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Pasha or any Turkish General the command of troops on the frontier. evidence gathered on all sides, the Turks are detested by the Soudanese more than any other race.
It was by the disorders of the Bashi-Bazouks that the discontent was first created in the Soudan, and the presence of a Turkish General and his Staff with an army on the frontiers would raise the fears of the Soudanese and add to the adherents of Mahdism. This the case, it would be hopeless to attempt pacific negotiations, and the result might be a terrorism and extermination which no one could advocate.
Moukhtar Pasha as a civilian negotiator may do much good, but supported by bayonets he might be the cause of great evil.
I have, &c.
(Signed)
H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.
No. 1.
Sir H. Drummond Wolff to the Marquis of Salisbury.—(Received January 25.)
(No. 30. My Lord,
Confidential.)
Cairo, January 16, 1886. WITH reference to my despatch No. 29 of this day, while deprecating the policy recommended by Moukhtar Pasha if carried out with the views attributed to him and under his supervision, there is much in his suggestions which might be made available under our superintendence.
The military status quo is ours, and after the great sacrifices we have made we are entirely justified in availing ourselves of it, not with selfish objects, but with the view of putting an end to a state of things dangerous to Egypt and burdensome to Her Majesty's Government.
The proposals of Moukhtar Pasha are as follows :-
That a purely Mussulman force should be interposed between Her Majesty's forces and the Soudanese, which might form the nucleus to collect the well-disposed portion of the Soudanese population.
That there are many amongst these anxious for tranquillity there can be no doubt, and this is evidenced on all hands by the composition of the forces recently put to flight at the battle of Ginnis.
I therefore venture to recommend to your Lordship's special attention the inclosed Report from Mr. Stuart Wortley, which he has brought to me here by the orders of Generals Stephenson and Grenfell. It explains in full the scheme of the ex-Vekil of Dongola, and presents to my mind the elements of a practical solution of the difficulties in the Soudan.
The ex-Vekil's proposal, to a certain extent, carries out the ideas of Moukhtar Pasha, while it keeps them under our control. I shall not venture to offer any comments on the military aspect of the proposals; but these seem to be approved by the military authorities. I readily accept their opinion of them, which is favourable.
I would venture, however, to present to your Lordship the political considerations which occur to me. The object which, I believe, Her Majesty's Government havo in view is the reduction of the number of British troops stationed in Egypt to the minimum indispensable to the duties they have to perform, and to the accomplishment of this object before the summer months. This can only be realized by the sub- stitution of native for British troops, and it is in this light that I regard the proposals contained in the very able Report of Mr. Stuart Wortley herewith inclosed.
The first point to be considered is the constitution of the native corps suggested by the ex-Vekil. This proposal, if carried out, will combine two advantages. It constitutes the purely Mussulmau element suggested by Moukhtar Pasha; it also provides an advanced guard, which, for offensive or defensive purposes, may serve as a frontier force, to be incorporated hereafter, if necessary, in the Egyptian army. If this force could be created and stationed on the frontier, the Egyptian army could be quartered as a support at Wady Halfa, while British regiments could be withdrawn as far as Assouan. I believe the latter might also be reduced considerably, but on this point Her Majesty's Government will receive advice from the War Office.
Passing next to the moral influence to be exercised by the advanced Mussulman guard, I believe that this will be considerable.
Mr. Wortley informs me that the Dongolawi, Hawawir, Sowarab, and portions of
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