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If the exclusion order against him is rescinded Tshekedi would wish to re-establish himself with his followers in a south-eastern area of the Reserve where he claims his support is greatest. He admits that his

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return will provoke an outcry from his opponents and Seretse's following, but conterPagehaginot result in violence or disordetage 195 of 587

Tshekedi has also lodged a large number of complaints

regarding interference with his cattle and property and the molesting of his followers. He alleges that the local Administration and the police have not taken adequate or effective action to protect his interests in his absence and he goes so far as to suggest that they are prejudiced against him.

5.

I have considered all these representations very carefully in consultation with the High Commissioner and his officers. I recently visited the Protectorate including the Bamangwato Reserve and saw for myself how things stand.

There is some force in Tshekedi's arguments, particularly those that concern his own personal position. He undoubtedly suffers some hardship through his absence, especially regarding the care of his cattle.

We must, however, give prime place to the interests of the Bamangwato people, whose whole social structure has been shaken by recent events and who are now making a slow and steady recovery.

6.

I am completely convinced of the wisdom of the White Paper decisions and that Tshekedi's exclusion from residence in the Reserve is fully justified. At the Kgotla which I held at Serowe on 1st February, the attendance was estimated at 10,000 and all ten speakers without exception emphasised dislike if not hatred of Tshekedi and pressed for his continued exclusion. The audience appeared fully to support these views. Local officers report that the support enjoyed by Tshekedi in the Reserve is negligible and that the vast bulk of the people are bitterly opposed to his return. These officers advise that rescindment of the exclusion order and even continuation of visits by Tshekedi to the Reserve may lead to serious disorder and will certainly retard the re-establishment of order and local government. Tshekedi's reiterated disavowal of claim to the chieftainship makes little difference for, particularly in view of his personality and reputation, his return in any capacity to the Reserve would inevitably be construed by most of the inhabitants as a step towards his recovery of power and authority over them. He is generally feared as a strong and revengeful man who would punish and discriminate against all the leaders who have declared themselves against him. Bamangwato history is full of this sort of thing. When Tshekedi's proposals to federate or partition the tribe become known, they will incense the Bamangwato and convince them that he sets his personal ambitions above their interests.

7.

Moreover, the decisions set out in the White Paper were based on reasons wider than any differences existing between Tshekedi and Seretse and their partisans. As the White Paper explained the Bamangwato have for long displayed tendencies to faction and feud between branches of the ruling family and the dispute arising over Seretse's marriage merely aggravated these tendencies. I am firmly convinced that until the Bamangwato are satisfied that Tshekedi will be firmly excluded from the tribal area, they will not settle down to the establishment of local and central councils which is now under way. This is necessary both in order to make the tribal organisation more representative and in order to create a Native Authority to whom we can hand over authority and thus bring to an end the present temporary direct rule, which the people do not like and which has been criticised by Africans elsewhere.

8.

I am satisfied that as a result of my visit the Bamangwato are now ready to apt Senft58's exclusion under the terms of tRagh95 Ba587. All that now alarms them is the fear of Tshekedi's return. The local administration is making reasonably good progress in the establishment of

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not be detetonined until it is as representative as possible and fully

Native

Page 196ority and understand that its final shaage 198attern must

understood and accepted by the people. Consultation with the whole tribe naturally takes time. Our officers, in whom I have confidence, are convinced that relatively rapid progress will be made when, but not before, it is clear that Tshekedi will not return.

9.

I have therefore come to the conclusion that the interests and views of the Bamangwato must prevail over Tshekedi's private interests in so far as they are in conflict. The only hope of orderly progress is for us to stick to our declared policy. To wobble now would be fatal.

enforced

This means that the White Paper policy must be firmly

as I declared at the Kgotla it would be. I must tell Tshekedi that his exclusion stands and that he can only return to the tribal area in very special circumstances and only with special leave.

I will do what I can to protect and preserve his private interests. I propose to instruct the local Administration to examine and deal energetically with Tshekedi's complaints regarding interference with his property and the molesting of his followers.

I will also assure Tshekedi that the Administration will protect his property and interests during his absence.

I will propose to Tshekedi that he should concentrate part of his cattle in an area at present very sparsely inhabited in the extreme South of the Bamangwato Reserve and near his present residence. This will cost money which, in the present state of the Protectorate's finances, will have to come from United Kingdom sɔurces, For the administration will have to help by making bore-holes, dams, and roads to open up the area and provide access to the railway. The Bamangwato will not like this and indeed, in their speeches to me, protested against any such proposal. It is, however, necessary in order to give Tshekedi reasonable justice. He will still have to leave many of his cattle in the main tribal area and look after them (as Seretse is doing) through agents,

10.

It is possible that Tshekedi may accept these decisions and suggestions with a fair grace. But he may well be resentful and angry.

He may contest the exclusion order in the courts or even (although I doubt it) attempt to defy it physically. On the Prime Minister's directions I have already taken the advice of the Law Officers who are satisfied that the powers available amply justify and validate the action taken to exclude him.

Tshekedi may seek to enlist public support in Britain. I am sure he cannot stir up anything like the trouble that Seretse did; but he may win some sympathy. He may argue that our real reasons for refusing to recognise Seretse and for excluding him were fear of South African reactions and that, besides inflicting injustice on him, we have brought the Bamangwato to chaos and thus brought them closer to incorporation into the Union.

Tshekedi may even try to stage a reconciliation with Seretse and demand that they should both be allowed to return as private individuals. There is, however, at the moment no indication of Seretse's willingness to be reconciled. Indeed he has been receiving warnings from his followers in Serowe that they will not recognise any agreement which he may enter into with Tshekedi and that they are not prepared to countenance the return to the Reserve of Seretse and Tshekedi as private individuals. They have

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al so informed thef8sident Commissioner in the sarpagenge afg8xplained that they are opposed to the return of Seretse in any capacity except that of Chief.

. It is of course quite impossible for men in the position of Tshekedi and Seretse to have a private capacity among a people like the Bamangwato. When Seretse returned to the tribe to be with Ruth he was not able, even when he tried, to avoid exercising many of the functions of a chief. The people expected and demanded it of him and resorted to him in general. In the same way Tshekedi's visits to look after his cattle (in a purely private capacity) have angered and frightened the people and fed their fears that he wants to be chief. Moreover, it is implicit in all Tshekedi's own proposals that his leadership is required as well as his presence,

I intend to provide as well as may be against these dangers by ensuring, if Tshekedi shows resentment, that our account of the background and reasons for our decision is fully understood by the press before Tshekedi puts out his version. I expect, too, that there will be favourable reactions from the Bamangwato. We cannot, however, expect, should Tshekedi seek public support, that there will not be some criticisms of us, which may be backed by some Labour M. Ps.

11.

To summarise:

(1) I propose at an early date to inform Tshekedi in reply to his representations that the White Paper decisions stand and that the exclusion order against him cannot be rescinded. I will do my best to get him to accept this and to persuade him to concentrate, with Government assistance, most of his cattle in the south of the Bamangwato Reserve close to his existing settlement. I will undertake that the local Administration will be energetic in protection of his interests which remain in the Reserve, I will also make clear to him that the Government is anxious to make use of his undoubted abilities in other directions than Bamangwato political affairs and in a capacity or capacities which will enable him to give further service to his people.

(2) I propose immediately I have done so to issue a full press statement to forestall anything Tshekedi himself may say.

(3) In the Bamangwato Reserve the local Administration will continue its efforts to restore a system of native administration run by Africans but along more representative lines than in the past. With a conservative people this is inevitably a slow process, but I am convinced that it is the only solution and that nothing but Tshekedi's exclusion under the White Paper policy, can make it a success.

P.C.G-W.

Commonwealth Relations Office, S. W. 1.,

9TH APRIL, 1951.