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SECRET
C.P. (51) 137
23rd May, 1951
Printed for the Cabinet. May 1951
CABINET
Copy No. 31
JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Background
On 23rd April (C.M. (51) 30th Conclusions, Minute 4) the Cabinet authorised me to arrange for preliminary discussions to be held with the United States Govern- ment regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty, and agreed that, subject to certain modifications, the proposals in my memorandum of 16th April (C.P. (51) 104) could be adopted as guidance for our representatives in these preliminary discussions.
The Talks in Washington
2. The talks with United States officials were accordingly held in Washington from 25th April until 4th May, and their results were briefly as follows.
3. On the contents of the Treaty, our representatives, acting on instructions, reserved the United Kingdom position on the following points: the disposal of Formosa; Japanese claims in the Antarctic; the future status of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands; war criminals; fisheries; the initial date for purposes of certain of the property clauses in the Treaty (the United States wish to take the date of Pearl Harbour as a starting point, while we have technical reasons for wishing to start in some cases from the date of the outbreak of war with Germany); Allied property in Japan; Japanese gold, and assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries; the wording of the clause about general economic relations (although the Americans had in fact come some way to meet us on this); the civil aviation clause; and the disputes clause.
4. The United States representatives accepted the substance (though not necessarily the form) of our views on the following points: the end of the occupa- tion; the renunciation by Japan of her rights in renounced territories; the renunciation of her rights under certain international agreements (with United States reservations about the Congo Basin Treaties and the Bank for International Settlements, on which they have promised us an early expression of their views); Japanese debts; pre-war claims against Japan; renunciation of claims by Japan against Germany; German property in Japan; industrial, literary and artistic property; insurance, con- tracts, prescriptions and negotiable instruments; prize courts and judgments. The United States representatives also accepted our view about the multilateral agree- ments and conventions to which Japan should adhere or continue to adhere, but preferred that this should be dealt with in a separate protocol attached to the Treaty containing a voluntary declaration to the desired effect by the Japanese Government. The Americans also accepted our provision about War Graves, but would like this too to take the form of a separate voluntary declaration by Japan. There seems to be no objection to the United States proposal on either of these questions.
5. Apart from these points, our representatives reached agreement with the United States in substance on various questions (specified in paragraph 5 of C.P. (51) 104) where they had authority to meet the view of the United States Govern- ment, including, in particular, the omission of the war guilt clause which had figured in the previous United Kingdom draft. As regards the limitation of Japan's shipbuilding capacity, about which we had previously reserved our position while Government
agreeing to its omission from the draft Treaty, the United Stage 489 of 587
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voluntarily to limit her shipbuilding capacity, and they are now considering how effect can best be given to this.
6. The talks thus narrowed, but did not eliminate the area of disagreement on the substance of the Treaty. They resulted in a tentative and partially agreed draft in which all the necessary reservations by both sides were noted down. A copy of this draft is attached at Annex A. The United Kingdom and United States contributions to this draft are side-lined in the left and right-hand margins respec- tively; as will be seen, they are fairly evenly balanced, and in length the document is somewhere between the original United Kingdom and United States drafts. (Passages which are not side-lined are those which either were common to both sides, or emerged as a result of the discussion.) The representatives on both sides made it clear that the results of the talks were subject to approval by their respective Governments.
7. As regards procedure, our representatives had a talk with Mr. Dulles, who took note of the proposals approved by the Cabinet (Annex C of C.P. (51) 104) and expressed general agreement, though he said he would like to think certain points over further.
8. Mr. Dulles also raised the problem of Chinese participation and the dis- posal of Formosa. He seemed to realise the force of our case against the inclusion of the Chinese nationalists in the peace settlement, and took due note of the point that, in order to prevent this, I might, without commitment, even be prepared to recommend to my colleagues that neither of the two Chinese Governments should sign the Treaty, leaving open the question of their accession later. Mr. Dulles said that as soon as the present emotional state of congressional opinion allowed, he would start exploring the possibility of a solution on these lines. (We know confi- dentially from Mr. Allison that in fact Mr. Dulles and the State Department are both attracted by the idea of a compromise solution on the lines suggested by the Canadian Government (see paragraph 19 below). Mr. Dulles agreed that the Formosa clause should present no difficulties once the Chinese problem had been solved.
9. The general effect of the talks seems to have been to clear up the atmosphere and dispel certain suspicions which were beginning to form on the United States side to the effect that, despite our protestations to the contrary, we might in fact be trying either to delay the Peace Treaty or to give it a restrictive and illiberal character. The talks seem to have convinced the United States Government that in this important Far Eastern matter it was possible for British and Americans to work together as a team.
The Next Stage
10. After consultation among the Departments concerned at the official level, I now recommend that the draft of the Treaty (Annex A) should be generally approved, subject to the clearing up of certain drafting and other minor points, which is already in hand. Among the points still outstanding those which raise questions of policy are further discussed in Annex B. On these questions I invite my colleagues to agree that:-
(a) We should accept the United States proposal that the United States should continue to administer the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° North latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela and the Marcus Islands, pending the making of any proposal by the United States to the United Nations to place these islands under its trusteeship system; and that the Treaty should not provide for Japan to renounce her sovereignty over these islands.
(b) As further discussion in Washington has failed to move the United States Government from their attitude on this point, we should no longer seek to insist that stocks of Japanese gold should be made available as reparations. (It has not been found possible to reach agreement on this recommendation with the Treasury at the official level.)
(c) We should not accept the United States contention that Japan should be allowed, by the absence of any provision to the contrary in the Treaty, to retain the ownership of her assets in neutral countries, unless Japan were obliged to pay the Allies a sum of about $20 million to cover their Page 490 valy out of which His Majesty's Government would get to receive
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Ringfediatelyfthe value of the Swiss francs held by Japan Switzerland in respect of payment for the relief of prisoners of war. (d) If the United States persist in their view that the disputes clause of the Treaty should not make any provision for claims disputes arising out of of the Treaty to be settled by a special neutral tribunal, we should not press our contrary view further, since the formula in article 21 of the draft at Annex A would in fact not rule out the reference of claims disputes to a neutral tribunal by agreement between the State con- cerned and Japan.
(It is possible that the further clarification of the United States attitude which is still proceeding may reveal further points which will have to be sub- mitted to the Cabinet subsequently for decision, e.g., on the Congo Basin Treaties or an Allied property in Japan.)
The decisions of the Cabinet on these points will be included in a brief for the guidance of our representatives in the next round of informal discussions with the United States Government, which will be held when Mr. Dulles comes to London on 2nd June. It is hoped that these talks may resolve the outstanding points of difference.
11. In the discussion on procedure referred to in paragraph 7 above, Mr. Dulles reverted to his earlier suggestion about the desirability of circulating a joint United Kingdom-United States draft to all the other Governments concerned. In so doing he made it clear that he could not commit the United States Government to the suggestion. He seemed favourably disposed towards it himself, however, and it may be thought that in order to be prepared for any official United States pro- posal in this sense, His Majesty's Government on their side should consider its desirability. The following considerations arise:-
(a) Any draft which may be agreed with Mr. Dulles would in fact be a joint United Kingdom-United States effort. This being so, there seems to be no reason why we should hide our light under a bushel or try to con- ceal the very considerable influence which we have had on the shape of the peace settlement as it is beginning to emerge.
(b) Our association with the United States as one of the two principal drafting Powers would be good for our credit in all parts of the world, particu- larly in the Pacific and Far East, where it would help to correct any misunderstandings which may be current about our non-participation in the Pacific Defence Pact.
(c) Given the number of difficult questions at issue between ourselves and the United States at this moment, particularly on Far Eastern questions, it may be thought that it would be useful in both countries to advertise the fact that here is one important Far Eastern matter on which both countries have been able to co-operate on an equal and harmonious basis.
(d) If the objection is raised that our association in a joint draft with the United States suggests that we are hanging on the Americans' coat-tails, the answer can be made that in any case the fact of our consultations with the Americans on the subject is known, and that if any resulting document was not a joint one this would savour far more of American predominance than a joint draft would.
(e) It may also be objected that the Japanese Government, who have unofficially been shown the previous United States draft, would find the new draft less satisfactory to themselves and, if it was a joint one, would blame us for this, so that our future relations with them would suffer. This is clearly not a consideration which should deflect us from our course, and in any case the Japanese would be able to guess that the differences between the United States draft and any new one, even if not circulated as a joint one, were in fact due to our influence. (f) It must be recognised that, in sponsoring such a draft, the United Kingdom Government may, on certain issues, be committing themselves publicly to policies which will be opposed by some Commonwealth Governments. For example, the Government of Australia may not agree to the pro- posal regarding Japanese gold in Annex B. The Government of India may not agree with our views on procedure (Article 13). It is, however, inevitable that, at some stage, we must face these issues, and the present Wagra4eem to be a suitable stage. We have, of coursegebeen infclose
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Page 49 consultation with Commonwealth Governments throughout, and they know our present position fully. We shall also keep them closely informed of the progress of the forthcoming talks with Mr. Dulles in
London.
12. In view of these arguments, I recommend that we should endeavour to arrange that any agreed draft which may emerge from further discussions with the United States should be circulated to the other Governments concerned as a joint document on behalf of both our Governments.
13. As regards the programme of work on the basis of the proposals approved by the Cabinet on 23rd April (C.P. (51) 104, paragraph 8), I recommend that the next steps, should be as follows:-
(a) Talks with Mr. Dulles in London in the first week of June, aimed at eliminating the outstanding points of difference and producing a draft with which we can both agree.
(b) Circulation of this document (if possible as a joint United Kingdom- United States draft) to all the countries at war with Japan (as regards the special position of China please see paragraphs 18-20 below) with an explanation that it has been drafted after consultations with the principal Parties to the Peace Settlement, and with a request for comments within a month.
(c) Discussions, probably in Washington on drafting the final text. (d) Reference back to Governments for approval.
(e) Signature of the Treaty, possibly in Washington, though this has not been
settled.
(f) Ratification.
14. As regards publicity, Mr. Dulles has suggested that two or three days after the draft Treaty has been communicated to all the Governments concerned as at (b) in paragraph 13 above, its text should be officially released in order to forestall leakages. I agree with this proposal. I also recommend that, shortly before or simultaneously with the release of the text, a full statement should be made in Parliament explaining the policy of His Majesty's Government on those points in the Treaty which are of most concern to public opinion in the United Kingdom. In advance of this, it may also be considered desirable to make a short statement regarding the talks in Washington and the visit of Mr. Dulles at the first opportunity after Parliament reassembles.
15. As regards consultation with Commonwealth and other interested Governments, the Commonwealth representatives in Washington were kept fully informed of the progress and result of the talks.
16. I recommend that Commonwealth Governments should be informed at once of the instructions which we propose to give to our representatives at the talks with Mr. Dulles, and that their representatives in London should be kept fully informed regarding the progress of the talks. I also consider that it would be desirable that the United States Government (and His Majesty's Government if associated with them on a joint basis), in circulating any draft which may be agreed on in the talks with Mr. Dulles, should explain that this document is the result of consultation with all the principal parties to the Treaty, which, in fact, includes all the Commonwealth countries (except South Africa) as well as France and the Netherlands.
17. The French and Netherlands Governments are being informed in general terms of the results of the talks in Washington and I recommend that we should similarly inform them of the results of the talks with Mr. Dulles.
Chinese Participation
18. My colleagues will recall that they decided on 22nd March that the United States Government should be informed that in the view of His Majesty's Government the Central People's Government of China should be invited to partici- pate in any negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan; the Cabinet felt that an unequivocal communication in this sense should be made to the United States Government, and that at that stage it would be undesirable for us to engage in hypothetical discussions with the United States Government regarding the possibility of a compromise solution (C.M. (51) 22nd Conclusions, Minute 3). His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington made representations to thegnited States
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aide-mémoire in reply stating that the United States Government did not see how, in so far as it was concerned, the views of His Majesty's Government could be implemented. The matter was considered further by the Cabinet on 23rd April (C.M. (51) 30th Conclusions, Minute 4) and in the sense of that discussion I instructed our representatives at the talks in Washington to explore the matter further with the State Department, and if it appeared that there was a serious risk of the association of the Chinese Nationalists with the Treaty, to discuss on an informal and non-committal basis the possibility of a compromise solution on the lines of that outlined in the next paragraph. As will be seen from paragraph 8 above, Mr. Dulles's reactions in the tentative discussion of this problem with our repre- sentatives were not altogether discouraging.
19. By way of a compromise the Canadian Government have made the following proposal to the United States Government and His Majesty's Government. They consider that the lack of unanimity among the Governments most concerned in the Japanese Peace Treaty on the question of the proper Chinese signatory poses a major problem, and they are also concerned with the effect of this problem on the future relationship between Japan and China; they feel that it might be undesirable from the point of view of future stability in the area that Japan be bound to accept the signature of any Chinese Government, upon which the opinion of the Allied Powers is divided, to a Treaty with such important implications for itself and China. The Canadian Government agree that an early Peace Treaty with Japan is desirable. For this reason, and because of the difficulties already mentioned, they suggest that while provision be made in the Treaty for signature on behalf of China, the signature be delayed for the present. An accession clause could be included in the Treaty under which China might later accede.
20. This proposal seems to me to have much to recommend it and I consider that it deserves serious study. I suggest to my colleagues that, having put our views about the desirability of an approach to the Central People's Government of China on record, and having, as they will recall, received a negative response from the United States Government, the next stage should be to consider the question on an immediate working basis, and that from this point of view the most important object is not to bring the Central People's Government into the peace settlement, which in fact would almost certainly be impossible owing to their own attitude, as well as to the attitude of the United States, but to prevent the United States from insisting on Chinese nationalist participation, which up to now has appeared only too likely. I therefore recommend that in the talks with Mr. Dulles our representative should be authorised to explore the situation further, and if it appears that the United States Government may be willing to leave the nationalists out of the peace settlement, that on that understanding we should no longer insist on the participation of the Central People's Government, but that there should be an accession clause providing for China to accede to the Treaty when certain specific conditions, requiring a more general measure of agreement among the other signatories on Chinese and Far Eastern questions generally, have been fulfilled.
Formosa
21. As regards Formosa, the wording of the relevant clause will depend on the solution of the problem about Chinese participation. It will be recalled that hitherto we have maintained that the Treaty should state that Japan cedes Formosa to China, while the United States Government have contended that the Treaty should simply sever Japan's connexion with Formosa without specifying what should become of it. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Americans were to insist on the Chinese nationalists participating in the Treaty, it would then clearly be undesirable for Japan in the Treaty to cede Formosa to China, for although in law the cession would be to China as a State, the practical effect would be to legalise Chiang Kai Shek's hold on Formosa. Consequently, if it appeared that there was a serious likeli- hood of the Chinese nationalists being associated with the Treaty, it may be thought that we should reconsider our previous view and agree with the United States that the Treaty should provide only for Japan's renunciation of her sovereignty over Formosa, without any mention of cession to China. If, however, the nationalists are not allowed to participate in the Treaty, then it may be thought that we should maintain our view that the Treaty should provide not only for renunciation by Japan but for cession to China, with some appropriate suspensory provision which in
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