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in South East Asia also made it desirable that recognition shoul Page 762 of 1007before the end of this Page762 off00s agreed that recognition should be accompanied by three measures:-

(a) His Majesty's Government should state unilaterally

that they assume that the new Government accept China's existing international obligations.

7.

(b)

(0)

At the same time as recognition is granted, resis-

tance to Communism in South East Asia should be strengthened.

British propaganda should explain that there is no inconsistency in a policy which recognises the Communist Government in China and at the same time intensifies resistance to Communism in South East Asia.

Probable effects of recognition of Communist China in South East Asian countries.

It was agreed that, as far as United Kingdom terri- tories were concerned, recognition of Communist China would in no way affect the attitude of the Chinese communities of those territories. These communities have already tacitly accepted the Chinese Communist Government. The appointment of Chinese Communist Consuls in colonial territories would present the Colonial Governments with a difficult problem, but by itself this should not be allowed to delay the granting of recognition. Of the foreign territories in South East Asia only Burma and Indo-China would be sensibly affected by the granting of recognition. In Burma it would encourage the near-Communist tendencies of the powerful Burmese Socialist Party, and in Indo- China it would seriously undermine the confidence of Bao Dai and the confidence of the Indo-Chinese people in Bao Dai (but see paragraph 9 below). In the case of India it would be India's responsibility to safeguard the status quo in Tibet as far as this could be done by a unilateral declaration.

8. South East Asian Regional Problems General.

(a) The conference welcomed a statement by Mr. Rees- Williams of His Majesty's Government's policy in South East Asia based on the memorandum circulated with C. P. (49) 207. It was agreed that the long-term objective of His Majesty's Government's policy in South East Asia should be the creation of a regional pact through which the Governments of the area could work in partnership with the countries belonging to the North Atlantic Pact and also with Australia and New Zealand. Since, however, the present situation in South East Asia was not favourable for attempts to create such a pact in the near future an initial approach should be made by the stimulation of economic co-operation in the region.

(b) The conference considered that the danger from Communi si was so great and imminent in South East Asia that energetic short-term action was required irrespective of steps which it might be possible to take to attain the long-term objective. In the opinion of the conference the Chinese Communists were unlikely to attempt military aggression beyond their frontiers; but it was thought that they could be expected to stimulate conspiracy against and subversion of orderly government in South East Asia at the earliest opportunity.

(c) It was agreed that Indo-China would probably be the immediate objective of Communist action in this sense and that thereaPage 762tof1097would be made to overt Page 762 of rigging regimes in Siam and Burma. If these attempts were successful the South East Asian Communist Parties would have gained control

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