CAB129-52 — Page 9

SECRET

Printed for the Cabinet. May 1952

Page 9

Copy No. 62

C. (52) 152

CABINET OFFICE

9th May, 1952

RECORD COPY

CABINET

GERMANY

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I am circulating for the information of my colleagues an interesting personal letter which I have received from M. Schuman and which sets out his views on the tactics which we should employ in meeting the latest Russian proposals with regard to Germany.

It seems to me that his mind is working on very much the same lines as ours.

A. E.

Foreign Office, S.W. 1,

9th May, 1952.

Translation of a Personal Letter from M. Robert Schuman to Mr. Eden

You were so good as to ask M. Massigli for my personal ideas on the present situation. I answer your request most willingly and will allow myself full and free expression of my views.

The confusion which one finds existing everywhere in people's minds to-day shows that the manœuvre undertaken several weeks ago by the Russians has been more successful than was expected. We have perhaps depended too exclusively on the safeguard which we have in the incontestable sincerity and the personal authority of the Federal Chancellor. It has, however, now been shown that neither one nor the other have been sufficient to prevent a profound disquiet breaking out in the ranks of his coalition and even of his own party. German public opinion is wondering which road it should follow.

As so often in the course of its history Germany finds itself faced with the problem of its unity, a problem by which it is obsessed and which the Russians have been able to make the prize of a supreme temptation to achieve immediate unification in return for certain postponements and certain questionable conditions. Into the bargain the Germans will not be sorry to free themselves somewhat from the too indiscreet insistence of the Allies and to benefit also, particularly in the economic field, from a détente between East and West. Would it not be for them an opportunity to resume an active and independent rôle ?

As for the Allies, they are attracted by the prospect, if not of obtaining a genuine and widespread détente, at least of avoiding an aggravation of the situation or even an irremediable conflict.

All this disposes people towards conversations designed to reach a limited understanding.

Those responsible for our policy should not neglect any opportunity nor should they be the dupes of any trap.

In the very first place we must examine the real intentions of our opponent. At present we are limiting ourselves to guessing them and to putting forward Page 924200

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bynghases of Why should we not put to him precise questions, from which he will find it impossible to escape, if necessary around a conference table?

The moment has come to bring into the light all ambiguities and traps designed not only for us but especially for the Germans. It is necessary that the latter should finally understand that the unity which is being offered to them entails important unknown elements and undoubted servitudes.

The Russian tempter has known how to concentrate all eyes on the freedom of all-German elections. This problem has indeed its importance, but it is not insurmountable and I presume that the Russians will do everything necessary to achieve a solution if at this price they can bring about the creation of a single German Government, which is to say the end of the Federal Govern- ment, enemy No. 1. Now what have we to show? Fine arguments destined to make the elections impossible? We shall lose the game in so far as the Germans are concerned. In any case, this is not the real problem.

What is important is not so much to know by what procedure unity will be achieved as to define that unity itself. Even those Germans who are most fanatical and most enamoured of unity must recognise that unity is not everything, that unity subjected to servitude, that is to say to Russian control under whatever form it may be, might perhaps be for Eastern Germany a momentary alleviation but would be for Germany as a whole a step backards and a new surrender.

It is this truth which must be made to shine out before the eyes of everyone. We must oblige the Russians to demonstrate it themselves. The clarifications for which we shall ask will put an end to their reluctance to speak, which up to now has veiled their contradictions. One must at last find out under what régime Germany would live if unified but occupied quadripartitely and without a peace treaty or any contractual agreement.

To set up a single Government without assuring it beforehand of a modicum of freedom is to hand over Germany to Soviet manoeuvring and to paralysis. We have understood this; Germany will understand it, too, if we can find the way to say it and to make it be said.

In putting these questions insistently we shall act in the interest of Germany as much as in our own. We shall widen the field of debate in transferring it to its proper ground, where resides the weakness of the adversary. We shall show up their swans as geese.

Light will be shed on the true intentions of all. At the same time our relations with Germany will be made more reasonable. We shall succeed in putting an end to certain reservations and distrust. We shall no longer have the attitude of those who plead for unity as a tactical move while hoping that it will not come about. In the past our own egotistical preoccupations have appeared to be more important to us than genuine search for common objectives. On the other hand, we shall cease to be the victims of a dangerous series of bidding in which there is a risk that Germany will make us pay too dearly in an auction indefinitely disputed or protracted.

Germany must feel the whole weight of her own responsibilities. She will have to choose not between integration with the West and German unity, which would be an impossible dilemma for her, but between unity which entails the guarantees of liberty offered by us and a unity subjected to quadripartite control. To sum up, Germany must be convinced that her true interest, even in the quest for her unity, is to stand in our ranks.

I am happy to have been able to note that in all this business our views have been very similar. Your proposal for a reply constitutes an important step forward and could serve as a basis for discussion. If I have won you over to the ideas set out above it would only remain to make a few precisions in the text in order to give them their full weight.

Our tactics should no longer be defensive but offensive and open.

Paris, 6th May, 1952.