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Otago harbour is a narrow estuary about twelve miles long, nearly parallel to the coast, from which it is separated at its upper end by a neck of land less than a mile in width.

Dunedin (population, 18,499) is situated at the upper end of this estuary, and Port Chalmers about half-way between it and the sea.

The entrance near Harrington Point is only 400 yards wide, and the channel from the Narrows upwards is intricate. If the buoys were removed, the navigation would be difficult without a pilot. However, considering the wealth of the town, and the extent of its trade, including the production of gold, the Committee are of opinion that the harbour should not be left undefended, and therefore recommend the construction of a battery for three 7-ton and three 64-pounder rifled guns, near Haddington Point, to bear upon ships attempting the passage of the Narrows.

As the City of Duredin is only two miles distant from the sea, although a long way up the estuary, and is possessed of considerable wealth, a local force should be organized for its defence adequate to resist any that may be landed from a small hostile squadron on "Ocean Beach," or any other landing-place within a moderate distance for an attack upon the town, and it would be decidedly of advantage if a field battery of artillery formed part of this force. In fact an organization of this sort would appear to be advisable at all the towns in New Zealand referred to in this Report; because in the absence of some such organization, they might be exposed to predatory attacks for the purpose of levying contributions, and thereby subject the inhabitants to great annoyance and seriously cripple their resources.

The fact of such a force being organized would probably be in itself a sccurity against any attempt of the nature contemplated being made.

The Committee are aware that a large volunteer force numbering several thousand men of all arms, as well as a militia force, and a strong body of constabulary, have been organized in New Zealand under the Defence Department; and that the military forces of the Colony have done good service in the field, reflecting great credit on both the officers and men engaged, but they have not sufficient information to know to what extent these forces would be available for the defence of the principal ports to which they have referred in this Report. They merely point out the necessity for organizing a local force, which, in the event of war, should be at all times available in the immediate neighbourhood of each of the more important towns and centres of trade near the sea coast.

While dealing with the question of the temporary defence of New Zealand, the Com- mittee have become aware of a prevailing impression that if a confidential agent of the Home Government were sent to the Colony to discuss with the local Government the measures which should be undertaken for its defence, the Colonial Government would be found prepared to assist to a very great extent in carrying into effect the measures which may be considered advisable. This proceeding might be attended with great advantage if the question under consideration were an organization for the permanent defence of the Colony, and there were ample time for discussion; but the Committee having been desired to limit their Report to the measures necessary for extemporizing defences under the emergency of an immediate war, have considered that they could not recommend the adoption of this proposal, which for the present would only lead to delay.

It has also been suggested to them that if a ship-of-war were permanently stationed at New Zealand, a material guarantee for the defence of the Colony would be afforded by the power which would be given of summoning the ship by telegraph to the rescue of any threatened point. The Committee cannot too emphatically state their opinion that any such security would be altogether illusory. When the distances which separate these important settlements are considered, it will be seen at once that naval defence by a single ship, of whatever power, or even by a small squadron, cannot be relied upon. For instance, supposing an attack upon Auckland, the ship or squadron being at Lyttelton; the passage from one to the other under the most favourable conditions would occupy from two to three days, during which time the mischief might have been done.

If the squadron had happened to be at sea instead of in port, an extra day, or even more, might have elapsed. Or, again, a feint by a single ship on one port might be made to draw the squadron away from the real point of attack. In fact, nothing would be more fatal and deceptive than to trust exclusively to Her Majesty's ships for the defence of individual ports scattered over a length of coast from north to south of 1,100 miles. The idea reveals a total misapprehension of the amount and nature of protection to be derived by New Zealand and all other distant Colonies from their connection with Great Britain, and especially from her supremacy as a maritime Power.

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