7. The last occasion on which proposals for a Channel Tunnel were re- viewed by His Majesty's Government was in 1930. The views then given by the Chiefs of Staff (C.I.D. Paper No. 176-A) can be summarised as follows:---
(a) Logistic
Owing to the increased impediments of military formations (compared with 1914) the Tunnel would be unlikely to offer any advantage as com- pared with sea transport for the move of an Expeditionary Force to the Continent, even from the point of view of time.
(b) Strategic
There would be grave disadvantages in the Army being dependent for its main line of communications on a submarine tunnel, since this might have an adverse influence on strategy in an Allied withdrawal; either the British Army would become separated from its Ally in order to fall back on the Tunnel, or, falling back in conformity with its Ally, it would become separated from its base. Any Commander-in-Chief would, therefore, prefer to be dependent, as in the past, on the adaptable and well-tested system of sea communications.
(c) Cross Channel Services
The existence of the Tunnel would mean a reduction in Cross Channel steamer services, involving the disappearance of some steamers and the silting up and deterioration of the ports of Newhaven and Folkestone. On the out- break of war we should wish to use these ports and steamers for military purposes.
(d) Risk of Capture
An enemy might be prepared to take very considerable risks in an attempt to capture the Tunnel by a coup de main. Adequate provision would, there- fore, have to be made both to protect it and to put it out of action if necessary. The defence of the northern end of it would become a military commitment of the first importance, for which additional regular forces would need to be retained in the United Kingdom in peace. This might be a serious embarrassment in an emergency; it would also add considerably to the annual maintenance cost of the Tunnel.
8. The Chiefs of Staff therefore concluded that--
(a) no important military advantage was to be found in the construction of
the Tunnel;
(b) from the point of view of Imperial defence it would involve a heavy
military commitment without any corresponding advantage.
Military Developments since 1930
9. The main military developments since 1930 which have a bearing on this problem are:-
(a) The power of weapons of mass destruction and the enhanced ability to
deliver explosives by means of rockets and aircraft;
(b) advances in mining and submarine warfare;
(c) airborne forces;
(d) the increased weight of modern Army equipment and the increased
logistic support required for land and air forces.
(e) fifth column activity.
We examine below the views of the Chiefs of Staff in 1930 in the light of the above developments.
Strategic
10. In modern war, particularly if weapons of mass destruction are used, the need for spersion will be of even greater importanlagerh38rah2could, therefore, only be considered as one of several lines of communication to the Continent and not necessarily the main line. It would, however, be a most
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valuable plomatiye fhipping, since current developments in mining and sub- marine warfare constitute a greatly increased threat to sea communications.
Logistic
11. Modern Armies and Air Forces require considerably more logistic support, particularly as regards oil fuels. The petrol Pipe Line laid under the Channel during the last war was operated successfully but its capacity was limited. If the Channel Tunnel is built there would appear to be no technical difficulty in constructing a Pipe Line to go through the Pilot Tunnel or in one of the main traffic tunnels.
..
Such a Pipe Line would ease the problem on petrol and oil supply, although, as in the case with administrative support as a whole, alternative plans would have to be made in case the Tunnel should be destroyed. Furthermore, the weight and size of modern equipment, particularly tanks, heavy artillery and radar apparatus, make loading in the normal cargo ships difficult and there are very few specially fitted ships available. The proposed tunnel would be able to handle expeditiously much of this equipment, although it is unlikely to be able to take the largest items.
So long, therefore, as the Channel Tunnel and its rail connections at either end can be kept in working order, it would form a most valuable line of communica- tion, although it could never meet our full requirements. It would be particularly valuable for rapid movement of personnel and heavy equipment and would be unaffected by mining and submarine warfare.
Cross Channel Services
12. The existence of the Tunnel would reduce the use of ports on both sides of the Channel for passenger and freight traffic. This, in turn, would lead to deterioration of the ports and disappearance of Cross Channel steamers.
Although the ports of Dover, Folkestone and Newhaven are not indispensable militarily for the support of forces on the Continent, the Belgian and French Cross Channel ports will almost certainly be required. Moreover the loss of the Cross Channel steamers would be serious.
Liability to Capture
13. The use of airborne forces and the developments of fifth column techniques has increased the danger of the ends of the Tunnel being captured by surprise. Adequate arrangements will therefore be required both in peace and in war for the protection of the Tunnel and, if necessary, to put it out of action.
As regards the defence of the Tunnel exits, this should not involve a large commitment in peace, although we are placed at some disadvantage in that we cannot be responsible for the protection of the French exits.
Scientific developments should enable us to put the Tunnel itself out of action should we so desire, although this will add to the cost of construction. The decision to do this, which must be made on a Government level having regard to all the factors, might be a difficult one to make in certain circumstances and, therefore, there is the danger that such a decision might be left until too late.
Advantages
Deductions
14. The Tunnel would have the following military advantages
(a) it would provide an additional means of communication to the Continent with the valuable asset that it would not be subject to the dangers of submarines or mines;
(b) it would offer the most convenient means of transporting certain heavy
military equipment to the Continent;
(c) it would increase the speed with which available reinforcements could be
sent to the Continent.
Disadvantages
15.
plt would have the following military disadvantages of 662
(a) the Tunnel would be only slightly less vulnerable to air attack than other Cross Channel Lines of Communication. It is, however,
however, more
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vulnerable to fabotage. It can, therefore, only be considered as one
of several Lines of Communication;
(b) it would entail a small additional defence commitment in peace; (c) there is a danger that a hostile Power might capture it intact. The likelihood of this would be considerably increased if France were to come under Communist influence;
(d) the Tunnel would, in peace, take much of the traffic now handled by the Cross Channel ports. This would result in deterioration of the ports and a reduction in the number of Cross Channel steamers available. These ports and steamers are required in war.
(e) the decision to put the Tunnel out of action might be a difficult one to
make in certain circumstances.
Conclusions
16. We conclude that the military advantages are outweighed by the military disadvantages. However, the military considerations are of minor importance relative to any strong political or economic arguments for or against the project, always provided adequate means of putting the Tunnel out of action are incorporated in its construction.
TEDDER, FRASER,
(Signed)
W. J. SLIM.
Ministry of Defence, S.W. 1,
21st June, 1949.
1.
· APPENDIX B .
MEMORANDUM BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE
This is the first time since 1929 that the Government has undertaken an enquiry into the merits of a Channel Tunnel. It is also the first time since 1924 that the Foreign Office has been called upon to formulate a view. The department has accordingly attempted in this memorandum to review all the argu- ments both old and new and to assess their cogency on a strictly objective basis. The problem is one of vast implication, which merits full consideration from a fresh start.
2. The memorandum deals mainly with the political aspects of the problem; short passages have, however, been included on the economic and strategic aspects, since, although these are the primary responsibility of other departments, they nevertheless have a certain Foreign Office interest and must also influence con- sideration of the problem as a whole. It is, in fact, probable that the Govern- ment's attitude to the scheme will be decided on economic and strategic, and not on political grounds.
Historical Background
3. The idea of a submarine tunnel connecting England with the continent is about 150 years old. It was first thought of, we are told, by an ingenious Frenchman in the year 1800 as a means by which his master Napoleon could invade this island. More respectable motives inspired later studies of the idea, and in 1865 Sir John Hawkshaw undertook geological surveys of the English and French coasts. Further surveys were made in 1875 by the newly-formed French Tunnel Company. In 1881 experimental shafts were sunk near Dover by the South Eastern Railway Company. Military fears and opposition were then aroused and have ever since that time held back the project.
4. Attempts to revive the scheme in Parliament were regularly defeated until the year 1929, when Mr. Baldwin was obliged to set up an Economic Com- mittee of Enquiry. In 1930 this committee published its report which, briefly, held the scheme to be physically feasible and economically justifiable; Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's overnment, However, rejected it on physical, economic and military
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grounds. In the subsequent debate in the House the Government only secured the defeat of 4heofcheme by the narrow majority oPaeven 49tef 66n the House to-day 200 Members have put their names under the motion.
Past Foreign Office Views
5. Our archives show that opinion in the Foreign Office, both official and ministerial, has always been heavily against the tunnel.
The Political Arguments in Favour
6. The construction of a tunnel under the Channel promises certain political advantages which are both substantial in themselves and easily perceptible to the public at large. They can be summarised as follows:-
(a) The Effect on our European Allies
Many of our European allies in Western Union and the Atlantic Pact are still unconvinced that we have really abandoned our traditional policy of retaining our freedom of action by avoiding entagling continental alliances. It would go far to convince our sceptical allies if the British Government should now, after firmly opposing the construction of a Channel tunnel for over seventy years, give support to the project, which would be a symbol of the new relationship which we are trying to set up among the countries of Europe-in other words, the "Spirit of Western Union. If we can give the lead, we shall be taking a really big, imaginative and con- structive step towards the recovery and integration of Western Europe. There is reason to believe that the French, who, of course, have nothing to lose politically or strategically, would welcome the project.
(b) The Effect on the U.S.S.R.
The project should discourage Soviet hopes of driving a wedge between the nations of Western Europe. It should also impress the Kremlin with the initiative, co-operation, wealth and mechanical skill of the Western Powers.
(c) The Effect on the United States
The tunnel should appeal to those elements of governmental and public opinion in the United States which desire to see material evidence of closer co-operation and self-help amongst the countries of Europe. Generally speaking, it is the kind of project to strike the American imagination, both because of its technical nature and because of its appeal to the sentiments of human brotherhood and neighbourliness.
(d) The Effect on British Public Opinion
The project should help to bring home to public opinion in this country the importance and permanence of recent changes in British foreign policy. It should create a more real appreciation amongst English people of the fact that the security and prosperity of France and of Western Europe generally are essential to Britain's security and prosperity and that we are now in every sense a part of Europe.
(e) Freedom of Movement
A Channel Tunnel would increase the freedom of movement and the speed and comfort of travel between the Continent and the United Kingdom, and should thus, by encouraging travel in each direction, be an instrument for greater understanding and sympathy between the nations. Cultural, social, sporting and political contacts should be amplified by it.
(f) The Council of Europe
The project would be a most suitable practical subject for discussion by the Council of Europe when it is set up and would give it just the sort of fillip which it will need to establish itself as an organisation capable of dealing with large-scale practical European problems.
The Political 44rguments Against.
7. Against these attractions of the project have been advanced against it for the past half to a greater of lesser degree, to be valid to-day.
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