together with the nature of the squadron against which we have assumed we have to provide, that it would be injudicious to recommend ordnance of heavier weight than 12 tons. Such a gun, with the improved modifications, would in all probability (see paragraph 64 referred to) pierce the 8 inches of armour at 3,000 yards recommended in these papers, whilst the present 9-inch will not do more than pierce 6 inches, but even if it does not quite do so, I would not attach too much importance to this condition.

4. I have based my Report on the penetration of 6 inches at 3,000 yards, and I am still of opinion that, taking into consideration the facts enunciated in paragraph 15 of my Report, and in paragraph 12 of the Governor's Memorandum, this power is sufficient. At the first meeting of the Committee, a medium iron-clad, referred to in paragraph 3 of the Governor's Memorandum, was defined by Commander Jolinstone, R.N., to be one carrying 6 inches of armour; heavier vessels would be of the dangerous class watched and blockaded by our own ships of war; any iron-clad would, in the absence of refitting stations, be especially anxious not to incur injuries from shore batteries; whilst it must be remembered also that the tendency of modern opinion is to give the victory to guns over armour, so that for purposes for which squadrons-English and foreign-are kept in ultra-European waters, we are much more likely in the future to be opposed by powerful unarmoured cruizers than by even medium iron-clads.

5. I may here remark that, from an excellent Return published in one of the last numbers of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, the "Minim" does not carry 12 inches of armour- as stated in paragraph 14 of my Report-but 8 inches and 6 inches only. The "Prince Poyarski has 44-inch and 34-inch armour, whilst the type which the French keep in these waters, viz., the

Armide" and "Atalante,” have 6-inch and 4-inch plates.

"

6. Another point which I notice in these papers is the large variety of arcs of training recom- mended. Thus, besides the angles of 70 and 180 degrees which are suited for "A and "D pivots respectively, I find no less than nine other ares mentioned, viz., 90, 105, 117, 143, 165, 168, 194, 270, and 272 degrees. I assume that the officers who have been considering these lateral ranges are not prepared to recommend that special racers should be provided for each of these arcs, but that they propose, in Committee, to classify them to suit the different types of service racers, or at most to recommend that, in addition to such types, one or more sets may be provided by the Carriage Depart- ment of special lengths to meet special conditions. I notice that for several of the larger arcs mention is made of providing "D" pivots, but a "D" pivot (or rather racer) is one which only gives a lateral training of 180 degrees.

7. In two or three instances-notably in No. 1 gun at Fort Siloso-extraordinary arcs of training, necessitating special circular emplacements, are proposed, in order to allow the guns to bring a reverse fire to bear on the New Harbour. From my previous Memorandum, relative to Commander Johnstone's proposal for floating defences, it will be seen that I attach little importance to this consideration. Our batteries, guns, and submarine mines are intended to keep the enemy outside the harbour, and, if we fail in doing so, the fortune of the day will not be turned by the fact that an armament, small in com- parison to what he has already practically beaten, is still bearing on him when he is inside. Such a time, however, is the opportunity for the local launches, fitted with spar torpedoes, or even for self- motive torpedoes discharged from stations on shore, and, to distract the enemy's attention, there is no reason why two or three guns should not bring a reverse fire to bear, provided the existing works enable this to be done without much alteration, but the consideration is not of sufficient importance to warrant a heavy expenditure in alterations and modifications-an expenditure which would be much more usefully employed in increasing the efficiency seaward.

8. I might here state to the Committee three points which weighed with me when framing my when framing General General Report, and which led me to recommendations differing somewhat from those expressed in the papers now before me, and in which evidently the same points have not been so earnestly kept in view :-

Report.

(a.) That whatever might have been the nature of recommendations, were Singapore totally un- defended, due regard must now be paid to existing conditions, carried out in times of emergency under certain restrictions of time, money, and nature of ordnance.

(b.) That the armament already provided by the Imperial Government should be distributed in the

* Inclosure 15 in No. 74.

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