CAB129-45 — Page 385

The Division of Functions

46. In any federal association of States it is important that the division of functions between the central and territorial authorities should be as clearcut as possible and that the central and territorial Governments should be provided independently of each other with adequate sources of finance. The proposals for finance and recommendations for the division of functions are set out in Chapter V below; in those proposals we have, broadly speaking, allotted functions affecting the external relations of British Central Africa and services which transcend territorial boundaries to the central Government and legislature, and services which impinge closely on the daily life of the people to the territorial Governments and Legislatures.

47. In accordance with this principle, defence, rail, trunk road and air communications, posts and telegraphs, broadcasting, the supply and dis- tribution of electric power, external and certain aspects of inter-territorial trade, customs and medium and long-term research would be central functions. Local government for Europeans and Africans, native administration in all its forms, primary and secondary education for Africans, medical and health services, agriculture, animal health, forestry, game, fisheries and police services would be territorial functions. Since Africans are not at present appreciative of the benefits to be secured by closer association, and since they are not yet qualified to play the full part to which they can eventually aspire in the federal Government and Legislature, we have been particularly careful to reserve services which intimately affect African life and development to the territorial Governments and Legislatures. Under our proposals the political development of Africans, both in national politics and in local government, would go forward as at present in the three territories.

Constitutional Status of the Territories

48. In framing our proposals we have had to take account of the fact that the three territories have a differing constitutional status and are at different stages of material development. In the constitutional sphere we have had to consider how, without infringing Southern Rhodesia's self-governing status, to provide for His Majesty's Government's special responsibility for the two northern territories and in particular for African welfare and advance- ment. We propose that the three territorial Governments and Legislatures should retain their existing status and powers within the spheres assigned to them under the scheme which we put forward, the Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Governments remaining responsible to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. In the federal sphere the Government and Legislature of British Central Africa would have full responsibility with a Cabinet system of government, subject, however, to the safeguards described in the following paragraphs. These safeguards are designed to preserve the special responsibility of the United Kingdom Government and Parliament in respect of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland while not interfering with the efficient working of the Central African constitutional arrangements.

The African Affairs Board

49. We propose that an African Affairs Board should be established consisting, under its Chairman, of the three Secretaries for Native Affairs of the territorial Governments, one elected or unofficial member drawn from each of the territorial Legislatures and one African from each territory. The

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function of this Board would be to examine before publication from the point of view of African interests all proposed federal legislation (both principal and

subsidiary) pnd to report thereen to the federal Governory. Aence of

all such proposed legislation to the Board would be Stingatory. At the time of publication of a Bill the federal Government would be obliged to make the views of the Board known to the Legislature in the form of a statement. If the Board reported that the proposed legislation would, in its opinion, be detrimental to African interests, it would be open to the Government to pro- ceed with it and the Legislature to pass it, but the Governor-General would be required to reserve it for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure and the matter would then be referred to the Secretary of State. The Board would also hold a general watching brief in respect of all matters affecting African interests so far as they related to federal subjects and in addition it would have the positive task of promoting liaison between the three territories in all matters affecting African affairs.

The Minister for African Interests

50. The Chairman of the African Affairs Board would be the Minister for African Interests in the federal Cabinet, who would be appointed by the Governor-General from among the members representing African interests in the British Central African Legislature. In making and terminating the appointment of this Minister the Governor-General would act in his own discretion, but subject to the approval of the Secretary of State. The Minister for African Interests would have the special function in the Cabinet of pro- posing any measures thought by him to be desirable in the interests of Africans and of considering measures proposed by other Ministers to make sure that they were not detrimental to African interests. As a member of the Cabinet, it would be his duty, subject to his special responsibilities for African interests, to co-operate with and assist his Cabinet colleagues in the conduct of the affairs of the federal Government. Normally, agreement on any representations made by the Minister for African Interests would no doubt be reached by the ordinary methods of consultation and discussion; in a case, however, where it was found impossible to arrive at a solution and the Minister for African Interests took the view that the executive action proposed by Ministers would be detrimental to African interests, he would have the right to report this view to the Governor-General. The Governor-. General would then be required to certify to that effect and to refer the question to the Secretary of State who would be able to give or withhold his approval. The proposed measure would not be carried out until the decision of the Secretary of State had been made known, unless exceptionally the Governor-General were to certify, after representation by the Prime Minister but on his own responsibility, that on grounds of urgent public necessity action should proceed.

51. These arrangements would have several advantages. The machinery designed to protect African interests would operate locally and the Minister for African Interests as a member of the federal Legislature would be a local man with practical experience of conditions in Central Africa. Equally the members of the African Affairs Board would be men with practical experience of the problems of the three territories. The presence of Africans on the Board and their association with the Minister in his capacity as Chairman would ensure that African views were fully made known to the Board itself and to the Central African Cabinet. The position of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and of the United Kingdom Parliament would be safeguarded by the requirement that legislation considered detrimental to African interests should be reserved for the signification of His Majesty's