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Appendix No. 4.

CEYLON.

Trincomalee

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166

to Colombo, which can be approached from the north or from the south by parties landing on the

coast.

*

11. In the event of war breaking out, it would of course be necessary to remove from Galle to Colombo whatever stock of coal might be at the former place at the time, and to prohibit the storing of coal at any undefended port in the island.

Trincomalee.

12. The importance of Trincomalee arises solely from the fact of its possessing a safe and commo- dious harbour; it is out of the line of trade, and has never attracted shipping, even at the time when it was the only harbour in Ceylon. It is of no practical value to the Colony, as the neighbourhood for 60 miles in every direction is almost uninhabited and uncultivated. Supplies are not obtainable locally, but might be brought by road from Kandy or Colombo.

13. On the other hand, it is capable of defence, and, if left altogether undefended, would afford a convenient spot to which an enemy's ship might resort for slight repairs. Supplies are not easily obtainable, and coals should not be found there unless there are means of defending them.

14. For the defence of Trincomalee, according to the more complete plans referred to by Colonel Nugent, a garrison would be required consisting of 2 batteries of artillery, a strong battalion of infantry, 50 men Royal Engineers, and 35 mounted men, or a larger force than is at present available for the whole of Ceylon.

15. Three courses appear to us to be open for adoption with reference to Trincomalee :----

(a.) If Trincomalee is considered of sufficient importance to warrant its adoption as an Imperial fortress, and as a place for refitting and repairing ships of Her Majesty's Navy, then deliberately to select it as the central naval station for coals and stores, and for the repairing and refitting of Her Majesty's ships in the Indian Ocean.

16. This should not be thought of unless Her Majesty's Government are prepared to spend 500,000l. at least, not merely in defending Trincomalee, but also in the construction of a dock and the supplying machinery for the repair of ships and their engines. Further, to station an additional regiment and battery of artillery in the island. The terms of our Commission preclude our proposing such a policy, and we should hesitate under any circumstances to do so, having regard to the remoteness of the spot and the small practical use which would be derived, except by Her Majesty's Navy, from the dock and machinery in comparison with other neighbouring ports, such as Bombay or Colombo.

(b.) To abandon Trincomalee altogether.

17. This course possesses one advantage-that it would entail the removal of all coal, and naval and military stores, such as would attract an enemy's cruizer, but it would leave the place open as a resort to such cruizers for the purpose of small repairs.

(c) To construct a small but strongly defensive work on Fort Ostenberg, such as would, with the aid of torpedoes, render the entrance of the harbour difficult to an enemy's cruizer, and render it impossible for that cruizer to remain there.

18. The extent of the defences should be limited within the capabilities of a force consisting of 1 battery of artillery, 50 men trained for torpedo purposes, and 2 companies of infantry to man the works, this being the largest force which would, in our opinion, be available for Trincomalee. For the same reason, we would withdraw the armament from Fort Frederick as a position of defence, for the obvious reason that, while this fort is of little value for the purpose now had in view, no troops will be available for holding it.

19. If this last proposition should be adopted-and we are, upon the whole, inclined to submit it for consideration-it should be clearly borne in mind, and made an inflexible rule, that no unnecessarily large stock of coal and naval stores should be allowed to accumulate at Trincomalee, so as to offer temptation to an enemy to attack the place in stronger force than the limited work we have recommended could resist.

Colombo Defensive Works.

20. The defensive works required at Colombo, in addition to those already exisiting, will be the construction of a battery carrying three 10-inch 18-ton guns and two 64-pounders at Mutwall Point. The Commissioners have inspected the two sites suggested for the works at this locality, and are in favour of the one at Chine Lodge, as being 1,200 feet nearer to the sea, and as being more convenient in other respects.

The Rock House site is very confined, and would be difficult of adaptation for the necessary works. It would also be much more expensive.

21. Barrack accommodation should be provided for 1 officer and 50 men, and in designing the barracks care should be taken that they should not present a landmark for directing an enemy's fire on the battery.

22. The addition of one, or perhaps two, 10-inch guns to the north side of the Battenberg bastion, to fire along the breakwater, and the replacing the three 7-inch guns now in that battery with 9-inch guns, as suggested by Colonel Nugent.

23. These works would deny the harbour of Colombo to the enemy, but would leave it exposed to bombardment by a cruizer from a distance at which the effectiveness of the shore batteries would be at a disadvantage.

24. In our view Colombo should be looked upon as the coal depôt of Ceylon in time of war both for naval and commercial purposes, and as the port where efficient machinery could be relied upon for repairs to engines and the like. We are of opinion, therefore, that the harbour should be as strongly

* In case, however, it is decided to retain Galle as a fortified place, the necessary details for its defence will be found in the Memoranda of Colonel Warren, R. E., appended.

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