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capabilities of each to undertake naval or military operations on the Pacific Coast of Canada :-

(a.) France.-The French fortified port nearest to Prince Rupert is Saigon, about

6,200 miles distant.

now

The peace strength of the garrison of French Indo-China is 25,000 men, of whom 11,690 are Europeans. In the event of war 16,000 to 18,000 native reservists and 8,000 gardes indigènes would be available, besides about 7,000 Europeans who have undergone military training. The native troops are indifferent and the military position is still considered somewhat precarious, although the internal conditions of the country are improving.

(b.) Germany.—The German fortified port nearest to Prince Rupert is Kiao-chau

(" T'sing-tāu "), 4,722 miles distant.

The establishment of the garrison of Kiao-chau is 2,240 men. There are also about 400 reservists, who can be called out when required. (c.) Russia.-The Russian fortified port nearest to Prince Rupert is Vladivostock,

3,971 miles distant.

The Russian Siberian troops were reorganised in 1910. They now consist of the Ist, IVth, and Vth Siberian Army Corps in the Pri-Amur Military District, with headquarters at Khabarovsk on the Amur, the IInd and IIIrd Siberian Army Corps in the Irkutsk Military District, and the 11th Siberian Rifle Division in the Omsk Military District.

(d.) United States.-The Americon naval base nearest to Prince Rupert is Seattle,

572 miles distant.

(e.) Japan. The nearest base in Japan is Nagasaki, 4,340 miles distant from

Prince Rupert.

Japan has a standing army of nineteen divisions complete and fit for service in every detail. A division at war strength is about 20,000 men. With the addition of certain reserve brigades and of her national army, Japan could probably place over a million men in the field.

6. Having regard to the comparative weakness of their naval and military forces in those regions and to the remoteness of their bases from Canadian territory, it is to the last degree improbable that either France or Germany could undertake naval or military operations of a serious character on the Pacific Coast of Canada; while Russin, in spite of her great military resources in Eastern Asia, owing to her naval weakness, appears for the present to be precluded from undertaking serious operations oversea. Any attack on Prince Rupert undertaken by these Powers is therefore likely to be limited to raiding attack by one or two unarmoured cruisers.

7. In view of the remoteness of the contingency of a war with the United States, the scale of attack that could be brought to bear by that Power has not been taken into consideration.

8. As regards Japan, the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has, for the present, relieved us from the necessity of considering the scale of attack that Japan could bring to bear on British possessions in the Pacific. For, so long as the Japanese Alliance remains operative, not only is the risk of attack by Japan excluded from the category of reasonable probabilities to be provided against, but British naval requirements are held to be adequately met if the combined British and Japanese forces in the Pacific are superior to the forces of any probable combination of two naval Powers.

9. Having regard to these considerations, the Admiralty are of opinion that, under existing conditions, it is not reasonably probable that any attack on Prince Rupert more formidable than a raid by one or two unarmoured cruisers will be

undertaken.

10. The above opinion on the scale of probable attack on Prince Rupert is based upon a consideration of the strategic conditions created by the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Should the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be determined, changes in the strategic situation in the Pacific would ensue which might affect the position of Prince Rupert. It is probable, however, that considerations of the risk she would incur of embroiling herself with the United States would deter Japan from undertaking military operations on the American Continent.

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