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His Highness the Khedive began the proceedings by reading through the Con- vention aloud. After this the Turkish High Commissioner said he would call our attention to Article II, viz., the means of pacifying the Soudan. He said that his views and those of the Khedive were to be currently communicated to me, and that I should have to take part in their execution, and that he had not yet had the time to confer with His Highness as to the proposals to be made to me.

As I had gathered from many of the observations of his Excellency, both to myself and others, that he had views as to military operations to be undertaken in the Soudan, I interposed by calling attention to the wording of the Article. I pointed out that the clause had been drawn up in this form at the instance of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries, who had declined to entertain my proposal that Turkish troops should be sent to the frontier. The provisions of the Article merely referred to negotiators and not to military operations. I was quite willing, as I believed I was authorized, to discuss any subject referring to Egypt which either the Khedive or the Turkish High Commissioner might bring forward, but I must draw the distinction between what was in the Convention and what was not.

I thought it necessary to establish at once that the Turkish Government had recognized the fact that England is in military possession of Egypt, and that no interference can be admitted as of right in our military operations, while Her Majesty's Government would, I am sure, be glad to receive suggestions from those competent to give them.

Moukhtar Pasha seemed somewhat astonished at my view of the Article, which, I told him, would be confirmed if he referred it to Constantinople. He then said that pacific means were of no avail unless backed up by warlike means, adding that Prince Bismarck exercised a great moral influence because all the world knew he was backed up by powerful military forces. I acknowledged this, and therefore expressed my willingness to discuss the military points collaterally but as outside the Convention.

His Excellency then proceeded to explain his views of the steps to be taken to pacify the Soudan, much in the manner I have explained in my despatches and telegrams. Ile considered that negotiators would be useless unless supported by an adequate military force; that the military force must be purely Mussulman; that the Soudanese should not remain face to face with an English force, but that they should be assured that the English were within a distance near enough to support, if necessary, the Mussulman force and the negotiators, but that they would leave the country when order was restored and assured.

I told his Excellency that the scheme would require money, that a great part of the Egyptian force was already engaged, and that it could not be augmented without resources which were not forthcoming.

His Excellency said that he thought the present force of army and gendarmerie together would be sufficient, and though he did not clothe his ideas in words, I per- ceived that the drift of his proposals was this: that the British troops should take the entire charge of Egypt, while the Egyptian troops and gendarmeric should be dispatched in a body to the frontier.

I then cursorily mentioned the proposal of the ex-Vekil of Dongola as presenting some possibility of realization, though I stated that this was my personal opinion, and that I had no authority to discuss it from Her Majesty's Government.

Somewhat to my astonishment the Khedive welcomed the idea with considerable warmth, while Moukhtar Pasha was very reserved about it. I shall venture in another despatch to call your Lordship's attention to this circumstance.

During the whole conversation the Khedive spoke little, but he occasionally made some criticisms, showing much intelligence in public affairs.

At previous conversations with His Highness and with Moukhtar Pasha, they had expressed to me anxiety as to how far we should communicate our proceedings to the press. I suggested that at the end of each sitting we should agree together as to what information we should give to the correspondents.

It was therefore agreed to-day that we should say we had discussed first the Soudan and then other questions connected with the Convention, but that our con- versation had been essentially of a preliminary character.

During the whole sitting both the Khedive and Moukhtar Pasha treated me with marked cordiality.

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I have, &c. (Signed)

H. DRUMMOND WOLFF.

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