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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY.

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THE Chief of the Imperial General Staff has forwarded for consideration by the Committee of Imperial Defence, in connection with the Imperial Conference, Memorandum on the strategic relations existing between the United Kingdom and the Oversea Dominions and India." The statement the Memorandum by the Colonial Defeuce Committee, referred to on p. 3, recorded the decision of the Government of the day (public statement of the Duke of Devonshire on the 3rd December 1896, C.I.D Paper 19-C., of the Committee of Imperial Defence, of the Admiralty, and of the War Oliice (C.I.D. Paper T-A., paragraph 17). This statement has been modified to suit changed circumstances by C.I.D. Paper 62-C, which was approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence at its 107th Meeting on the 14th July, 1910. Paragraphs 17, 18, and 24 of this Paper are as follows:-

"17. Until a comparatively few years ago the main bases of practically all the first class naval Powers were situated in European waters, and the greater part of their forces was then concentrated in these waters. So long as this condition prevailed, the Admiralty were able to arrange the disposition of our naval forces in time of peace, so as to be able immediately to deal with the main fleets of any of the several possible combinations that might be arrayed against us.

"18. Of recent years, however, owing to the rise of the American and Japanese fleets based upon the Western Atlantic and Pacific, and to the entry of Germany into the ranks of first class naval Powers, the naval situation has undergone considerable change.

"The superiority of the British fleet over the fleets of the two strongest foreign naval Powers is, in the opinion of the Admiralty, still maintained. But, owing to the increase in the number of first class naval Powers, the strength of our naval forces, as compared with that of the naval forces of all the Powers in the world, has diminished; and it is possible that immediately on the outbreak of war the British fleet might not be supreme in all quarters of the world where the enemy's ships may be found.

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For example, in view of the great strength of the foreign squadrons now normally stationed within striking distance of the shores of the United Kingdom, a peace distribution of our fleets designed to meet a hostile combination of European naval Powers would not place our naval forces in a position immediately to assert their superiority over a hostile combination which included a Power based upon the Pacific or Western Atlantic. It is thus possible that, in the early stages of a war with a com- bination of naval Powers whose bases are far apart, the command of seas remote from our centres of naval strength might rest with the enemy.

"24. No general rule can be laid down for universal application regarding the period during which the local defences of British ports abroad may be called upon to sustain attack without naval support, or as to the nature and scale of the oversea attack to be provided against. The duration of the period will vary in the case of each place according to its proximity to the centres of naval power of the enemy and to the disposition of our fleets on the outbreak of war. Similarly, in endeavouring to assign a limit to the scale of probable oversea attack, it will be necessary to consider the case of each place separately, due regard being had to the value of the objective, to hydro- graphical and topographical conditions, and to considerations of distance, time, and relative naval and military strengths."

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