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THIS DOC RN45057 PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MÃge1499&587ERNMENT)

1 GTR (6) 128 12

SECRET

C.P.(51) 95

30TH MARCH, 1951

CABINET

100 69 169 169 kn BEN BLE 179

COPY NO. 31

EGYPT

DEFENCE NEGOTIATIONS

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

At their meeting on 22nd March (C.M.(51) 22nd Conclusions, Minute 7) the Cabinet invited me to submit a memorandum explaining the basis on which I propose to reopen the negotiations for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1935. This decision arose from a considera- tion by the Cabinet of the conclusions of the Defence Committee on 19th March (D.O.(51) 6th Meeting, Minute 1). The Defence Committee then approved proposals put forward in two papers (D.O.(51) 12 and D.O,(51) 28) by the Chiefs of Staff as a basis for negotiation with the Egyptian Government. These Chiefs of Staff proposals in turn were the result of the Cabinet's decision on 14th December, 1950 (C.M.(50) 86th Conclusions, Minute 5) to cause the necessary studies to be made in order that His Majesty's Government should be able to decide whether the method of approach outlined on a personal basis by my predecessor to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs last December would satisfy our essential defence needs.

2.

The Cabinet will recall that the Egyptians have been pressing us for many years to evacuate Egypt, and that in 1946, in accordance with one of the provisions of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, a provisional agreement was reached with the then Egyptian Government. This agreement would have provided, inter alia, for the replacement of the present Treaty by a new Treaty of Alliance, and for the evacuation of all British Forces within a period of three years. Owing to a difference of interpretation of a protocol concerning the future of the Sudan, the Agreement was never signed, and we have continued to remain in Egypt and to maintain and build up our base in the Canal Zone. We have sought to justify this under the 1936 Treaty. After 1946 we were unwilling to negotiate with successive Egyptian Governments because we regarded them as entirely unrepresen- tative. At the beginning of last year, however, a Wafd Government, which we regard as broadly representative, came into power and renewed the familiar Egyptian demands. The Chiefs of Staff papers, to which I have referred, form the basis of instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo to resume negotiations, if my colleagues decide that it is desirable to proceed with the attempt to reach agreement with the Egyptian Govern- ment.

3.

The problem which I suggest we have to consider is how to reconcile our military requirements for a Middle East base and our political requirements for the maintenance of our position in the Middle East with the need to take account of the continued pressure of successive Egyptian Governments, and of public opinion in the Middle East and else-

where1498¶ure the withdrawal of British troops from Itin 8911.

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ThePagain its of the present proposals of the Chipei Staff y very briefly summarised as follows:-

4.

be

(i) There will be a phased withdrawal of British troops from Egypt

which will be completed in five years ending at the end of 1956.

(ii)

(iii)

(iv)

Thereafter there shall be a British base in Egypt manned by some

3,500 British civilians. This base might be held under an agreement with the Egyptian Government.

There shall be an integrated Anglo-Egyptian Air Defence

Organisation requiring the continued presence of some 10,000 R.A.F. personnel in Egypt.

We shall have the right of re-entry into Egypt if we consider

that war is imminent.

There are a number of points about these proposals which will certainly be objectionable to the Egyptian Government. For example, they are likely to resent the continued operation of the base by a large number of British personnel after 1956. Secondly, they are likely to object that the proposed withdrawal of British forces is not sufficiently rapid, especially since under the 1946 proposals we agreed to withdraw from Egypt within three years. Thirdly, they may well consider the number of R.A.F. personnel proposed for the Air Defence Oranisation to be excessive, and even if this Organisation can be set up now, it is unlikely that the Egyptian Government will commit themselves regarding the post- 1956 period. Fourthly, the Egyptians are unlikely to agree that we should constitute ourselves the judges of whether a war is imminent since a decision to this effect would carry with it the right to send our troops back to Egypt.

5.

Arguments for and against attempting to reach agreement.

The arguments in favour of and against resuming negotiations with the Egyptian Government on this basis may be summarised as follows:-

Arguments in favour

(a)

If we do not reach agreement with the Egyptian Government, they may well take the dispute between us to the United Nations. They did so in 1947 after the failure of the Bevin-Sidky negotiations, and the matter still remains technically on the agenda of the Security Council. The Egyptians then attempted to secure a recommendation of the Security Council to the effect that the 1936 Treaty was no longer valid and that we were, therefore, not entitled to retain British forces in Egypt. They failed then to secure such a recommendation, and the Security Council was unable in the end to agree on any recommendation. Whatever might be the decision of the Security Council now, we should at best be put in the invidious position of having to justify the retention of our forces in a country whose Government objected strongly to their presence, and under an instrument whose provisions we ourselves have largely overstepped. If we had made no serious attempt to reach agreement with the Egyptians beforehand, we might expect litle sympathy or assistance even from our friends; if, however, we had made a reasonable offer (for instance, something broadly speaking as favourable to the Egyptians as the Bevin-Sidky proposals, but taking Pageol of 587 changed international situation) dageds501 of 58uld be

considerably strengthened.

-2-Page 151 of 587

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Page 151 (b) If we do not reach agreement with the Egyptians, we may expect them to make trouble for us in Egypt. They could do so by means of administrative obstruction such as the denial of port, railway and labour facilities. They would probably not thereby make the position of our forces in the Canal Zone untenable, but such action would gravely impair the efficiency of the base. It is, however, possible (though not likely) that such measures might lead on to full-scale economic warfare between Egypt and the United Kingdom in which both we and they would suffer severely. It is, in any case, likely that there would be anti- British demonstrations and rioting which might (though this again is no more than a possibility) even lead to our having to intervene forcibly for the protection of British lives. In such an event subsequent developments would be incalculable but might result in our having eventually to take over the administration of the country in order to maintain our position. The situation would, no doubt, be exacerbated if we had made no serious attempt to reach agreement, and if the pro- ceedings of the United Nations had given support to Egyptian claims.

(c) The 1936 Treaty is, in any case, under Article 16, due for revision in 1956, at the request of either party, and if no agreement can be reached then, the difference shall be submitted to "The Council of the League of Nations" (that is, probably, for this purpose the Security Council of the United Nations). We have, therefore, to face the probability that after 1956 we shall have no legal basis at all for our continued presence in Egypt. We must, therefore, look ahead and consider alternative arrangements, especially in view of the time needed for administrative readjustment. Meanwhile we are already infringing the 1936 Treaty, which was designed for a purpose totally different from that for what we are at present using it. It was specifically designed to ensure the liberty and security of navigation in the Suez Canal against any external threat, not to provide a main base from which we should fight a campaign to defend the Middle East. The number of troops which we at present have in the Canal Zone, and the area which we occupy, are, and have for some time past been, greatly in excess of those stipulated in the Treaty. Some revision of it, therefore, or the substitution of a new agreement, would be desirable.

(d) An agreement with Egypt is one of the pre-requisites for any com- prehensive defence arrangement in the Middle East. We cannot make a defence agreement with Israel for co-operation in war-time without first reaching agreement with Egypt. If we tried to reverse the pro- cess we should lose the Arab States. On the other hand, an agreement with Egypt might open the way for a subsequent and separate agreement by us with Israel.

(e) The more generous our offer to Egypt the better are the chances of Egyptian co-operation in such matters as the provision of the facilities essential to us in time of war and of Egyptian man-power. A settle- ment might also improve the chances of Egyptian political co-operation with us in world affairs generally. A failure to reach, and still more to try to reach, agreement will make Egyptian and Arab co-operation both in peace and war more unlikely and might involve us in difficulties in Iraq and Jordan, where we have strategic facilities at present.

Arguments against

(i) An agreement to withdraw British troops from Egypt may be inter- paged in Dgypt and elsewhere as a yielding to Eggfahspreksize. This might, to some extent, weaken our political position in the Middle East.

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