CAB129-78 — Page 148

LARSEN

CAPE ANNA

BRIALMONT COVE

ONEKO HARBOUR PARADISE HARBOUR

13 2

60°W.

HEL

Antarctic Circle

CAPE LEGOUPIL

OHOPE BAY

BAY

SNOW HILL ISLAND

60°5.

50°W.

ISLANDS

"DUNDEE ISLAND

1

Page 148

vi

SOUTH ORKNEY ISLANDS

SANDEFJORD BAYC

SIGNY ISLAND

LAURIE ISLAND

SCOTIA BAY

„CAPE GEDDES

·70°-

WEDDELL

SEA

VANSEL BAY

·63°

60°

WED DELL

SEA

STATIONS IN THE

FALKLAND ISLANDS DEPENDENCIES

50

100

MAY

1955

250

200

250

Nautical Miles

}

50 W.

Pecked coastline is based only on rough reconnaissance Approximate position of ice front

Page 148

RESEARCH DEPT., FOREIGN OFFICE,

May 1955

W.

146c

4

146D

the Page 149 of 32 has just come into power-could als lover133 such

Page 149 of,321 an affront to the national dignity in Antarctica. We should have to be prepared, therefore, for the Argentinian and Chilean Governments, to take action to re-establish their bases, supported by their naval forces.

Strategic Considerations

15. Our strategic requirements in this sector of Antarctica are adequately met by our possession of the Falkland Islands. We can see no justification on strategic grounds for the operation contemplated.

16. Before any action against the bases could be taken, a large naval supporting force would have to be provided. Due to the remoteness of Antarctica, it would be necessary to maintain this force permanently in the vicinity, to enable counter-action to be effective in time. Such a force could only be provided at the expense of denuding the Home and Mediterranean Flects, and at heavy cost. On strategic grounds, we are emphatically of the opinion that an increased and continuing commitment in the area should be avoided.

Conclusion

17. We conclude that-

(a) There is no strategic justification for the operation contemplated.

(b) The operation is not feasible with the ships we at present plan to have in

the area under the Tripartite Naval Declaration.

(c) To ensure our ability to carry out the operation successfully and to maintain our position in the face of possible Argentinian and Chilean reaction, it would be necessary, in advance of the operation, to despatch strong naval reinforcements to the vicinity, and to maintain them there subsequent to the operation. As these naval forces could only be provided at the expense of denuding the Home and Mediterranean Fleets and at great cost, we are strongly opposed to the operation.

(Signed)

MOUNTBATTEN OF. BURMA.

GERALD TEMPLER.

RONALD IVELAW-CHAPMAN

(for Chief of Air Staff).