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But to raise this large force, which cannot certainly be a highly organized and disciplined one, will entail large extra expenditure.

The force, it is true, will probably effect the desired object, and hold the province safely; but the question is, will it be felt that this force affords sufficient security to justify a great reduction of the Army of Occupation in Egypt; is not some backing of a disciplined and reliable force wanting?

Admitted that Mussulmans can best treat with the natives of the Soudan, I cannot allow that any leaders of troops here afford the same guarantee from a military point of view as the English officers who have brought the Egyptian army to a pitch of spirit, discipline, and general efficiency previously undreamt of. There can be no doubt that a battalion of the present Egyptian army must be more valuable, as an element of security for Dongola, than twice its numbers of the Vakeel's levies; it can be relied upon to obey orders.

Under this belief, I consider it essential that a garrison of Egyptian regular troops be established at the head of the cataracts, at some suitable entrenched position near Abou Fatmeh, or Ilanneck, and provided with at least four steamers.

With this backing behind him, the force of the Vakeel need not be more than the gendarmerie necessary to maintain order and look after the southern frontier of the province—say, about 2,000 men.

The English-commanded Egyptian post near Fatmeh-at the door so to speak of the Soudan--will not be mixed up in any frontier questions at the south of Dongola Province, nor be brought into direct contact with the tribes.

If the view universally held in Egypt, that the removal of the direct contact with the rebellion to a point south of Dongola will free the districts north of that province from fear of inroad be correct, then it is clear that the present Egyptian army should be sufficient for the garrisoning of such posts as it may be thought advisable to occupy from the first to the third cataracts-from Assouan to Abou Fatmeh-say, two-thirds of the present Egyptian army would thus be devoted to this frontier-guard, six regiments, roughly speaking.

The English might then retire entirely from Upper Egypt, and reduce their garrison considerably in Lower Egypt, occupying, therefore, much the same position as holding the door of Egypt, as a backing to the native garrison, as the Egyptian garrison of regular troops at Fatmeh towards the Dongola levies.

The revenues of Dongola, which has always been a province which gave a good surplus over its administrative expenses, should soon be equal to defraying not only the costs of the local force, but of the Egyptian garrison near Fatmel.

The main practical difficulty in the reoccupation of the head of the cataracts is the length of the land-line of communication from Halfa to Fatmeh. The railway extension from Akasheh to Fatmeh is manifestly out of the power of the Egyptian Government at present; but this difficulty is far less serious a matter to Egyptians than to British troops.

The fate of Hicks' large and ill-organized army, sent madly en l'air into the heart of Kordofan, and the rout of Baker's undisciplined mob at Teb, has made English military opinion extremely nervous respecting using Egyptian troops even as organized by Englishmen.

This has been unfortunate, as entailing extra expenditure of English life and money, and consequent increased impatience of English public opinion of everything connected with Egypt.

*As England cannot, therefore, be expected ad infinitum to garrison Wady Halfa and hold its railway, I consider it the most prudent course to trust the Egyptian army with the whole frontier-guard, and the keeping open of communications between Upper Egypt and Dongola-the province itself administered, as proposed by Lieutenant Wortley, by the Vakeel or some other energetic and loyal official, but with a con- siderably smaller local force than that suggested.

I say more prudent, for it would be the height of political imprudence to abandon the railway, while, on the other hand, there are certain objections to the continued retention of British troops in Upper Egypt, for in the same way as it may not be desirable to have English-led troops in direct contact with the fanatical Soudanese, so is it not desirable to let the frontier of Egypt be too palpably guarded by British troops.

A European force in the background is now, I fear, essential in Egypt-though that force may be only a small one-to preserve the lives and property of Europeans, and that civilization which, however alien, has taken root here since the days of Mahomet Ali,

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