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3. In considering the scale and nature of oversea attack that the temporary possession of the local command of the Pacific would enable an Eastern Power to bring to bear on Australia, it is necessary to draw a clear distinction between large operations, the success of which will depend on the power of the foreign fleet to keep open oversea communications with its bases for an indefinite period and hasty raids dependent for success rather on surprise and rapidity of execution than upon the number of troops employed.

For the success of raiding operations the maintenance of open oversea communication is not an essential condition. During the period that the local command of the Pacific rested with au Eastern Power, the dispatch of a raiding force across the sea against British possessions in that region would be a practical operation of war for that Power.

The probability of such raids being undertaken will vary inversely as the strength and efficiency of the local naval and military forces maintained in Australia. Upon an estimate of such strength and efficiency will an enemy determine whether the probable result of an attempt by s raiding force to effect serious damage before being destroyed or compelled to surrender would be commensurate with the risks incurred in the enterprise.

5. In estimating the strength of the land forces necessary to meet a raiding attack such as above mentioned, three principal factors must be considered :-

(i.) The ocean distances which lie between Australia and the territory of any possible enemies. (ii) The armed strength and power of transportation oversea of any conceivably hostile nation. (iii.) The vast extent of the Australian continent, its existing railway communications, and its

territories not connected by such communications.

Further, it must be borne in mind, as suggested in Oversea Defence Committee's Memorandum No. 429 M of the 24th February, 1911, that, “should the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be determined, changes in the strategic situation would ensue which might have far reaching effects upon the position of Australia and necessitate a reconsideration of the scale of probable attack.”

6. Consideration of these factors induces the belief that the land forces required must not be less than 100,000 men. Of this number a proportion varying according to individual requirements is needed to secure the naval bases and auxiliary harbours from attack, and to maintain public confidence and national credit. The remainder must be left free to form a field army capable of acting as a mobile expeditionary force. In view of the fact that railway communication "does not at present exist with Western Australia and the Northern Territory, such an expeditionary force must be organized and equipped so as to enable it to be dispatched oversea with the least possible delay.

7. A defensive attitude of a purely passive nature is, however, as is well known, the most ineffectual method of employing an army as an instrument of policy. As far as the organization and administration of the Australian forces are concerned this has been realized, and the whole of the Australian military forces are in consequence being uniformly enrolled, organized, and equipped in order that any sub-division thereof may be able to assume the offensive.

& But the time has now arrived when provision must be made for giving wider effect to the policy of active offence. Two new factors have arisen which affect the basis upon which plans of operation for the mobile forces of Australia must be prepared :-

(i.) At the Imperial Conference of 1909 the representatives of the self-governing Dominions signified their general concurrence in the proposition: "That each part of the Empire is willing to make its preparations on such lines as will enable it, should it so desire, to take its share in the general defence of the Empire."

(ii.) The establishment of the Royal Australian Navy under the Naval Agreement of June 1911 imbued with the same spirit of active offence as the Royal Navy, marks an increase in the responsibilities of Australia.

As regards (ii) the present limits of the Australian naval station do not include any foreign territory, yet they approach so closely the French possessions of New Caledonia and the German and Dutch possessions in the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea, the Java and Flores Seas, that war preparations must include plans for the occupation, if necessary, of probable hostile bases in these localities.

9. For the fulfilment of these obligations, as well as to provide efficiently for the needs of home defence, it is incumbent, therefore, that plans of operations should contemplate the employment, overseas, of such portion of the Australian forces as may from time to time be deemed necessary, and is voluntarily agreeable so to serve.

10.-(i.) The question of the scale of probable attack by warships on Australian ports has been decided by the Oversea Defence Committee in their Memorandum No. 438 M, dated the 26th May, 1911, where it is laid down that, as a naval base, the value of Sydney as a strategic objective will be considerably enhanced, and that in determining the standard of defences there the contingency of attack by armoured cruisers must now be taken into consideration.

(ii) The only form of naval attack that need be provided against at other Australian ports is, however, raiding attack by unarmoured cruisers.

(iii) The distances of porta in Australia from foreign ports which a hostile squadron might possibly use as a base are given in the following table:—

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PRINTED AT TER FOREIGN OFFICE BY G. R. HARRISON.—4/4/1913.