CAB129-52 — Page 42

SECRET

C. (52) 159

12th MAY, 1952.

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CABINET OFFICE

RECORD COPY

COPY NO.

64

CABINET

COMMAND IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Memorandum by the Minister of Defence

At the request of the Cabinet I have prepared this memorandum stating the problem to be solved and summarising the discussions which took place with Admiral Fechteler. The problem has been fully considered by the Chiefs of Staff and I am in agreement with the proposals they have formulated and which they expounded to Admiral Fechteler.

2.

What is required is a system of command in the Mediterranean which will take account of the situation likely to develop in that area, should war break out, and which will ensure that the various strategic interests are properly related to each other and dealt with. At Lisbon the system of command in the Mediterranean was looked at from the point of view of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.C.), and then deferred for further examination and report to the next meeting of the Council. The problem however has a much wider setting.

The British View

3.

Once war starts there will be no N.A.T.O. and non-N.A.T.O. theatres of operations, but the Western Allies will be fighting on a global basis. The Lines of Communication of two separate commands run through the Mediterranean. These commands are:

(a) The Southern Flank of SACEUR's Command

N.A.T.O. Command under C.-in-C. South.

·

a

(b) The Middle East at present a British Command outside

N.A.T.O. in which British and not American forces and interests will predominate.

4.

In war, the naval command in the Mediterranean must be a unified Allied command, organised in such a way that the requirements of SHAPE's Southern Flank and of the Middle East will receive proper attention. There is not room in the Mediterranean for two separate naval commands, one looking after the requirements of SHAPE, and the other looking after the requirements of the Middle East. The naval and air forces of several nations engaged in submarine, anti-submarine, mine laying, minesweeping, convoy and offensive operations may be conflicting and all will need co-ordination. Account must also be taken of strategic and other air traffic.

5.

The Allied Naval Commander, in our view, must co-operate with and serve both the European and Middle East Commands, but, as their interests may from time to time clash, he must be given strategic guidance. This can only

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be done effectively by placing him directly under the authority which controls the global strategy of the war. This authority we must at present assume to be the SPagang of 200 It would be just as wrong to place the Page & Naf200

Commander under SACEUR's Commander-in-Chief, South, as it would be to put him under the Commander of the forces in the Middle East.

6.

We fully recognise that the United States Carrier and Amphibious Task Forces have been allocated to SHAPE by the President of the United States. Nevertheless, the co-ordination of their activities with other naval and air operations in the Mediterranean must be the responsibility of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean.

7.

These views were expressed fully and clearly to Admiral Fechteler.

The United States View

8.

Admiral Fechteler's views seemed to be based on the idea that until an Allied Middle East Command is set up, the system of command in the Mediterranean should take no cognizance of the requirements of the Middle East. He repeatedly emphasised that his task was to set up a N.A.T.O. Command in the narrow sense. Thus, although he fully agreed that there should be an Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, he considered that this Commander-in-Chief must be subordinate to Commander-in-Chief, South. support of his view he argued:

In

(a) that it was essential that Commander-in-Chief, South,

should have control of all naval and air forces supporting his operations along the whole of the northern shore of the Mediterranean. This must include the control of his logistic support, i. e. of his lines of communication from Gibraltar;

(b) that the President of the United States had specifically

committed United States naval forces to the Mediterranean for a N.A.T.O. task, namely the support of SACEUR's right flank;

(c)

that the French and Italian naval authorities had expressed their view strongly that their naval forces and the control of their own particular communications should be under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, South.

9.

Admiral Fechteler was asked how, under his proposed system, the important interests of the Middle East Command would be satisfied. He gave no satisfactory reply on this point. Hermerely indicated that he did not think a N.A.T.O. Commander-in-Chief should have responsibilities outside N.A.T.0, and he said that this view was held by several other N.A.T.O. powers, particularly the Scandinavians. He did, when pressed, agree that the N.A.T.O. Commander in the Mediterranean would in fact have to have some responsibility for convoys to the Middle East.

10.

It can be seen from the above summary that the real points of difference between ourselves and the Americans are:

(a) Whether the Allied Naval Commander in the Mediterranean

should be responsible to the Standing Group, or to SACEUR's Commander-in-Chief, South.

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