CAB38-17 — Page 45

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53. In recording the above opinions the Colonial Defence Committee desire to point out that they have strictly confined themselves to the consideration of the question actually referred to them, vis.: to concert measures to ensure that the local naval and military defences at Hong Kong are on a sufficient scale to enable the fortress lo hold out for a period of one month.

They venture, however, to submit the following observations on the broader aspects of the question of the defence of Hong Kong for the consideration of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

54. In section VIII of this Memorandum the Colonial Defence Committee have expressed the opinion that to enable the defences of Hong Kong successfully to oppose attack by an expeditionary force of such strength as Japan might, in certain eventualities, be able to bring against the fortress, an addition to the garrison of 14,000 to 16,000 men with a due proportion of artillery would be required.

They are, however, aware that, apart from the considerations of cost and the administrative difficulties which place serious obstacles in the way of making any such addition to the garrison of Hong Kong in time of peace, there are grave strategic objections to diminishing our power of offensive action by locking up a large force in a remote naval fortress such as Hong Kong.

The Colonial Defence Committee are therefore unwilling to recommend that any such garrison should be permanently maintained in Hong Kong.

55. On the other hand, to defer the dispatch of military reinforcements to Hong Kong until hostilities appear to be imminent is not practicable. For not only would the Admiralty be unable in such circumstances to undertake responsibility for the safe convoy of military garrisons to foreign stations, but there is also the important consideration that to send out reinforcements in anticipation of war at a time when delicate negotiations are in progress would prejudice the chances of a settlement, and might even precipitate hostilities.

56. The Colonial Defence Committee therefore submit that if it is decided that the permanent maintenance of a large garrison in Hong Kong is not practicable, the only alternative means by which the fortress can be rendered secure from such forms of land attack as Japan might bring to bear, is by the reassertion of our naval supremacy in the China Seas should the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be terminated.

In this connection the Colonial Defence Committee venture to point out that, at their 102nd meeting, the Committee of Imperial Defence expressed the opinion that care should be taken sufficiently to reinforce the fleet in the Far East before the termination of the Alliance, in order to neutralise the danger from a preponderant Japanese fleet in China Seas,"

If effect is given to this conclusion, it is submitted that there will be no need for the local naval and military defences of Hong Kong to be maintained on sufficient scale to enable the fortress to hold out for a period of one month against attack by a strong expeditionary force, and that therefore no large increase of the garrison will be required.

57. The Colonial Defence Committee would, however, point out that they have on previous occasions expressed the opinion that the present infantry garrison of Hong Kong is the bare minimum required to defend the land fronts-19 miles long- against raiding attack by a landing force with a maximum strength of 4,000 men, which is now regarded as reasonably probable. They therefore recommend that advantage should be taken of any opportunity that may be offered by the reduction of the infantry at stations abroad to strengthen the garrison of Hong Kong by the addition of one battalion of British infantry.

58. The conditions affecting the proposed additions to the fixed defences are somewhat different. The fixed defences are designed to deal with certain forms of naval attack described in paragraphs 17 and 23 of this Memorandum. As such forms of naval attack might be executed in a few hours, they may be regarded as possible contingencies even at a time when the command of the China Seas rested with the British Fleet. The defences required to meet them should therefore be provided even if the supremacy of the British Fleet in China Seas is maintained.

From the conclusion (a) of the Committee of Imperial Defence that “so long as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance remains in force the British possessions in the Far

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