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possible, whereby an independent Government could be formed in that province, of which the Egyptian Government would act merely as a Suzerain.

General Stephenson considers that this might be done in the manner proposed by Djawdat Bey, and does not consider that any responsibility would attach to either the British or Egyptian Governments after Djuwdat had been once equipped and

started.

General Grenfell, however, does not consider that such an undertaking could be sanctioned and assisted by the English and Egyptian Governments without incurring a responsibility in case of a reverse or need of assistance. He is strongly in favour of the proposal, but considers that it would be advisable that Djawdat should be supported in the first instance by a small force of cavalry and mounted infantry, who should proceed as far as Abou Fatmeli.

Colonel Colvile is also greatly in favour of Djawdat Bey's scheme, and does not consider that any responsibility would attach to the Governments. He is of opinion that the presence of Djawdat Bey with a well-armed force would have the effect of gathering the Dongolawis around him, and that he would act as a magnet to many fribes who have been forced to throw in their lot with the dervish movement, but who would welcome an independent centre.

The jealousy that exists amongst the tribes has hitherto prevented any coalition amongst them against a common enemy, and the attempt at forming any sort of Government and maintaining order by the re-establishment of representatives of ancient families as rulers has proved a failure. One tribe will not recognize a leader of another tribe, and what is required is an aliea magnet around which the various tribes can be drawn without jealousy.

The late action at Ginnis has completely routed the advanced portion of the enemy's force. From various documents which have been found in the enemy's camp, it appears that the Emirs had considerable difficulty in massing men at Ginnis. The larger portion of the army which we defeated was composed of Dongolawis and the riverain population between Merawi and Ginnis. A levy of so many men was made from each Sakich.

The more fanatical and warlike tribes, viz., the Jaalin, Baggara, and Gobush, were represented only by about 3,000 men. There is no doubt that dissension exists at present amongst the Kordofan tribes, and the Arab movement is not so unanimous as hitherto.

The Emir rule, however, is very powerful, and will remain so as long as no counteracting influence exists to weaken their power.

The advance of the Soudanese upon Egypt has been temporarily checked, and some time may elapse before another force can be collected to march on the Egyptian frontier. But the difficulties of massing such a force will increase or diminish according to the policy which is pursued as regards our military dispositions.

The present position at Kosheh has no advantages as an advanced post from which to re-establish a settled state of things in Dongola. The country between Kosheh and Halfa is almost barren; the railway to Akasheh involves an expenditure of 50,0007. per annum, which is a dead loss, as no revenue is derived therefrom. The railway is at present kept in working order with the greatest difficulty; there are no regular workshops, and the rolling-stock is repaired from time to time by being patched up.

In General Stephenson's opinion, there are but two courses to pursue. One is to withdraw to Halfa and fix the frontier at that place; the other to make some arrange. ment as regards Dongola, as proposed by Djawdat Bey.

In the former case, it should be borne in mind that considerable encouragement would be given to the Arab movement, and the uneasiness which has prevailed in Lower Egypt would be greatly increased. The chances of withdrawing British troops from Upper Egypt would become more remote, but the military position would be improved, and the useless expenditure which the railway involves would be avoided.

In the latter case, the enemy would lose their hold on the rich Dongola province; the scene of action would be removed further from Egypt by the formation of a barrier between Egypt and the Soudan; encouragement would be given to those tribes who are anxious to throw off the Emir rule, and a direct commerce from Kordofan and Darfour would be opened to Egypt.

The chances of withdrawing British troops would greatly increase. The force which would be necessary for Upper Egypt would be less in case of Dongola being reoccupied than in the event of a withdrawal on Wady Halfa. The railway could be worked by native labour at exactly half the present cost; and by reducing the traffic to two trains per week the cost of the railway would be still further decreased.

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