CAB129-45 — Page 185

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tem advantages of total embargo (i.e. the creation of difficulties for the movement and supply of Chinese armed forces),

would not be so dangerous for Hong Kong, and would command a wider measure of support in the United Nations. The only form of embargo which would appear to satisfy these requirements is one based strictly on strategic considerations. It would apply to a fairly short list of items selected from those categories of Chinese imports which are of direct importance to her war effort, e.g. metals and ores, machinery and tools, vehicles, chemicals and oil. The object would be to limit the short term striking power of the Chinese forces.

6.

You will appreciate, though this is not a point which you would wish to stress with the Americans, that items selected for an embargo of this sort would be mostly covered by the Paris Consultative Group's embargo list.

Thus, the effect of action by the United Nations would be limited to closing to China and to China alone a few sources of supply outside the Paris Group, and to preventing leakage through trans-shipment from countries other than Russia and her satellites which are not members of the Paris Consultative Group.

Shipping Controls

7. Shipping controls, which we consider should in any case be ancillary to trade controls, would not be effective without a wider measure of support from other members of the United Nations than we think likely to be forthcoming. We calculate that, even on the most favourable assumption regarding co-operation by other members, China would still be able to make alternative arrangements for the necessary tonnage to carry essential imports. The British Merchant Fleet, the Dutch and possibly others would be embarrassed by the probable defection of Chinese seamen. Attempts to fill their places by Pakistanis or Indians might be made difficult.

Naval Blockade

There

8. A naval blockade is the only sure way to make an embargo total' in the probable event of a number of countries not being willing to impose it by export control at the source. But we are strongly opposed to it. Apart from the fact that it could not legally be enforced against the ships or goods of countries which did not agree to economic measures, it could be instituted only with difficulty so long as operations in Korea continue on their present scale, and the political objections are overwhelming. would be vehement opposition from India and other members of the Asian group to such a provocative form of economic warfare; military counter-measures by the Chinese might well provoke general hostilities; and there is an obvious risk of incidents involving Soviet bloc shipping. The main difficulty however is that apart from a decision of the Security Council there is no way of binding members of the United Nations. the Uniting for Peace Resolution (and indeed under its inherent powers also) the Assembly can only make recommendations which are not binding. A Resolution to embargo or blockade China would not be binding on members of the Assembly who voted against it and could not legally be enforce against them by those of

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