CAB38-17 — Page 77

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they should have more definite information as to the exact responsibilities that would devolve upon the Army and Navy respectively, and a more precise knowledge of the rôles to be assigned to the two services at the various stages of the joint operation.

This question was accordingly considered by the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, whose conclusions, which were approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence at their 107th meeting of the 14th July, 1910, were as follows:

(1.) No responsibility for the defence of the Suez Canal or for the preservation of its neutrality should be accepted by the Admiralty for the following reasons:—

(a.) Naval action could only be taken in conjunction with other Powers signatory to the Suez Canal Convention, and the intervention of other Powers might be highly inconvenient.

(b.) The need for action might arise at a time when no ships were within several days'

steaming of the Canal, or could be spared for the purpose.

(c.) It is essential that complete freedom of action and the maximum of mobility for every

ship should be preserved to the Fleet.

(d.) The effectiveness of naval action is by no means assured.

(2.) In an emergency the Navy should render such assistance as the exigencies of the moment permit, but ships should on no account take action in the Canal except in the case of great urgency.

(3.) The Army should be responsible for making the best arrangements possible for the defence of the eastern frontier of Egypt. In making such arrangements no reliance should be placed on any naval co-operation whatsoever.

7. Although the Defence Scheme under consideration was prepared before this report was drawn up, the General Officer Commanding the Force in Egypt anticipated the conclusion of the Committee as regards naval action in the Canal, and based his arrangements on the assumption that warships would not be used actually in the Canal, except in case of extreme emergency.

II.—Disposition of Troops in Defence Scheme under consideration.

8. The Defence Scheme under consideration is concerned only with the measures required to deal with attack of the nature of hasty raids which could be undertaken without such previous preparations as would ensure our having warning of the intention of the enemy.

An invasion of Egypt from the east in any considerable force could not be undertaken without railway construction or other preparations, which would take a considerable_time to complete. The military measures for dealing with such an invasion of Egypt will be separately dealt with.

9. The Defence Scheme provides for the holding of the line of the Suez Canal, For the defence of the Canal the only troops immediately available are those forming the mobile column at Cairo under the Cairo Defence Scheme (about 900 rifles with 2 mountain guns), consisting of :-

1 squadron of cavalry;

1 section of a mountain battery;

2 sections of a field company, R.E.;

1 battalion of infantry; and

1 camel corps (50 came's).

10. The arrangements under the Defence Scheme contemplate the disposition of these troops as follows:-

At El Kantara

At Chalouf

At Ismailia

-

{

{

1 troop of cavalry.

25 mon, camel corps.

1 company of infantry.

1 troop of cavalry.

1 company of infantry.

2 troops of cavalry.

25 men, camel corps.

2 mountain guns.

6 companies of infantry.

2 sections of field company, R.E.

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