CAB129-78 — Page 146

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ANNEX

ANTARCTICA

146A

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Introduction.

The Argentine and Chile have both refused to accept the International Court's jurisdiction or arbitration by an independent tribunal' over the Antarctic problems. As soon as we receive notification from the Registrar of the Court that the case has been withdrawn from the Court's calendar we shall be free to take any action. we wish to assert our rights in the Antarctic, and from the legal point of view the earlier we do so the better. Politically the coming Antarctic season would be the best time. Evictions in the following two seasons would probably be far more difficult, since activities in connection with the forthcoming International Geophysical Year (I.G.Y.) are likely to have profound effects upon the balance of power in the Antarctic.

Alternative Courses

2. The Foreign Office and the Cabinet Oflice have listed three possible courses of action, and they consider that the best of these would be to remove certain selected Argentinian and Chilean bases.

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Bases to be Removed

3. The Foreign Office suggest two alternatives:

(a) To remove Argentinian and Chilean bases on Deception Island only. These consist of one manned and two unmanned Argentinian bases and one manned Chilean base. :

(b) To remove all the Argentinian and Chilean bases upon which we have a strong, very strong or absolutely water-tight legal claim. In addition to those listed at paragraph 3 (a), these consist of three manned Argentinian bases: Half Moon Island, Hope Bay and Barry Island, plus two Chilean bases on Greenwich Island, one of which is manned.

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4. They would prefer action on the lines of .3 (b) above, and state that the most convenient moment for this operation would be early in January 1956, after the end of the United Nations General Assembly's session. They add that it would be convenient to be able to deliver an ultimatum to the Argentine and Chile to abandon their bases or to submit them to our administrative control about. one month in advance of the operation.

Foreign Office Questions

5. The Foreign Office have asked for our views on the following points: (a) Are the proposed operations feasible from the military point of view? (b) What is the strength of the forces likely to be required to carry out the

operation, and can such forces be made available?

(c) Will the ultimatum proposed in paragraph 4 above, by eliminating the element of surprise, reduce the chances of success? If so, should the operation be prepared and carried out in complete secrecy?

FACTORS AFFECTING THE OPERATION

The Tripartite Naval Declaration

6. The Tripartite Naval Declaration as agreed between the United Kingdom, the Argentine and Chile limits the number of warships signatories may have south of 60 degrees South at any one time. This agreement is reviewed annually in about November. It is very convenient to all three parties and we have no wish to see it denounced.

Forces in the Area

7. Under the agreement the forces normally operating in the area are:- (a) United Kingdom.-One warship, which will be H.M.S. Protector, a converted netlayer of 3,500 tons armed with a twin 4-inch and two twin Oerlikon guns. She will have on board a platoon of Royal Marines and two S-55 helicopters. There will also be the Royal Research Ship John Biscoe and a small supply 'ship. Page 146 of 321

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