CAB129-37 — Page 432

SECRET

C.P. (49) 212

21st October, 1949

Printed for the Cabinet October 1949

Page 432

224

CopyR No.

31

CABINET

SOVIET INTENTIONS TOWARDS YUGOSLAVIA

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I recently instructed my Department to examine the question of Soviet intentions towards Yugoslavia. I now circulate for the information of my col- leagues the conclusions reached and a summary of the arguments on which they are based.

Conclusions

(a) The Soviet Government regard the disappearance of Tito as more and more urgently necessary and they have probably made fresh plans within the last few weeks in order to bring this about.

(b) These plans are likely to include the active promotion of rebellion in Yugo- slavia, but to stop short of actual armed intervention by the Red Army.

(c) The possibility of intervention by the Red Army at some later stage cannot be entirely excluded, though there are no signs of preparations for an attack at the

moment.

(d) The Yugoslav economic position is more precarious than we had previ- ously thought, but Tito, nevertheless, has a good chance of surviving the winter and, if he does this, nothing short of actual invasion is likely to shake him.

Argument

The destruction of the Tito heresy has become a matter of supreme importance to the Soviet Government. Though the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism teach them that all situations inevitably turn to their advantage in the long run, they are not likely to be content simply to await the results of the pressure which they have been exercising against Yugoslavia during the past fifteen months. Still less is it likely that they will withdraw from the course on which they are set.

The probability is that the Soviet Government realised in the course of last summer that they had misjudged the position and that Tito would not come to heel or succumb simply as a result of economic and propagandist pressure. Their fresh plans certainly include the intensification of the political war of nerves through such measures as the denunciation of the treaties of friendship between Yugoslavia and the satellites, the virtual suspension of diplomatic relations and the trumping up of charges, against the Yugoslav Government, of territorial designs on Hungary and Albania. These political cards have by now nearly all been played and the threat to resort to more effective means which was con- tained in the Soviet note to Yugoslavia of 18th August is only intelligible on the assumptions either that (a) they intend to attack Yugoslavia or (b) they are confident of an anti-Tito putsch.

""

If the Russians are confident of an anti-Tito putsch, it is difficult to see what grounds they have for such confidence. It is just as difficult for an illegal oppo- sition to organise itself successfully in Yugoslavia as in any other totalitarian country. Peary of 10 to be loyal, the security policepare competent ad

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TitPagoprofy lie ought to have grown rather thanage.100 the other hand, Tito's economic position is known to be bad and it seems likely that this knowledge will encourage the Soviet Government to try to engineer internal risings before they embark on any more open kind of intervention.

If no rebellion has occurred by next spring the Soviet Government are not likely to be deterred from invading Yugoslavia by regard for world opinion. This has never deterred the Soviet Government from anything upon which they have set their mind and they would have no difficulty in reconciling action against Yugoslavia with their pose of being the champions of world peace.

A more likely deterrent is the fear of provoking a general conflict. They might, however, be reasonably confident that they could take military measures without serious risk of Western armed intervention. The larger the scale of the invasion and the sooner the operations were brought to a conclusion, the smaller the risk would be. We might expect, therefore, that if the Soviet Government decide that the Red Army must be used they will mount a full-scale invasion.

There are no signs whatever of preparations for an imminent attack by the Red Army and it seems likely that before the Soviet Government decide to commit the Red Army they will pursue a policy of steadily increasing pressure, including the infiltration of armed bands to provoke local disturbances.

Foreign Office, S. W. 1,

21st October, 1949.