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The existence of a Tunnel would tend to commit us to one nation-France --and to destroy or at least diminish that freedom of action which we have always striven to maintain. It is too early to be confident that our traditional policy of detachment may in no circumsances have to be revised. And no one can answer for the long-term friendship or political stability of France. Apart from the general danger of Communism there is always the risk of specific rifts in Anglo-French amity, such as the Fashoda incident or the Ruhr crisis.

(b) Danger in War-Time

Supporters of the Tunnel scheme used in the past to argue that we could rely on international instruments, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellog Peace Pact or the Locarno Treaty, to ensure peace. The results of that reliance were disappointing. To-day our strategy is based on the slender assurance of the United Nations and on alliances which include France. We hope that these alliances will remain intact; but we cannot be certain. It is quite on the cards that France may fail to recover spiritually, economically, politically and militarily; and that she will succumb to Com- munism, The present grouping of Western Union would then lose its value to the other partners, who might seek to avert further disaster by form- ing other alliances. The Channel Tunnel might then prove to be a serious embarrassment and liability unless infallible security precautions could be taken the potential efficacity of these precautions is a moot point. Lord Balfour observed on this subject: "As long as the ocean remains our friend, do not let us deliberately destroy its power to help us.

(c) The Basic Change

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The existence of a Tunnel, with its undoubted military vulnerability, would tend to create a certain nervousness in this country, against which those few miles of salt water have always, perhaps illogically, protected us. Although the aeroplane has already done much to destroy the conception of the Channel as a "moat defensive to a house," there is still an obvious signifi- cance, for the British people, in inhabiting an island having no land com- munication with its neighbours. An important element in the character of our national life would be altered by the creation of a land connection. What the precise effect would be is difficult to judge, and the point needs much thought; but one offect might for example be the weakening of that unquestioning sense of superiority over the peoples of the continent which forms an essential element in British self-confidence and which has proved its value in recent times. The preservation of our physical detachment is closely allied to our consciousness of security. Anxiety to avoid the drastic step of blowing up the tunnel might moreover inspire policies of expediency and near collaborationism.

(d) Do close contacts between peoples necessarily breed friendliness?

It has been argued that in the long run closeness of contact between peoples does not necessarily improve relations and may even do the opposite. History is full of illustrations. In face of the Communist menace it is, of course, important for all Europeans to widen their knowledge of the range of the culture which they have to defend, and our policy is to destroy the barriers which impede personal and social intercourse between the nations of the West. This old objection, however, cannot easily be dismissed, and at the least we must hold it doubtful that increased opportunities for travel really contribute a positive advantage of great importance.

(e) American Reactions

It has been argued (in paragraph 6 (c) above), that the Tunnel would appeal to the Americans. Conversely, may it not move them to demand whether it was for such ends as this that Marshall aid was given? Such long-term enterprises of unproven necessity, the more isolationist Americans might argue, are a luxury that Europe cannot yet afford; and if she has so might arguage142 of 662

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Page te ofpot available she had better use it fondaning her industry or re-equipping her armed forces.

(f) Is the Tunnel necessary?

An analogy has been drawn on commercial and social grounds between the Channel Tunnel and the St. Gothard, and the argument has been advanced that the building of the Tunnel is necessary to increase trade and other contacts between Britain and the Continent. This analogy is basically fallacious. Tunnels provide the only satisfactory passages through the Alps, which are an otherwise insurmountable barrier. The English Channel on the other hand, provides a broad highway for shipping, the most economical of all forms of transport. Many critics will undoubtedly argue that the vast capital required could be far better employed on other, more immediately profitable exercises.

(g) Delayed Effect

During the seven long years of its construction, the Tunnel might, more- over, lost much of its popularity. Money will pour down it, whilst no visible profit will emerge: loans will be floated and taxation perhaps increased: there may be accidents and interruptions. After four or five years the Tunnel may come to be regarded as a white elephant.

The most important political considerations in favour of the Tunnel are predicated on the immediate psychological effect. This effect, however, can only be of a token nature for at least the first seven years: by the end of that period many things may have changed.

Summary of Political Arguments

8. The Department is not attempting to strike a balance of the political considerations for and against the scheme. There are important short-term advantages: there are strong long-term objections. The project is not the only means to the accomplishment of the ends envisaged and there may be other less costly and less risky methods of furthering the same objects. Vital elements in our national life and character, deriving from the consciousness of living on an island, will inevitably be affected if a land connection with the Continent is created-whether for better or for worse is a matter for conjecture.

9. If a conclusion based solely on the immediate political advantages of the project had to be reached at this moment, it might be that the answer would be favourable. But if, as seems probable, economic or strategic considerations prevent a start from being made for some years to come, it may be better to defer final assessment of the political factors until the need for a decision becomes more actual. The political balance sheet may look very different in a few years' time. It would be embarrassing if, after giving its blessing to the scheme to-day, His Majesty's Government were forced to raise political objections at a later stage when the economic possibilities were more favourable. It might, accordingly, be wisest for the Foreign Office to maintain a non-committal attitude.

Economic Considerations

10. We are not called upon to put forward economic arguments, and this paper does not therefore go into such obvious points as the increase in the tourist traffic, but these arguments are bound to influence our views, and there may be certain politico-economic considerations to which we should draw the attention of the economic Departments.

11. Those Departments will doubtless be revising the estimates of cost and profit which were drawn up in 1930, but meanwhile it may be useful to make some remarks based on the calculations then made and on recent figures supplied by the Channel Tunnel Parliamentary Study Group.

12. There were two outstanding features in the conclusions drawn in 1930:

(a) Until a pilot tunnel had been constructed it could not be said with cer- tainty that the project was practicable; there might in particular be Page fissures of faults in the "Lower Chalk stratum under the sea bed;

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