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Military operations have not been going too well for the rebels; the difficulties of supplying them have been increased by the defection of Yugoslavia; and communist influence among the Greek population as a whole has dwindled, partly as the result of successful police action in destroying secret communist organisations and partly as the result of a genuine popular revulsion against the traitorous role of the Greek Communist Party. The object of the Soviet Government is no doubt to enable them to recover from this unfavourable situation and to prepare the way for a new lease of life for the Greek Communist Party. Having failed to destroy the Greek State by force from without, the Soviet Government would now like to regain the opportunity of subverting it from within by "lawful" infiltration. They may also wish to have their hands free to deal with Yugoslavia and may even be activated by fear of an entente of some kind between Yugoslavia and Greece.

5. because:

6.

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

The Soviet proposals are unacceptable as they stand

the Greek Government would rightly refuse to agree to take part in any scheme which placed the rebel junta on the same juridical basis as themselves;

they would, rightly, insist on a rebel surrender

being a prerequisite of any settlement; and

Soviet representation in any international body

supervising an amnesty accompanying the cessation of hostilities or supervising new elections would, unless special safeguards were devised, give the Soviet Government endless opportunities of making a genuine and favourable settlement impossible.

The Greek Government would have to be persuaded to invite a supervisory body and might well refuse to do so if Soviet participation in this supervision were made a condition, though they might be persuaded to agree to Soviet participation if it could somehow be made innocuous.

7.

Our aim should therefore be to endeavour, with out appearing unreasonable or obstructive, to exclude the Soviet Government from participation in the supervision of a cease-fire, general amnesty or elections. At most, we might concede the principle of Soviet participation in the supervision of new elections provided that the Western Powers were satisfied that conditions under which a fair and free election could be held had first been achieved in Greece. At best, many months must pass before any such conditions could exist.

8.

Dr. Evatt, President of the United Nations Assembly, is also continuing his attempts to conciliate Greece and her northern neighbours. These broke down last November mainly because the Yugoslav Government were unwilling to conclude a frontier agreement with Greece. A contributory cause may well have been Greek insistence on reserving the right to raise through the appropriate channel their claim to Northern Epirus. The present position is understood to be that the Greeks will insist on no explicit reservation on this point in any draft agreement to be discussed with Albania but will not agree to any text which even by implication might suggest that their claim had beenPage°V₤366

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