Page 106 United States Fleet now outnumbers our own by about three to one. Unless we can ensure the unstinted help of those resources we cannot hope successfully to fight another battle of the Atlantic. The appointment of an American officer as Supreme Commander is the best possible guarantee that the full resources of the United States will be thrown into the defence of our sea communications. Much has been made of the danger that the Supreme Commander might divert British forces from the East Atlantic to the West Atlantic. The much greater likelihood is that an urgent need will arise to divert American naval forces from the West to the East; and there is little doubt that this is likely to be achieved more easily and more speedily under an American Commander than under a British Commander. Moreover we need naval reinforcements from outside the Atlantic area altogether. If so they can only come from the United States Navy, and a United States Supreme Commander would clearly be in much the best position to obtain such reinforcements quickly. It is well to remember that the greatest naval threat will probably be in the Eastern Atlantic and North Sea. This is the area where we particularly desire a British Admiral in command at sea in tactical control. His fleets will be mostly British ships reinforced as necessary by such American ships as may be placed at his disposal by the Supreme Commander. Thus in fact the main defence will be conducted by a British Admiral which is what we especially desire.
22. It must be remembered too that this is a case where the wishes and interests, not of two Powers, but of twelve, have to be taken into account and their agreement obtained.
23. It is not a new thing for British naval forces to be placed under an American Supreme Commander. Our Fleet in the Pacific in 1945 served to the general satisfaction under Admiral Nimitz.
24. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is a bold, novel conception from which we hope and believe great advantages will flow. We have always made it clear that it would mean some pooling of sovereignty, and here is a case where we must make some small sacrifices for our own and the common advantage.
10 Downing Street, S.W. 1,
19th March, 1951.
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