CAB38-23 — Page 115

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whatever. There were no flights of aeroplanes and no anti-aircraft guns. The War Office had parked some howitzers at Chattenden. This was admittedly only a make- shift arrangement, and he thought it highly probable that an airship would have come and gone before the howitzers got into action. A regular scheme of defence was necessary providing for all lights being extinguished, and for rifle fire, which would drive the airship upwards and make the accurate dropping of bombs more difficult. The study of this question was most urgent. In this country we were still only in the earlier stages of experiment. No firm in the country had yet built an airship--Messrs. Vickers were going to try to-and we had none except the small experimental military ones. We were getting one from France, and the contract for Parseval” had been signed, but whether the German Government would ever allow it to leave the country was another matter. The Germans had twenty-four airships, most of which were capable of reaching this country.

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LORD ESHER asked what the advantage in small airships was.

COLONEL SEELY said that it lay in the ground handling. This was one of the principal difficulties in dealing with airships, and one which had cost the Germans at least six.

THE PRIME MINISTER enquired whether it was not very dangerous for airships to attempt to land except where special arrangements were made for them.

COLONEL SEELY said that the Germans now had a great number of sheds, and, though it was rather risky, it was possible to moor in the open.

LORD ESHER pointed out that for offence the largest type of airship was required.

MR. CHURCHILL said that whatever the best antidote to attack by aircraft might prove to be, he was quite certain that it would not be by passive defence.

The cost of providing overhead cover would be appalling, and the protection afforded could not be made satisfactory. It was not practicable to bury a dockyard power house, for instance, yet a bomb successfully dropped on that would bring the whole work of the yard to a standstill. The number of points requiring protection was great, and they often covered large areas, for instance, oil tanks, cordite hills. The Admiralty and all the Government buildings were now exposed to au attack, which, if successful, might have very grave consequences. These craft must be kept away altogether and that would only be done by attacking them.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that these considerations were also germane to the next item on the agenda. As to the report before them he understood that during the five or six months which had elapsed since it had first been presented the course of events had made it obsolete in some details. Most of the action proposed had been sanctioned provisionally already. Subject to these considerations he thought that the roport might now be approved.

(Conclusion.)

The recommendations contained in the Report of the Technical Sub-Committee on Aerial Navigation (airships) [C.I.D. paper, 159–B] are approved.

III-CONTROL OF AIRCRAFT.

Report of the Standing Sub-Committee (C.I.D. paper 166-B).

(Discussion adjourned from the 121st meeting.)

COLONEL SEELY said that the Committee would recollect that the Report proposed orginally to constitute flying over an area in which flying was prohibited an offence against the Official Secrets Act, and therefore a felony. This, it was thought, would be sufficient to justify the use of military force to prevent its commnission. The Committee at its 121st Meeting had expressed doubt as to the correctness of this view of the law, and had expressed the opinion that, in any case, it would be much better to take the power to use military force against an aircraft disregarding the prohibition, in specific terms. The Sub-Committee had reassembled, and had redrafted

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