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necessary, by those of the Government, would soon effect the clearance of any obstruction, and the utmost risk that would be run was that a new, or newly repaired, battleship might be delayed in her departure until the channel was again navigable. The recommendations of the Committee were approved by the Admiralty and War Office.

8. It will be seen, therefore, that the adoption of the Admiralty proposal to establish an Examination Service at Barrow would involve the reversal of a recommenda- tion of the Home Ports Defence Committee, approved only three years ago.

9. The reasons brought forward by the representatives of the Admiralty in favour of a reversal of the previous recommendation of the Committee may be summed up as follows:-

(a.) Fresh information has been obtained which shows that the Home Ports Defence Committee were wrongly advised in 1909, and overestimated the rapidity with which an obstruction could be cleared. (b.) The importance of Messrs. Vickers, Sons, and Maxim's works to the Navy is

now far greater than would appear from H.P.D.C. Memorandum No. 7-M.

10. With regard to (a), copies of a Memorandum by the representatives of the Admiralty on the Home Ports Defence Committee, and of a letter from Mr. Albert Vickers are attached in Appendices IV and V respectively. From the latter it will be seen that, the salvage resources of Barrow are limited to three divers, some powerful tugs, dredgers, barges, and punts, and a floating crane with air-compressing plant on it.

11. The representatives of the Admiralty have informed the Committee that these resources would be totally inadequate to clear the channel rapidly in the event of one or more large vessels being sunk in the entrance channel. Precautions would probably be taken by the enemy to ensure that the bottoms were practically blown out of the blockers, so as to avoid any possibility of their being patched and floated away. The only possible method of removing the obstruction would be by removing it in pieces, and, in the case of a cargo of cement into which water had penetrated, this would be a tedious and lengthy process. The representatives of the Admiralty have recorded their opinion (Appendix IV) that it is improbable that Government aid could be relied upon at short notice, as assumed by the Home Ports Defence Committee in paragraph 4 of H.P.D.C. Memorandum No. 7-M. They also think it would be unwise to rely upon private salvage companies, such as the Liverpool Salvage Association, since in time of war there is likely to be a large demand for salvage steamers elsewhere. Some information on the subject of the practical difficulties encountered at Glasgow in removing the steamship "St. Bees," sunk in the Clyde in September, 1912, as well an some notes on Barrow, obtained by the Chairman in the course of a personal visit to Glasgow and Barrow, are attached in Appendix VI.

12. With regard to (b), the naval representatives on the Home Ports Defence Committee traverse the statement in paragraph 4 of H.P.D.C. Memorandum No. 7-M that "the utmost risk in case of the channel being blocked is that the departure of a battleship, the building or repair of which had just been completed, might be delayed pending the removal of the obstruction." This statement, which was made on the authority of the naval members of the Committee in 1909, was based on the supposition that the obstruction could be very rapidly removed. Ships can, as a rule, only be completed and passed out of the works at comparatively long intervals, even in time of war or emergency, when the establishment would be working under high pressure, and it was assumed to be very unlikely that the obstruction would occur simultaneously with the completion of more than one important vessel.

13. If, however, the obstruction is likely to remain in place for a matter of months, as the Committee are now advised, the results might be extremely serious. At the present time there are building at Barrow to the order of the Admiralty 1 battleship, 2 light-armoured cruisers, 10 submarine boats and 1 fleet auxiliary, in addition to 2 battleships, 4 river gunboats, and 2 submarines for foreign Governments and the naval service of Dominion Governments, all of which might in an emergency be requisitioned by the Admiralty. If the obstruction was judiciously placed and under existing cir- cumstances it would be done deliberately, without any possibility of interference, and

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