CAB129-45 — Page 144

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BRAVO FAR

29th March, 1951

CABINET

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

For the purpose of this paper the Middle East is defined as comprising Persia, Turkey, the Arab States (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, the Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen), Israel, and the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms.

2. The political problems of the area can be divided into three categories:-- A. Internal problems in the States concerned.

B.-Problems affecting relations between States of the area.

C. Problems affecting relations between these States and other foreign Powers

(principally the United Kingdom).

Internal Problems

3. Turkey is homogeneous and comparatively stable and prosperous, and presents no serious internal problems.

4. Israel is comparatively stable politically, but has grave economic troubles which, in default of great and continuing external aid, might bring about collapse.

5. The Arab States, while at differing stages of development, are all organised more or less on feudal lines, and power remains in the hands of a limited ruling class who are for the most part reactionary and corrupt, but to whom there is as yet no visible alternative, which is a pity and will require discrete attention. These countries are all politically immature, and parliamentary democracy, where it has been established, works most imperfectly; and the general standard of adminis- tration is low. The irresponsibility and personal rivalries of the ruling classes result in perpetual political instability; but the populations are predominantly agricultural, with little or no industrial proletariat, and their standard of living, though low, is not such as to breed serious discontent. Communism, to which Islam is hostile, has consequently made little headway amongst them; but conditions favourable to its expansion clearly exist.

6. In Jordan, Syria, the Lebanon, and the Egyptian-administered "Gaza strip," the presence of nearly 900,000 homeless and destitute Arab refugees from Palestine constitutes a grave humanitarian and political problem which bears par- ticularly hardly on the economy of Jordan and has so far defied the efforts of the United Nations to solve it.

7. Persia, though different in race and language from the Arab States, suffers from similar political troubles, aggravated by the existence of a substantial Com- munist-dominated party (the Tudeh Party), whose influence is favoured by bad administration and unsatisfactory economic conditions. The personal loyalty which the Shah inspires, and the traditional Persian suspicion of Russia, are counter- factors.

Inter-State Problems

8. Arab-Israel Situation. No peace settlement between Israel and the Arab States is in sight. The Armistice Agreements between Israel and her Arab neigh- bours, supervised by a50nited Nations Commission, work reasonabBgwell, 4despite7

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Page 145 periodical frontier incidents, particularly between Israel and Jordan. Israel undoubtedly desires a peace settlement, in order to enable her to demobilise and pursue her economic development. The Arab States do not; Arab hostility to Israel is unrelenting, and the Arab League last year passed a resolution providing for the expulsion of any of its members which made peace with Israel without the League's consent. The Arabs also fear Israeli economic penetration, and, while realising that they could not successfully attack Israel, imagine that the blockade to which they are subjecting her is more effective than is actually the case and will eventually produce her downfall. King Abdullah of Jordan, more far-sighted than most Arabs, would welcome a settlement, which would bring Jordan substantial economic advantages, but no Jordan statesman will follow him for fear of counter- action by the League. Consequently, while recent private Jordan-Israel talks have made some progress, they are unlikely to produce more than a limited ad hoc solution of certain difficulties between them.

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9. The Tripartite statement issued by the United Kingdom, United States and French Governments in May 1950 in effect constitutes a guarantee to both Israel and the Arab States against aggression by the other. Israel believes in it; the Arab States less so, because they fear that Jewish influence in the United States and United Kingdom might prevent its implementation if Israel were to commit aggression. Jordan, however, believes in the additional guarantee provided by the Anglo-Jordan Treaty of Alliance.

10. The present unstable equilibrium between Israel and the Arab States may well continue indefinitely. Its main disadvantages are:

(a) The difficulty, in present circumstances, of fitting both Israel and the Arab

States into a comprehensive plan of Middle East defence, and (b) Certain practical difficulties, such as the closing of the Iraq pipe-line to

Haifa and the Egyptian ban on the passage of "contraband

contraband" goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal.

11. Inter-Arab Friction. Whilst the Member States of the Arab League share a common hostility to Israel, they are divided by the long-standing rivalry and dislike between the Hashemite Rulers of Iraq and Jordan, on the one hand, and King Ibn Saud (who expelled this family from his dominions in 1926) and King Farouk. This rivalry has been particularly manifested in violent opposition by Egypt and Saudi Arabia to any form of "Greater Syria" project (i.e., a union between Syria and either Iraq, or Jordan, or both), which they regard as liable to increase unduly the power of the Hashemites.

12. The Tripartite Statement, referred to in paragraph 9, equally constitutes a guarantee against an attempt by any Arab State to attack, or absorb, another Arab State by force, but this does not seem to be generally recognised.

13.

Turkey and the Arab States.-Turkey, since the Arab States were ampu- tated from her after World War I, has made no attempt to interfere in their affairs. Syria has had a quarrel with her since 1938, when the French allowed her to annex the Syrian province of Alexandretta. But while her relations with the Arab States are outwardly good, they are still suspicious of her, and there is evidence that any attempt to bring her into close co-operation with them would be resisted.

14. The Arab League. The Arab League, founded in 1944 in response to some British encouragement, has proved incapable of promoting any practical measures of inter-Arab co-operation and proved entirely ineffective in the face of Israel in 1948. It is also split, as indicated above, by internecine disputes. It does, however, respond to a deep-rooted sentiment amongst the Arabs that there should be unity amongst the Arab-speaking peoples, and although it sometimes appears moribund its members always tend to stand together against any outside Power. At the United Nations, for example, the Arab States usually vote as a bloc; and they have adopted a common front in opposition to Israel and the Western Powers over Palestine, to the French over Syria and the Lebanon, and more recently to United Kingdom policy over Libya and to the French over Morocco. The League, in fact, has a nuisance value which must be reckoned with. Since Egypt plays the leading rôle in it, any deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian relations risks bringing the Leagle into whereased opposition to the United Kingdonganlal fields $7

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Relations Between the Middle East and Foreign Powers

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15. United Kingdom. While the United Kingdom still commands on the whole more influence and goodwill in the Middle East than any other foreign Power, we have in the past few years been encountering increasing difficulties. These derive mainly from the pressure of increasing nationalist sentiment, seeking to whittle, down such privileges or influence as we still enjoy; in the Arab States there is still deep-rooted resentment against us for the part we are deemed to have played in facilitating the establishment of Israel. (It will be recalled that German propaganda, playing on this theme, was responsible for the Iraqi revolt against us in 1941.)

16. Particular points at issue between the United Kingdom and the States of the area as are follows:

(a) Persia.—A separate paper has been submitted on the present Anglo-Persian dispute regarding the "nationalisation" of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company industry.

(b) Egypt.—The Anglo-Egyptian dispute is not only vitiating Anglo-Egyptian relations, but is liable to create trouble for us throughout the Arab World, in view of the existence of the Arab solidarity already referred to. (c) Iraq. The Persian oil dispute shows signs of creating a similar demand in Iraq for the "nationalisation" of the Iraq Petroleum Company oil installations there.

:

As from 1952 the Iraq Government have the right to demand nego- tiation for the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The extent to which they press for the modification of the present strategic facilities is likely to depend largely on the outcome of the dispute with Egypt.

17. United States and France. The only other foreign Powers with substan- tial interests in the area are the United States and France. The former has large oil interests, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and military missions in Persia, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and has of late been devoting greatly increased attention to economic development and to political and strategic problems. France has an alliance with Turkey and extensive cultural interests and some oil interests in the area, but is chiefly concerned to re-establish her political predominance in Syria and the Lebanon. Neither has much political influence; the United States is generally regarded as politically inexperienced and in the Arab States is the object of even more resentment than the United Kingdom over her past Palestine policy, while France is disliked for her past treatment of Syria and the Lebanon.

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18. The United States generally collaborate closely with us in the Middle East, but have been critical and somewhat unhelpful in Persia and have shown some reluctance to co-operate in defence in Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Our relations with France are less close (though she was a co-partner with us and the United States in the Tripartite Statement of 1950) and are periodically troubled by unjustified French suspicions that we are seeking political influence at their expense in Syria and the Lebanon.

19. Russia. The Russian Missions in Middle East countries maintain contact with the local Communist Parties and disseminate propaganda on the usual lines. Apart from Persia, however, Communism has so far had small success and is proscribed except in Israel. Occasional indications of Arab support for Russia (e.g., at the United Nations) are usually intended as a form of blackmail, designed to induce the Western Powers to take the Arab side against Israel. The present Israel Government is keeping Communism firmly in check. Turkish resistance to Russia is whole-hearted.

Conclusions

20. The present state of the Middle East must be regarded as unsatisfactory, both internally and from the point of view of United Kingdom interests. Apart from Turkey and, to some extent, Israel, all the component States are weak, indifferently governed, unstable, and in need of economic development and social reform. Turkey appears staunchly determined to stand by the terms of our Treaty of Alliance with her and to resist Russia, and Israel would almost certainly resist aggression from anywhere; but while the Arab States are generally favourable to the West and suspicious of Russia, and are beginning to co-operate with us in defence planning, it is doubtful how far any of them, still less Persia, could be relied upon to resist Russian aggression unaided. Bilateral defence arrangement between the

Bed King57 Chad King 5m2 and individual Arab States, and with ad af 58 Teasible and

may the possibilities are being explored, but the chances of promoting a regional Middle East defence organisation seem negligible, if only because of Arab-Israel hostility.

21. His Majesty's Government's relations with Turkey are excellent; with Israel they are improving. Our relations with the other States, while generally good, are threatened by the rising tide of nationalism, which in Egypt and Persia has already involved us in serious disputes and which may soon do so in Iraq. On our success in finding solutions to these disputes which shall take account of reasonable nationalist sentiment depends the maintenance of our influence, and of our vital oil and strategic interests, in the area.

Foreign Office, S.W.1, 29th March, 1951.