CAB129-36 — Page 134

Printed for the Cabinet. July 1949

Page 134

66

SECRET

C.P. (49) 153

15th July, 1949

CABINET

Copy No. 31

CHANNEL TUNNEL

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER

On 5th May, 1949 (C.M. (49) 32nd Conclusions, Minute 3), the Cabinet agreed that the Government should define their present attitude on the Channel Tunnel question, in case the matter should be raised by European Governments, either in the Council of Europe or otherwise; and the intention, then was that a Committee should be appointed for this purpose. Subsequently, the Prime Minister decided that it was not necessary to appoint a formal Committee, and that it would be sufficient for the interested Departments to put their views in writing. He asked me to arrange this, and the following is my report.

I invited those Ministers who, departmentally, are most closely concerned with this question, to give me their views in the light of present conditions, military, political and economic. All these conditions have changed considerably since 1930, when the proposal for a Channel Tunnel was last carefully studied. My colleagues, whom I have consulted, are unanimous against the early construc- tion of a Tunnel, and their general opinion is against it, even as a long-term project. In addition to the summary of their views; which is contained in paragraphs 3-6 of this paper, I attach as appendices--

(1) An appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff (Appendix A).

(2) A memorandum by the Foreign Office (Appendix B).

(3) A memorandum by the Board of Trade (Appendix C).

(4) A memorandum by the Minister of Transport (Appendix D).

2. Historical.-A proposal for the construction of a Tunnel under the Channel was first made by a French mining engineer named Mathieu. This proposal was made in 1802, a year when we had a few months' respite in our long war with France lasting from 1792 to 1815. Mathieu's proposal was made to Napoleon, and was supported by Charles James Fox. Since that time there have been many studies and discussions on this subject, including five inquiries by the British Government in the present century, in 1906-07, in 1914, in 1919-20, in 1924 and in 1929-30. On this last occasion economic opinion was divided, but Service opinion was, as it has consistently been, against the construction of the Tunnel. In the House of Commons on 30th June, 1930, a Private Member's motion in support of the Tunnel was defeated, on a free vote, by 179 votes to 172.

Among past Prime Ministers and other leading political figures who have expressed an opinion on this subject from time to time, there has been a very heavy majority against the Tunnel, its chief supporter having been Mr. Churchill.

The history of past discussions is summarised in Committee of Imperial Defence Paper No. 164-A of January 1929, and reference may also be made to C.I.D. Paper No. 174-A of May 1930, to the Report of the Channel Tunnel Policy Committee of the Economic Advisory Council of March 1930, and to the Report of the Channel Tunnel Committee (Cmd. 3513) of March 1930.

3. Defence Arguments.-In their new appreciation the Chiefs of Staff point out that in page the conclusion of their predecessors was that no important

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militaPaadvantage would be found in the construtore qf3 the fomnel and that, indeed, it would involve a heavy new military commitment without any corre- sponding advantage. The main military changes since 1930 which have a bearing on the matter are the development of weapons of mass destruction, advances in mining and submarine warfare, airborne forces, increased weight of modern equipment and fifth column activity.

Some of these developments strengthen the case for the Tunnel. It would, for example, provide an additional means of reinforcing armies on the Continent, and for sending heavy military equipment by a route not subject to attack by mines or submarines. But, after taking into account the vulnerability of the Tunnel to air attack, and the problems involved in defending the exits and making arrangements for the Tunnel to be put out of action at short notice, the Chiefs of Staff now conclude "that the military advantages are outweighed by the military disadvantages. However, the military considerations are of minor importance relative to any strong political and economic arguments for or against the project, always provided adequate means of putting the Tunnel out of action are incorporated in its construction.'

"while

4. Political Arguments.-The Foreign Secretary's view is that, there is no political objection to the scheme, the matter is purely academic, since in present circumstances, when there are so many other projects involving capital expenditure which must have a prior claim both from the political and from other points of view, we could not possibly justify the dissipation of our limited. resources on a scheme of this nature." A detailed examination is made in a Foreign Office memorandum which concludes that, although important short-term political advantages would flow from the construction of the Tunnel, there are also strong long-term objections, largely arising from the uncertainty of French political developments.

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5. Economic Arguments. The view of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is that over a period of years the necessary money (possibly about £90 million) and other resources for the Tunnel could be made available as part of our capital investment programme. It would, however, be necessary to squeeze out other large projects and "it would not be sensible to devote so large an amount out of our resources to this project unless it was thought to have substantial advantages, economic, political and strategic." The Chancellor also thinks that developments since 1930, including the growth of air travel and the introduction of the train ferry, together with the experience of the last war, may well be said to have diminished the attractions of the Tunnel rather than increased them.

The President of the Board of Trade considers that the commercial success of the Tunnel must depend upon (a) a reduction in the cost of cross-Channel transit compared with existing services and (b) the development of new traffic. It appears that comparatively little would be saved by the abandonment of existing services (e.g., ships, ports, rolling stock, &c.). Against this must be set the cost of upkeep of the Tunnel and the high capital charges that would be incurred. The economic case must, therefore, rest largely on the additional traffic that would be developed by the Tunnel. As regards passenger traffic, the prospects of a large increase are very speculative, and it would be hard to justify heavy capital expenditure to meet so uncertain a demand. Increased traffic in goods would probably consist mainly of imports of perishable agricultural produce and luxury goods, and it is most unlikely, on balance of payments grounds, that this could be allowed to go very far. The direct stimulus to British exports would probably be very limited.

The Minister of Transport considers that a through route between this country and the Continent might have great psychological value for European unity, but doubts whether the Tunnel would be more effective, from this point of view, than an improvement in the existing cross-Channel services. These services are maintained by a fleet.of specially constructed vessels and are capable of great development, particularly the train ferry. If the Tunnel were built, these services would wither away. The Tunnel would tend to monopolise the cross-Channel traffic and we should, therefore, be relying on one highly vulnerable means of communication, insfod of having our communications pragover large number of ports and routes. The maintenance of the present shipping routes, and par- ticularly the improvement of the train ferry service, is the right transport policy

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