ANNEX APage 431 of 662
TELEGRAM No. 113 FROM COUNCIL OF FOREIGN; MINISTERS, PARIS (UNITED Kingdom Delegation), TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE,
Following from Secretary of State:
8th June, 1949.
At Mr. Acheson's suggestion, I arranged for Mr. Barclay to call on him this morning to hear some points which the State Department wished to put to us about Hong Kong.
i.
2. Mr. Acheson said that in the view of the United States Government it was unlikely that the Chinese Communists would launch a full-scale military attack on Hong Kong. If they did, the position would be clear and the United States would certainly back us in every way they could. What seemed much more likely, however, was that the Communists would in due course demand the retrocession of Hong Kong or at any rate the surrender of the new territories. If we refused, they would probably apply an economic boycott or blockade and create the greatest possible amount of disturbance by infiltration. Mr. Acheson mentioned that the State Department view was that the Communist authorities would back their demands by quoting the assurance given to the Chinese Govern- ment in 1942 that His Majesty's Government would be ready after the war to discuss the terms of the leases of the new territories.
3. In the circumstances, the United States Government were anxious to know how we would propose to act if the Communists used all measures short of armed attack. What would be the extent and the possible duration of the pro- tective measures which might be necessary on our part and how far would British economic interests in Hong Kong be willing to play their part?
4. The State Department also wished to know what we hoped might come from an appeal to the United Nations, particularly in view of the fact that the Chinese Communists are not represented there and are not even an established Government.
5. Mr. Acheson said it would help to clarify American thinking on this whole problem if we could give him some sort of answer to these questions.
ANNEX B
TELEGRAM No. 365 FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM HIGH COMMISSIONER IN
AUSTRALIA
1st June, 1949.
Following is text of reply from Mr. Chifley to Mr. Attlee's message in your telegram No. 409 as supplemented by oral explanations on lines of your telegram No. 407 :--
1. I have received your personal message about Hong Kong and have dis- cussed with your High Commissioner at Canberra, your assessment of the military position there and the factors which have persuaded you to send additional reinforcements.
2. It is obviously of the highest importance that the colonies [sic] should be protected against any irregular or regular attack which might develop in the near future. The United Kingdom Government has, an obligation in this respect by reason of the fact that it is the administering authority. With this in mind, the Australian Government supports your recent decision to reinforce the Hong Kong Garrison.
3. Any requests now or in the future from the United Kingdom Government for material support in the form of any army, naval or air force personnel and munitions for the defence of Hong Kong would bare to be considered by Cabinet. I feel Cabinet would not be prepared to send material support to meet a full-scale attack on Hong Kong, for this would most likely involve full-scale war with the Chinese Government.
4. However, in considering the matter my colleagues and I would be influenced by the agmediate lepottathe United Kingdom Governmen have taken to prevent, the development of an attack within the next few by means of direot. negotiation and agreement with the Communist aut now in control of the large area of China. It seems to us that even tho attack which might develop within the next few months could be met reinforcements at present proposed, and even though the presence o reinforcements were sufficient to provent the attack developing, holding Kong by force in the years to come may not be possible, and an attempt i may easily lead to a major conflict.. In our view the main endeavour t the future of Hong Kong should be by positive means based on relations! the seemingly new Government and the Western countries.
►
?
5. This raises the general questions of recognition and trade relatio were dealt with in my message to the Foreign Secretary of 25th May. As it we shall be forced ultimately to recognise some kind of Communist in China, and we would hope to be able to carry on normal relations with a Communist-dominated China should decide to withdraw from all conta Western countries and turn its face towards Soviet Russia, this maj impossible. But until it is shown to be impossible we consider that nothing be done which might tend to discourage the Chinese Communists from
pre and cultivating China's normal contacts with Western countries.
6. So far as we are aware, the Communists have not yet issued any} threat against the integrity of Hong Kong. We understand that they have that their attitude towards Hong Kong will be determined by the of Western countries towards Formosa. If this, in fact, represents ( Communists' policy, there would seem to be everything in favour of tr reach a clear understanding with them on the future of Hong Kong as possible. There should be little difficulty in convincing them that, so far as Commonwealth countries are concerned, the formal restoration of Forn China as envisaged at Cairo and again at Potsdam only awaits the con of a peace treaty with Japan, and that we already regard Formosa for all p purposes as Chinese territory and would not wish to interfere there in ar
7. In addition, we would like to feel that everything possible wa done to allow Hong Kong to perform its rightful function as a commerc trade centre. The accumulated experience and unrivalled facilities of Kong as a trade entrepôt provide in our view the best hope that the ( Communists will not wish to disturb it. There is already evidence that th munists are prepared to give preferential treatment to well-established in that can provide them with the goods they need. The more they are enco to enter into commercial dealings with Britain and American enterprises likely they are to seek to integrate the Chinese economy entirely with: Soviet Russia. In Hong Kong they would find a read-made and efficient through which they could trade and which could deliver the goods they ne short, we consider that more attention to the normal commercial funct Hong Kong and less to its defence may be found not only to provide t safeguard for the security of Hong Kong, but also to offer the best cha establishing a practical working relationship with the Chinese Com against the day when they are in control of all China.
•
8. We would like to think that these possibilities have been very ca considered. In our view they provide a basis for a positive approach problem of Hong Kong and, indeed, China as a whole, as distinct from the n one of sitting back and awaiting developments. If the Communists shoul to the point of deciding to gain control of Hong Kong, we are dubious ab deterrent effect of a reinforced garrison. Even if the Communists decide risk a direct attack, they might well succeed in undermining British ‹ particularly in the leased territory, by insisting on their transit rights un 1898 Peking Convention.
9. It seems undesirable that attempts to reach an understanding w Communists on Hong Kong and to enter into commercial dealings with should be left uptile Communist Corkrament is Auf established and reco On the contrary, there would seem to be every advantage in undertaking sions with them as soon as possible in those areas where they are in control d
4. However, in considering the matter my colleagues and I would be greatly influenced by the immediate steps that the United Kingdom Government might have taken to prevent the development of an attack within the next few months. by means of direct negotiation and agreement with. the Communist authorities now in control of the large area of China. It seems to us that even though the attack which migüt develop within the next few months could be met by the reinforcements at present proposed, and even though the presence of these reinforcements were sufficient to prevent the attack developing, holding Hong Kong by force in the years to come may not be possible, and an attempt to do so may easily lead to a major conflict. In our view the main endeavour to secure the future of Hong Kong should be by positive means based on relations between the seemingly new Government and the Western countries.
✓
B
5. This raises the general questions of recognition and trade relations that were dealt with in my message to the Foreign Secretary of 25th May. As we see it we shall be forced ultimately to recognise some kind of Communist régime in China, and we would hope to be able to carry on normal relations with it. If & Communist-dominated China should decide to withdraw from all contact with Western countries and turn its face towards Soviet Russia, this may prove impossible. But until it is shown to be impossible we consider that nothing should be done which might tend to discourage the Chinese Communists from preserving and cultivating China's normal contacts with Western countries.
6. So far as we are aware, the Communists have not yet issued any positive threat against the integrity of Hong Kong. We understand that they have hinted that their attitude towards Hong Kong will be determined by the attitude of Western countries towards Formosa. If this, in fact, represente Chinese Communists' policy, there would seem to be everything in favour of trying to reach a clear understanding with them on the future of Hong Kong as soon as possible. There should be little difficulty in convincing them that, so far as British Commonwealth countries are concerned, the formal restoration of Formosa to China as envisaged at Cairo and again at Potsdam only awaits the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, and that we already regard Formosa for all practical purposes as Chinese territory and would not wish to interfere there in any way.
7. In addition, we would like to feel that everything possible was being done to allow Hong Kong to perform its rightful function as a commercial and trade centre. The accumulated experience and unrivalled facilities of Hong Kong as a trade entrepôt provide in our view the best hope that the Chinese Communists will not wish to disturb it. There is already evidence that the Com- munists are prepared to give preferential treatment to well-established interests that can provide them with the goods they need. The more they are encouraged to enter into commercial dealings with Britain and American enterprises the lese likely they are to seek to integrate the Chinese economy entirely with that of Soviet Russia. In Hong Kong they would find a ready-made and efficient channel through which they could trade and which could deliver the goods they need. In short, we consider. that more attention to the normal commercial functions of Hong Kong and less to its defence may be found not only to provide the best safeguard for the security of Hong Kong, but also to offer the best chance of establishing a practical working relationship with the Chinese Communists against the day when they are in control of all China.
8. We would like to think that these possibilities have been very carefully considered. In our view they provide a basis for a positive approach to the problem of Hong Kong and, indeed, China as a whole, as distinct from the negative one of sitting back and awaiting developments. If the Communists should come to the point of deciding to gain control of Hong Kong, we are dubious about the deterrent effect of a reinforced garrison. Even if the Communists decide not to risk a direct attack, they might well succeed in undermining British control, particularly in the leased territory, by insisting on their transit rights under the 1898 Peking Convention.
9. It seems undesirable that attempts to reach an understanding with the Communists on Hong Kong and to enter into commercial dealings with them should be left unaga Cormandise Government is duly established and recognised. On the contrary, there would seem to be every advantage in undertaking discus- sions with them as soon as possible in those areas where they are in control de facto
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10. We would like to emphasise that Australia's interest in the future of Hong Kong is in the strictest sans insidental to our interest in the future of China, and particularly in its leag-am relations with the Western Powers. From Australia's point of view, Hong Kong might be regarded as a potentially valuable link between a Communist China and the West.
1.
ANNEX C
..
SOME ASPECTS of the Batri CONNEXION WITH HONG KONG
The Colony
1. The Colony consist of:
(i) the Island of Hong Kong approximately 32 square miles),
part of the Kowloon Petula (approximately 3 square miles), and (iii) the New Territories (app⋅ «imately 359 square miles).
(i) and (ii) were ceded outright to
eat Britain by China in 1842* and 1860† respectively; (iii) was leased to fierat Britain by China for 69 years in 1898‡ to meet the Colony's defence nomis.
Inter-relation of New Territorier and arded arens
2. Besides their important to providing for defence in depth, the New Territories are essential to the waility of the Colony in other ways. In them are the main water reservoirs at the existing airfield of Kai Tak. The city of Kowloon has also extended into them, so that the boundary between the mainland ceded area and the New Territe now runs through a heavily built-up area. The site of the projected modern airport is in the New Territories and further adequate reservoir capacity (ded because of the insufficiency of the present water supply) can be found unly in the New Territories.
Reasons for retention
(a) The real interest and wishes of the inhabitants.
3. At the time of its cension in 1842 Hong Kong was a desolate island with no inhabitants except a few there. The present Chinese population of the Colony (about 1,800,000), except for the comparatively small numbers in the villages of the New Territories, are almost entirely persons, or the descendants of persons, who have cute to the Colony from other parts of China with the intention of living and working in British territory and under British administration. There is no es to douts that it is to their general advantage that the British connexion should weaintained and there is equally little reason to doubt that this is their real wish. (A plebiscite, however, would almost certainly give the opposite answer. very fact that one was to be held would
dae il imply a possibility of return to China and very few Chinese would dare take the risk of being noted as having mind against that.)
The proposition that the nation of Hong Kong, being predominantly of Chinese race, must necessarily with so be, and ought to be, under Chinese rule, is implicit in the views of a criticism of the United Kingdom position in the Colony is based on tal dislike of the Colonial system. The attention of these critics might be invited to Formosa as an example of an island, also populated almost entirely be Chase, ak has recently been restored to Chinese Pop When Chinese forces landed in Formosa at the time of the Japanese surrender they were wako berators. But disillusion followed rapidly, and gross misgovernment dand's new Chinese Administration led to arious discontent which we had in a bloodily repressed revolt in 1947. In ser opinion of His Majesty's fanal in Tamsul an overwhelming majority of Formogans now deuren from China, and would even welcome a Westernatusterghip Off (y/prene te contin dhe present régime.
the
by
Treaty of Nanking. 194)
Pg Contention, 1898.
·
of
† Peking Convention, 1860.
(b) The value of a British Hong Kong as a safe free and efficiently
20lene Far East. port and place) Achange for internationat made 145 Che Far East. Every month about £20,000,000 worth of goods is handled, Hong_Ki providing storage, insurance, banking and shipping facilities for this trade. addition Hong Kong provides et prosent the only shipbuilding and rep facilities between Singapore and Japan. In 1921, of the peak of its prosper entrances and clearances were 43,500,000 gross registered tona (gr.t.) and after war these had recovered to 22,000,000 g... by 1948. The contrast betw Shanghai under international control before the war and under Chinese con after it, and the further contrast between Hong Kong and Shanghai after the v point to the loss of security and efficiency and the increase of corruption wh are likely to result if Hong Kong were to pass under Chinese control. TI results would not only seriously damage international trade, but would ca grievous losses to British commercial interests, by whose exertions and enterp the Colony has during the past 100 years been raised to its present position.
(c) The strategio value of Hong Kong
Without entering into discussion of wider questions of general Par strategy, certain obvious strategic advantages of Hong Kong may be noted, viz
it is a base from which to exert political influence in China; it is a base from which offensive operations could be conducted in Chi It is a base which would contribute to control of communication:
the China sens; and
(iv) it has the important negative strategic advantage while in our ha that its harbour and dockyards, valuable for extending the range naval operations, are denied to an enemy.
(d) The expressed or implied undertakings given by His Majes Government since the war thất no alteration of the status of the Col was contemplated (ser Annex D).
The confidence with which British firms have gone ahead with rehabilita and development was undoubtedly based on the ministerial pronouncement: 1944 and 1945 recorded in Annex D. If there were any question of early re tion of the Colony to China not only would such firms auffer serious mate loss, but His Majesty's Government would certainly be accused of bad faith.
Tenability of Colony in face of Chinese hostility
4. Attempts on the part of a hostile China to make our position in Colony untenable might take several forms. As regards open attack (combi or not with other methods) the latest appreciation of the Chiefs of Staff in the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Government is not such that, eVBİ the Communists control the whole of China, it could be classed as a major Po and that therefore Hong Kong could be held unless we are engaged in a war v Russia. (The position of Hong Kong in the event of war with Russia invo considerations of general Pacific strategy which, as indicated in paragraph 3 above, are outside the scope of this paper.) As regards methods of coercion of than open attack-.g., blockade, boycott and instigation of internal unrest- Governor of Hong Kong has said that these and the measures required to cou them would result in the Colony's losing all its trade with China and in reduction of its trade with other countries. It is not possible to forecast how ] such pressure would be kept up against the Colony, but in the Governor's opin with a garrison at the strength to which the recently ordered reinforcements bring it, we could hold our position indefinitely, though this would involve feed the population by sea-borne supplies (in such circumstances however much of present swollen Chinese population would probably have left). On a lifting the blockade and boycott and cessation of internal unrest economic recovery wi probably be rapid.
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(6) The quing of p britisk Hong Kong us a safe, free and of port and place of exchange for international trade in the Pat East./ Every month about £20,000,000 worth of goods is handled, Hong Kong roviding storage, insurance, banking and shipping facilities for this trade. In Adition Hong Kong provides at present the only shipbuilding and repair cilities between Singapore and Japan. In 1921, at the peak of its prosperity, itroncss and clearances were 43,800,000 gross registered tons (g.rt.) and after the ar these had recovered to 29,000,000 g.r.t. by 1948. The contrast between hanghai under international control before the war and under Chinese control fter it, and the further contrast between Hong Kong and Shanghai after the war, oint to the loss of security and efficiency and the increase of corruption which re likely to result if Hong Kong were to pass under Chinese control. These saults would not only seriously damage international trade, but would cause rievous losses to British commercial interests, by whose exertious and enterprisO se Colony has during the past 100 years bean raised to its present position.
(c) The strategic value of Hong Kong
Without entering into discussion of wider questions of general Pacific rategy, certain obvious strategic advantages of Hong Kong may be noted, viz :——
it is a base from which to exert political infinence in China;
it is a base from which offensive operations could be conducted in China (iii) it is a base which would contribute to control of communications in
the China seca; URË
(iv) it has the important negative strategle advantage while in our hands that its harbour and dockyards, valuable for extending the range of neval operations, are denied to an onamy,
(d) The expressed or implied undertakings given by His Majesty's Government since the war that no alteration of the status of the Colony was contemplated (see Annex D).
The confidence with which British firms have gone ahead with rehabilitation nd development was undoubtedly based on the ministerial pronouncements in 944 and 1845 recorded in Annex D. If there were any question of early rendi- ion of the Colony to Chine not only would such firme suffer serious material
as, but His Majesty's Government would certainly be accused of bad faith,
'enability of Colony in face of Chinese hostility
4. Attempts on the part of a hostile China to make our position in the Colony untenable might take several forms. As regards open attack (combined r not with other methods) the latest appreciation of the Chiefs of Staff is that he effectiveness of the Chinese Communist Government is not such that, even if he Communists control the whole of Ching, it could be classed as a major Power nd that therefore Hong Kong could be held unless we are engaged in a war with tussie. (The position of Hong Kong in the event of war with Russia involves onsiderations of general Pacific strategy which, as indicated in paragraph 3 (c) bove, are outside the scope of this paper.) As regards methods of coercion other han open attack-4.g., blockade, boycott and instigation of internal unrest-the fovernor of Hong Kong has said that these and the measures required to counter hem would result in the Colony's losing all its trade with China and in the eduction of its trade with other countries. It is not possible to forecast how long uch pressure would be kept up against the Colony, but in the Governor's opinion, with a garrison at the strength to which the recently ordered reinforcemente will ring it, we could hold our position indefinitely, though this would involve feeding he population by ses borne supplies (in such oiroumstances however much of the resent swollen Chinese population would probably have left). On a lifting of he blockade and boycott and cessation of internal unrest economic recovery would
robably be rapid.
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