CAB129-36 — Page 154

Recommendation.

30

75

Page 154

I recommend that General Robertson should be informed that his proposals are approved.

The Considerations.

440

As General Robertson points out, there is a limit to the amount which can physically or economically be stocked in Berlin. I regard a five months' stock as satisfactory for our purposes, on the assumption that stocks are well- balanced. The existence of such stocks in Berlin will not only tend to discourage the Russians from interfering with our communications, but it will give the inhabitants of Berlin a sense of security and will enable us to prepare in good time for the resumption of the airlift in the unlikely event of the reimposition of the blockade. On the other hand, the con- tinuance of the airlift for a day longer than is necessary could not be justified. Not only does it impose a serious financial and economic burden on this country and tie up a large proportion of our carrying capacity, but also it increases considerably the financial and economic difficulties of the German administrations both in Berlin and the Western zones, particularly as regards requisitioning of services, billets, 'etc. There is therefore a strong case for reducing the scale

of the airlift as speedily as possible, provided always that an adequate margin is left to cover our basic security require- ments and to ensure that the successful stand which we have, thanks to the airlift, been able to make in Berlin is not imperilled.

5.

It will be seen from the calculations set out in General Robertson's telegrams that we shall have during September and October a reserve carrying capacity, both by rail and barge and, if necessary, in the air, which should suffice to cover any additional requirements which may arise. No allowance has been made for the carriage of raw materials for industry nor for miscellaneous consumer goods which are largely brought in by road. Road transport does, however furnish an additional reserve capacity in case of need, but it has been excluded from the present calculations. The two Military Governors intend to observe the position carefully from week to week in order to make any necessary adjustments if deliveries fail to come up to expectations. They will also decide how best to employ any reserve carrying capacity which may become available.

6

Although I should hope that the arrangements for building up and maintaining the stock-pile in Berlin, which have been recommended by the British and United States Military Governors, would be sufficient to deter the Russians from. attempting to re-impose the blockade, we must clearly take steps to see that there is an adequate organisation left on the ground in Germany to enable the airlift to be built up again swiftly if the need should arise. To this end the two Military Governors have in particular recommended that two Troop Carrier Groups of the United States Air Force and two heavy Transport squadrons of the R. A. F. should remain in Germany. I strongly support this recommendation, which appears to be a modest and reasonable insurance against further trouble. From the general political point of view I attach great importance to the retention by the United States Govern- ment of some of their heavy aircraft in Germany. This can only be ensured if we play our part. If, therefore, the United Page 5400f660ment are prepared to kPagetw94 fer Groups, I strongly recommend that we should contribute two Transport squadrons.

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