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NOTE

C.P.(51) 148

The attached paper is circulated

for consideration by the Cabinet at their

meeting on Tuesday, 29th May, 1951,

at 11.0 a.m.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1,

28TH MAY, 1951.

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Wi. 46712/5681 100m. .4-51 WA, & Co. G51/3.

Circulated 29/5 (8.0 am)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT 423

58

Pagination of this paper has

It is issued for the personal use of

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Sir Norman Brook

Copy No.

31

C.P.(51) 148

28TH MAY, 1951

CABINET

JAPANESE PEACE TREATY: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Introduction

As invited by my colleagues at the meeting of the Cabinet on 28th May (C.M.(51) 37th Conclusions, Minute 7(2)), I submit a supplementary memorandum on the question whether any restrictions on Japan's rearma- ment are contemplated.

Views of His Majesty's Government

2.

The United Kingdom and the United States have both accepted in principle the need to rearm Japan to a limited extent. This is because it is essential to the interests of the West to deny Japan's man-power and resources to the Communist world, and because the West has not the forces to achieve this result unless Japan takes an active part in her own defence. As regards the question whether any limitations should be put on Japanese rearmament, my colleagues will remember that on 2nd January (C.M.(51) 1st Conclusions, Minute 4) they approved a memorandum by my predecessor and the Minister of Defence (C.P.(50) 318) which included the following recommendations:-

(a) that a separate Defence Pact between the United States and

(b)

(c)

(d)

Japan should be concluded, concurrently with the Peace Treaty (agreement on this principle had previously been reached among all the Commonwealth countries);.

that in pursuance of the need for a liberal Peace Treaty it would

be undesirable, if not impossible, to impose or to suggest that Japan agree to detailed defence restrictions, so that it would not be practicable to include restrictive clauses in the Defence Pact;

that no firm military safeguard limiting Japan's capability for

aggression in the future is practicable;

that the only means of achieving any restrictions are:-

(i) Japan's voluntary acceptance of the provision of certain forces and weapons (including submarines, naval craft larger than frigates, and strategic bombing forces) by the Allies for her defence, and the restrictive influence of the

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(e) that Japan could be expected to agree both on military and

economic grounds to the forces and weapons referred to in (d) above being provided by the Allies.

Subsequent Discussions

3.

These views were put forward on behalf of His Majesty's Govern- ment in subsequent discussions with the United States and Commonwealth Governments, and have subsequently found general agreement. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand were reluctant for some time to accept the principle of Japan's freedom to rearm on the above basis, but even they are now disposed to accept it, since their security requirements are being met by the United States guarantee implicit in the proposed Pacific Defence Pact.

4.

The Indian Government have always felt strongly that the Peace Treaty should be a non-restrictive one and they have throughout shared the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on this particular point.

The Draft Treaty

5.

Article 5(b) of the draft Treaty attached as Annex A to C.P.(51) 137 is admittedly unusual in that it recognises that Japan may voluntarily enter into a collective security arrangement or arrangements participated in by other Allied Powers. Judging by the precedent of other Peace Treaties, it would have been more normal to say nothing on this point at all, i. e. to leave Japan completely free to rearm. (Restrictions on armaments were included in the Treaty of Versailles, and the Treaties of Peace with Italy and the Satellites after the last war, but the practical or psychological effects of the restrictive clauses have not been happy in any of these cases.) The United States Government wanted this passage included in the draft Treaty in order to serve as a hinge on which to hang the separate Defence Pact, which, as made clear in paragraph 2 above, is in fact the only possible means of putting any restriction on Japan's power to rearm.

Foreign Office, S.W.1,

28TH MAY, 1951.

H.M.