CAB129-33 — Page 394

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(h) the easing of tension between India and Pakistan; (i) the demonstration by Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan that, given peace and good order, a settled administration and a reasonably stable currency, the great productive and trading aptitudes of the population come into play. Siam points in the same direction;

and from a more specifically British point of view-

(j) the maintenance of our good name, political influence and economic interests thanks to the example set to the world by the British people in their efforts towards recovery;

to our act of policy in India;

to our policy of non-intervention and unperturbed watchful waiting in

China;

to the zeal, demeanour and resource of our representatives, whether of the foreign, Colonial, Commonwealth or armed services, and the growing spirit of collaboration among them, matching the endeavours of our people at home; and to the integrity, experience, enterprise and flexibility of reactions to new conditions shown by our business communities, the growth of a team spirit among them, and of confidence between them and the official side.

8. This would suggest that we have a part to play in this area which can be played by no other Power, though we clearly cannot play it alone. It can be best played by a combination of British experience and United States resources.

9. Finally, I would express my sincere thanks to you Sir, for making my journey possible; to my colleagues of the Foreign Service whose generous and thoughtful assistance multiplied the benefit and lightened the burden of the tour; and to His Majesty's High Commissioners at Karachi and Delhi, the Commissioner-General at Singapore, the Governors of Singapore and Hong Kong and the High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya and their staffs for all the courtesies and the very great kindness which I received at their hands..

II.-Notes on Tour

A.-Alexandria: 12th January, 1949

I stayed the night with the Consul-General. His Majesty's Ambassador, Sir J. Troutbeck (British Middle East Office) and the two Commanders-in-Chief (General Sir J. Crocker and Air Marshal Sir W. Dickson) came from Cairo to see me and spent the night also. We had talks before and after dinner.

2. The following are some of the points made :-

Palestine. (At this date, His Majesty's Government had not yet recognised Israel.)

(a) Agreement between Israel, Transjordan and Egypt should be promoted; (b) The frontiers of Israel should satisfy the conditions→→→

(i) of being not too unsatisfactory from the point of view of the defence of the Canal Zone. The G.O.C. stressed the vital importance of the Canal Zone and of Egypt generally from the point of view of the defence of the whole Middle East; (ii) of being likely to gain the acquiescence, in the long run at any

rate, of the Arab States;

(c) Israel should be drawn into the orbit of the Western Powers and denied to Soviet influence; for this reason the moderate Israeli parties should be supported. This is vital from the point of view of defence. (d) To this end, a joint United Kingdom-United States policy should be worked out. Diplomatic action should be taken both with Israel and the Arab States. The United States taking the lead in appropriate

cases in agreement with the United Kingdom. Page 394 of 488

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3. Middle East generally-Once the Palestine question is settled,

Page 395 of Anted Kingdom

of 488

Defence arrangements should be worked out between

and the Arab States.

(b) The United States should be associated with these, the object being (i) to build up a Middle Eastern front against the Soviet Union; (ii) to safeguard Middle Eastern oil supplies.

Arab States, particularly Iraq and Persia.

(d) A meeting should be held in London next summer attended by His Majesty's Representatives in the Middle East, the Commanders-in- Chief and representatives of the London Departments concerned. A time could be chosen when some of our representatives would normally be on leave. This was thought preferable to a meeting in Cairo or elsewhere in the Middle East.

(e) Commanders-in-Chief should have greater liberty to discuss defence matters with His Majesty's Representatives. At present, while they may talk to Sir J. Troutbeck, they may not open themselves fully to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo.

(f) Special attention should be given to the relationship between the new United States co-ordinator of plans and (i) our own Commanders-in- Chief (ii) the Governments of Arab States.

B.-Karachi: 14th-16th January, 1949

4. The High Commissioner (Sir L. Grafftey-Smith) kindly made it possible for me to see the Governor-General, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, some of his foreign and Commonwealth colleagues, and members of the British business community. At Karachi, as at other posts, I made a point of seeing as many as possible of the members of the Foreign Service of all grades, privately or at their work, paying particular attention at Karachi (as at Delhi and Calcutta) to our new colleagues from the Indian Civil and Political Services.

5. His Majesty's Ambassador at Kabul (Sir Giles Squire) came to Karachi to meet me and I had long talks with him about the situation in Afghanistan, and in particular about the present Afghan-Pakistan difference about the North-West Frontier Province. The Afghan Ambassador at Karachi (His Royal Highness Sardar Shah Wali Khan) joined us on one occasion and proved as persistent, if more reasonable and moderate, an advocate of the Afghan case as his colleague in London.

6. The Governor-General (His Excellency Khwaja Nazimuddin) was kind enough to ask me to lunch. It was a cordial and pleasant occasion at which little business was talked. His Excellency mentioned in passing Pakistan's need for arms and other supplies and for assistance from the United Kingdom in getting them. He also alluded to the difficulty of recruiting staff for the Pakistan armed and civil services.

7. At this lunch I met my opposite number in the Pakistan Foreign Office (Ikramullah). He was anxious to learn what were the functions of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office and his relationship with the Permanent Under-Secretary. The Prime Minister was about to appoint a deputy Foreign Minister and wanted to study precedent. I did my best to enlighten him and wrote out a few notes for him.

8. The Foreign Minister (Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan) asked me to tea at his house. We talked no business-he had just concluded some arduous negotiations with the Indian Government about property claims and was on the point of starting on a visit to Lahore. Instead he treated me to a brilliant talk on the topography of Devon and Cornwall and on his adventures in the remoter parts of Sweden and Finland. On this tour he had had no rival as a talker except General MacArthur.

9. My talk with the Prime Minister (Liaqat Ali Khan) was another matter. I found him studying a telegram recently received from London about the change in the King's title as a result of developments in Ireland and about the consequent need for legislative action in all Commonwealth countries. The point which was exercising his mind was how to describe in persuasive form for Barliamentary

purposes the advantages for Pakistan of staying in the Commonwealth when it was clear thap some of the mage solid of these advantages would still be eRİ WEJ by Ireland after she went out. We ranged over this question for some time and I suggested that he should discuss it with the United Kingdom High Commissioner who was more competent to help him than I could be.

10. He went on to put the Pakistani case about the frontier question with Afghanistan. The Afghan agitation was the agitation of a Kabul clique and not of the Afghan people. The Afghans threatened that they could make trouble in the North-West Frontier Province but the truth was that Pakistan could make more trouble for Afghanistan than Afghanistan for Pakistan. The people of the tribal areas had no desire to join Afghanistan. He was ready to test this by plebiscite. Pakistan was spending on the North-West Frontier Province as much as the whole Afghan budget. As regards a change of name to Pathanistan, he could not agree to any name which would have a tribal connotation. If he did, there would be the same problem in the West Punjab and in the East Bengal. He added, incidentally, that Pakistan was garrisoning the frontier area with one brigade, while the British had needed fifty battalions in their day. In reply to this uncompromising view, I told the Prime Minister that this frontier question was one to which the Secretary of State had given his personal attention and that he earnestly desired a settlement of it: it would be well worth Pakistan's while, in the general interest, to get this controversy out of the way.

11. Other topics touched on by Liaqat Ali were Pakistan's need for supplies and equipment for irrigation developments; and his pet idea of an anti- Communist bloc from Turkey to Pakistan.

12. On Indonesia he spoke at somewhat greater length and with what I thought was moderation and good sense. The Dutch would not gain but lose by their latest police action. Already they were in military difficulties. They would not be able to maintain their position by force. What they should have done was to model themselves as far as possible on British action in India. The Indonesians, who are not strong enough or experienced enough to march alone, would in the long run then turn to the Dutch again for assistance, as Pakistan and India will do to the British. Old associations will count for much; they have had their beneficial side, as is now readily admitted. Instead of promoting in this way the development of collaboration between East and West on a new basis, the Dutch have poisoned the whole situation in South-East Asia. I found this analysis of great value in talking to the Dutch in Batavia and on other occasions.

13. I had a good deal of talk from time to time with the High Commissioner on such matters as the supply of information on foreign affairs to Commonwealth posts; the future of ex-Indian Civil Service members of the Foreign Service, of whom there are quite a number in Pakistan; the relations between the Missions at Karachi and Delhi, which are excellent, though they do not see all matters in the same light; the advantages and disadvantages of membership of the Commonwealth for Pakistan and India. Some of these were not, of course, my affair, but I was glad to learn about them.

C.-New Delhi: 16th-20th January, 1949

14. For reasons which will be plain from the introductory remarks, the visit to Delhi was one of the high spots of the tour, and an indispensable preliminary to a visit to South-East Asia.

15. The High Commissioner (General Sir Archibald Nye) believes that there is probably greater scope for the development of British influence and the exercise of British action in India at the present time than anywhere else. He thinks that good will between the British peoples and their Governments, following upon the far-sighted and statesman-like action of His Majesty's Government in 1947, can be developed and turned to material advantage. We have an opportunity which ought not to be missed. But we must choose our men well (Sir A. Nye has ideas about this which will be recorded elsewhere) and act with circumspection. We are tending a delicate plant. The responsibility has sobered Nehru, Patel and other members of the administration, who all feel the need for support and advice. But thegare only likely to seek or accept such support or advice, especially the latter, if they have confidence in the sincerity and friendliness with which it

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is tendered. On the Kashmir question, he had waited for an approach from Nepruamb then,488 only then, had advised thap there should be no military solution but that the Indian Government should make a gesture in the direction of a political solution. He thought his advice, reinforced by the steadiness and wisdom of the Indian Commander-in-Chief, General Bucher, had borne fruit. In order to exercise such influence at the right moment, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, it is essential that the High Commissioner should receive full and timely information about events in the foreign field. In this respect, there had latterly been a great improvement. Since Foreign Office telegrams had begun to be repeated direct to him, on, e.g., Indonesia, he was fully in the picture and had no complaints.

16. General Nye thinks it likely that, under stress of responsibility, the minds of the Indian leaders will move slowly from some earlier anti-British, anti- Commonwealth and anti-Western positions and see that politically, ideologically and economically, the future of India lies in association with the West, in particular with the United Kingdom, rather than as an independent country, mediating between Western ideas and communism and leading India against the rest. I will not develop here his reasons for this: they seemed to me to be cogent.

17. The High Commissioner and I dined en famille with the Prime Minister (Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru) and his sister (Mrs. Pandit, Indian Ambassador at Moscow) and her two daughters. The splendours of the former Commander-in- Chief's house, where he has now been bidden to live, seemed to irk him. He was unwell and rather silent at dinner, but afterwards he took me into a corner and talked. He chose the topics himself.

18. He spoke first of communism. The results of communism in Russia must in the long run be evil because the means are evil. He said this in spite of the intellectual attraction which Marxism has for him. Marxism supplies a coherent explanation of the march of history and none has tried to do this since Marx. Perhaps it is now possible to compass such a synthesis. The vast develop- ment of scientific discovery has made the world almost incomprehensible to the single mind. Marx may be out of date now, but at least he tried and has had no successors. He added, incidentally, that he though that communism, in whatever country it might appear, would in the long run be overlaid and transformed by the national character, which must prevail in the end.

19.

About Malaya, he wondered. why we were finding it so difficult to suppress the Communists and restore law and order. Was this not because the so-called bandits had support from the local population for economic reasons? Would it not be well, therefore, to supplement the measures of suppression with measures to improve the material welfare of the people at large? As he had given me an opening, I asked him, given that it had always been and still was our policy to work towards the autonomy and eventual independence of colonial territories, how he saw the future of Malaya. To this he had no ready answer. He admitted the difficulties of a plural community (in which incidentally he complained that Indians were less well treated than Chinese). He thought that a composite or multilateral state might be the eventual solution. But he did not seem to think the problem an urgent one. He did not mention Indonesia (though this was the eve of the Delhi Conference) except to say that Malaya and Indonesia (unlike Burma) were territories which had had close and sympathetic contact with India in the past and where. Indian influence was strong. I repeated this part of the conversation in my various talks at Singapore and Kuala Lumpur.

20. The Governor-General (C. Rajagopalachari) kindly invited me to tea at the former Viceroy's house, which he now occupies. His Highness the Gaekwar of Baroda was présent for a short time, but he took his leave and I was alone with His Excellency (as he dislikes being called) for over an hour.

21. He started (I don't know why) by expatiating on the advantages of monarchy and of the disability of Presidents and elected or nominated persons like Mr. Truman or himself. The absence of monarchy leaves a lacuna in the lives of the people. The Indian people, in particular, need a symbol in their system of government. The princely families, had they not become degenerate and lifeless, might have furnished a constitutional monarch, but there was now small hope of this. Once the great figures of the liberation had passed away, there would be a gap which it would be difficult to fill. He was astonished that the régime had suivaged 39 welf 488 had the blood-bath India hadagne 30700gh488

22. He was much in favour of the establishment of provinces on a linguistic basis. Thiagala9&isrupt the unity of India. NationalismPage 39 disruptive force. Better a rather weaker state based on the toleration of variety. Such apparent weakness was not necessarily such a disadvantage as the apparent strength of the national state. The Europeans would have done better to preserve the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

23. He thought that fear of the atomic bomb was the cause of the present tension in the world and this would lead to war unless the tension could be eased. The best way to ease the tension would be not only to outlaw the use of the atomic bomb but to call a halt to all atomic research, peaceful as well as warlike, for a period. The world really didn't need, in a material sense, the fruits of atomic research in industry in the present phase. Better establish peace on a sure footing first. The Soviet régime might evolve in the direction of moderation and scrupulousness if tension, based on fear, could be removed. But time would be required, and an act of faith.

24. He thought that the British had given great gifts to India. They were the rule of law, the heritage of a great literature, and the freedom of the individual and an instinct for liberal democracy.

25. He said that the present United States way of life would lead to chaos and would have to be reformed when the time of scarcity arrived.

26. I was much taken by the Governor-General's shrewdness, wisdom and simple friendliness. He walked with me round the great garden, in this season at its brilliant best, which, with certain adventitious mechanical aids in the matter of the movement of waters, imitates the famous gardens of Moghul days. At one point he stopped and asked: What am I to do about all this pomp? I employ 5,000 men on these estates.'

27. I spent a short while with Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai (Secretary-General, Ministry of External and Commonwealth Relations), an old friend. We eschewed speculations and got down to business. -

28. He did not think that the present system of communicating information on foreign affairs from London to Delhi by telegram was adequate. More should be done through the High Commissioner and his staff in London. He was arranging to have the High Commissioner's staff reorganised and reinforced for this purpose. He hoped that the Foreign Office would give the High Com- missioners' office liberal day-to-day information, especially on European affairs, on which the Government of India had no other good source of information. Their missions in Europe were not yet competent to render adequate reports. On matters of current interest, where urgent action was being taken in the inter- national field, it would be useful if information could come through the High Commissioner in Delhi also. He would always be at the disposal of Sir A. Nye, of whom he spoke in very warm terms. He also threw out the suggestion that members of the Foreign Office should come to Delhi from time to time.

29. Like his colleague in Karachi, Sir Girja was anxious to know some- thing about the functions of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as there was some question of appointing a Deputy Minister, I enlightened him to the best of my ability.

30. As I was taking my leave, Sir Girja went out of his way to say that India was not seeking the leadership of Asia; but that events were forcing this rôle upon them.

31. I called on Sir Girja's two subordinates, the Foreign Secretary (K.P.S. Menon) and the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations (S. Dutt). Nothing of moment passed, but it may be worth recording that the latter had prepared a series of questions for me (which I did my best to answer) on our system of posting and promotions in the Foreign Service, how we tackled the problem of specialisation, how we organised the Commercial Diplomatic Service, and how the Foreign Office maintained liaison with the Commonwealth Relations Office.

32. One of my most interesting talks was with H. V. R. Iyengar (Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs), ex-Indian Civil Service and a former Private Secretary topthe Pruge Minister. He spoke first about commRaign398hefe48 about 100,000 party members in India, about 1,500 of them in prison. There

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are no Communist members of the legislature. Communism is not banned, except in Bengal The Communist press is free. The Communists are hostile to the Congress Party. This is the usual situation. Communists support the Nationalist Party until it attains. power, and then try to undermine it. This is one reason why the French and Dutch are unwise in weakening the Nationalist Parties in South-East Asia. This will play into the hands of the Communists.

33. Suppression alone, he thinks, is no cure for communism. There are 12,000 troops acting against the Communists in Hyderabad, but at the same time remedial economic measures are being taken. Like Pandit Nehru, he wondered whether some such combination should not be tried in Malaya. The economic life of the people was of a very low standard and should be raised.

34. On the French and Portuguese establishments in India he says that Nehru's policy was not to squeeze them out, but rather to press that the people should decide their future. The Government of India would have patience. But the French and Portuguese were behaving foolishly. However, there were more important questions than these.

35. India, he said, needed economic assistance: not a dole, but a loan and facilities to purchase. India was passing through a very difficult period. Only men of the personal prestige of Nehru and Patel and Rajagopalachari could have pulled her through.

36. He thought it important not to underestimate the importance of the Far East, but he recognised the importance of Europe in the present state of the world. It was also important to realise that the Americans, for all their good will, could not supply everything that everybody wanted.

37. He made a point of saying that relations between the United Kingdom High Commission, under the present High Commissioner, and the Ministry of External Affairs, were very cordial. There had been a certain coolness at an earlier stage.

38. The High Commissioner and I dined alone with the United States Ambassador (Mr. Loy Henderson), with whom I was already well acquainted. Mr. Henderson is taking his duties very seriously and is showing a good deal of public activity, not always of the most adroit. He is much incensed by Indian criticism of the American way of life and of United States policy, more so, I should have thought, than he need be. Though he has given his staff strict instructions not to express or countenance anti-British sentiments, I think he is rather restive at finding that Indian criticism is so often directed against the United States rather than against the United Kingdom (the same is true of China).

39. I also met Indian journalists, the new Indian Commander-in-Chief (General Cariappa) and his predecessor (General Bucher), and the Canadian, Australian and Chinese representatives.

40. It remains to touch on the visit of Dr. Burton, Dr. Evatt's chief lieutenant, who came to represent Australia at the Delhi Conference on Indonesia which opened on the day of my departure. I had several talks with him and the High Commissioner. He is obviously a man of great ability and has the gift of imagination; but we found that he had arrived with a distorted idea of United Kingdom policy on Indonesia and that he had seemed to attach greater weight to press reports and speculations than to official information from London. He seemed to have convinced himself that the United Kingdom Government had known in advance that the Dutch would take their second police action; that the United Kingdom Government had been consulted by Pandit Nehru before he had called the Conference; that the United Kingdom Government had assured the Dutch on the quiet that no action would be taken against them and that the Atlantic Pact would take first place; and that the arms which the Dutch were using in Indonesia had been bought with dollars supplied under the European Recovery Programme. That, in fact, there was nothing to be done with the Dutch, except apply sanctions; that Dutch action was a breach of the Charter; and that sanctions should be applied whatever the consequences might be in other parts of the world.

41. General Nye's handling of him could not have been better. He was firm but friendly; and, basing himself on the ample documentation received from London, wRage139 ofing&Dr. Burton to see United Kingdom polity48 a rather less

jaundiced light. I do not record all this for its own merits, but rather to show, by example, how asset 48&that our High Commissioners ag Commonwealth countries should have prompt, ample, first-hand information on foreign questions affecting the countries in which they serve.

D.-Calcutta: 20th January, 1949

42. We spent only a short night at Calcutta, but were able to see some of the staff of the Deputy High Commission and of the business community. What we heard tended to confirm what we had been told at Delhi, namely, that a new and better relationship was tending to grow up between British and Indians, and that prospects for British commerce were promising: we were getting contracts now that we should probably not have got before, in the days of political tension.

E-Rangoon: 21st-23rd January, 1949

43. Burma presents a much less encouraging picture than India and this was reflected in all that we heard there. I saw several of the Burmese Ministers, as well as the President. The interview with the last named was purely social and we talked no business.

44. The Prime Minister (Thakin Nu) gave the Ambassador (Mr. Bowker) and myself tea one afternoon in the garden of his house, which, like all Burmese official residences and public offices, was enclosed in a compound protected by barbed wire and closely guarded. Mr. Bowker took occasion to conduct some official business with the Prime Minister and from the latter's demeanour I was able to judge why it is said that, while a man of integrity, simplicity, even of saintliness, he is also suspicious, credulous, stubborn and slow.

45. We found Thakin Nu still intent on leaving the Government at an early date. He thinks he can organise support for the Government among party members and among the people at large from outside better than from inside. I expressed the Secretary of State's misgivings at this prospect.

46. On more general topics, Thakin Nu recalled that he had recently stated in public that he would rather be free than ruled by others; but if he had to be ruled by others he preferred the British. The British had introduced the rule of law into Burma, and the idea of personal freedom. In fact, better the devil you know than the devil you don't. I found this sentiment expressed in India also.

47. He put in a pressing plea for financial aid from the United Kingdom, but did not deny that, for all that, the Government were taking an anti-capitalist line, including His Majesty's Government, in their strictures, and that there was a good deal of anti-British propaganda in the country. He asked about Chinese communism and I gave the view current in London, as expressed in Intels, and confirmed to me by the Chinese Ambassador to India with whom I had a talk in Delhi. He himself was cautious and non-committal.

•

48. I did not see the Foreign Minister on this occasion, but he came to the Marine Airport to see me for a while on my return journey. Of the other Ministers, I saw most of U Ohn, Minister of Commerce, and Ambassador- Designate to London. He said, among other things that he was contemplating an appeal to the Burmese people for austerity in the use of rice, to avoid waste and reduce consumption, and so increase the amount available for export. An ethical and humanitarian appeal of this kind should be effective with the Burmese people. He also said that he was in favour of developing Burma's other natural resources to the maximum, but for the good of mankind and not for Burmese domestic advantage.

49. His Majesty's Ambassador has excellent contacts with Burmese Ministers and officials and they come gladly to his house. During my visit the formidable U Ba Swe, Secretary-General of the anti-Fascist People's Freedom, League and of the Socialist Party, came to the Embassy for the first time.

50. The senior Burmese officials whom I saw were generally in despondent mood. Some of them were inclined to blame us for having handed Burma over to an inexperienced Government which would not face facts or listen to skilled advice, but preferred to rely on outsiders of doubtful integrity. They had good off 488ir experienced British and Indian officials, and had not enough good officials to carry

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are no Communist members of the legislature. Communism is not banned, except in Bengall fh488ommunist press is free. The Corgourists fares Bostile to the Congress Party. This is the usual situation. Communists support the Nationalist Party until it attains power, and then try to undermine it. This is one reason why the French and Dutch are unwise in weakening the Nationalist Parties in South-East Asia. This will play into the hands of the Communists.

39. I also met Indian journalists, the new Indian Commander-in-Chief (General Cariappa) and his predecessor (General Bucher), and the Canadian, Australian and Chinese representatives.

41. General Nye's handling of him could not have been better. He was firm but friendly; and, basing himself on the ample documentation received from London,

wargable too bang Dr. Burton to see United Kingom feceived from London,

jaundiced light. I do not record all this for its own merits, but rather to show, by example, how assential it4s that our High Commissioners Commonwealth countries should have prompt, ample, first-hand information on foreign questions affecting the countries in which they serve.

D.-Calcutta: 20th January, 1949

E-Rangoon: 21st-23rd January, 1949

45. We found Thakin Nu still intent on leaving the Government at an early date. He thinks he can organise support for the Government among party members and among the people at large from outside better than from inside. expressed the Secretary of State's misgivings at this prospect.

don't. I found this sentiment expressed in India also.

49. His Majesty's Ambassador has excellent contacts with Burmese Ministers and officials and they come gladly to his house. During my visit the formidable U Ba Swe, Secretary-General of the anti-Fascist People's Freedom League and of the Socialist Party, came to the Embassy for the first time.

50. The senior Burmese officials whom I saw were generally in despondent mood. Some of them were inclined to blame us for having handed Burma over to an inexperienced Government which would not face facts or listen to skilled advice, but preferred to rely on outsiders of doubtful integrity. They had got grid of 48gr experienced British and Indian officials, and had not enough good officials to carry

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on with, and many of these were quitting in despair. Some of them said that if Aung San hadf 488, Burma might still be in the Commonwealthf 488

51. According to one of the British advisers still employed by the Burmese Government the most encouraging and stabilising element in the present precarious situation is the administration of law, based on English principles and still applied with integrity by the judges. Another of them, a man of great experience, said that no wise man could prophesy about the future of Burma. The real obstacle to progress was that the people did not really need to work hard. There was no lack of food; they need never be cold, and clothing was simple; and bamboo and thatch for shelter were there to be picked up.

52. The British commercial community were naturally despondent, but in quite good heart, determined to go on hoping for a turn to better days. One of them thought that the local Chinese, in league with their compatriots in China, were laying plans to take advantage of Burma's present weakness, and that, as this would not be in India's interest, Nehru should intervene and try to have order restored.

53 Mr. Potter, the Financial Adviser to our Missions in Karachi, Delhi and Rangoon, was good enough to give me a comprehensive review of the situation which, though it will be familiar to Departments, I will record here.

54. He said the plain fact was that the country was in ruins. It had been twice fought over and once occupied. The year after the end of hostilities had been disastrous. By collaborating with Aung San, instead of driving him into rebellion, we could have set the administration on the right road. Political parties now had well-armed private armies, with British weapons acquired during the resistance or since. There were three left-wing armies, and lots of things in addition. The rice mills just across the river from Rangoon were still being held to ransom. All this, in addition to the trouble with the Karens.

55. Burma, unlike India and Pakistan, had unwisely dismissed all British officials. This was a mark of inexperience and conceit. The Burmese Govern- ment did not trust its own skilled officials, who were now leaving Government service. The administration was pitifully understaffed. The Finance Ministry was on the verge of a breakdown. The banks were in rather better shape. Even if law and order could be restored, the country could not be run with its present staff. In spite of this, the Government were launching into new State enterprises -river shipping, timber, oil. They needed £13 million to balance the budget, £9 million from the Oil Company and several millions more to move the rice crop.

The

56. If financial help was to be given, it was essential to provide safeguards, such as the appointment of foreign advisers, especially in finance and banking. There should also be compensation arrangements. The United Kingdom could not conduct this kind of operation alone, if only for political reasons. Burmese were turning to us, but still regarded us as predatory capitalists who had exploited Burma in the past and now owed Burma something in return. They would not easily agree to safeguards or compensation. On the other hand, it was essential that Burmese Ministers should face the facts and take steps to develop the vast potential wealth of the country.

57. In Mr. Potter's view, which is shared by His Majesty's Ambassador, the Burmese problem should be tackled jointly by the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan. Pandit Nehru could speak with authority to the Burmese Minister as ostensibly a non-capitalist. It was in India's interest that he should take a hand, since India has a primordial interest in Burma as a supplier of food and a neighbouring State, and since the continuance of the present disorder could only work for the advantage of China or the Communists, the presence of neither of whom would be welcome to India. India had her own material interests too, though Nehru might be chary of supporting them too openly. Even if India could not contribute financially or find advisers, she could be a partner in and sponsor to any scheme which would combine assistance with safeguards. It was essential to break fresh ground in this way.

F.-Singapore: 24th-28th and 31st January, 1949

58. After the charm, colour, shabbiness and fecklessness of Rangoon, SPrugipor@3make$88striking impression. Itself a magentot Brit&& enterprise,

this great seaport, thanks to an efficient British administration and to the purpose- ful activityPagets dening population, largely Chinese, hasPmage4a4ematkable recovery since the occupation. With Hong Kong, and to a lesser degree, Bangkok, Singapore is a demonstration of the vast economic possibilities that would open out to South-East Asia if only peace and good order could be restored. Even in Malaya, in spite of the disturbances, production of tin and rubber has been maintained.

59.

I was fortunate to arrive at Singapore before the dispersal of the Colonial Governor's. Conference and was able to meet-in addition to the Commissioner-General (Mr. Malcolm MacDonald) and the

and the Governor of Singapore-the Governors of Hong Kong, Sarawak and North Borneo and the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya.

60. I stayed successively with the Commissioner-General, with the Foreign Affairs Adviser (Mr. Scrivener), with the High Commissioner for the Federation of Malaya (Sir Henry Gurney), at Kuala Lumpur, and with the Governor of Singapore (Sir Franklin Gimson).

61. A good part of our conversations related to purely Colonial problems and to the structure and functions of the Commissioner-General's Office, and need not be recorded here. But the Colonial Governors have their foreign pre- occupations and I gather that the Foreign Service members of the Commissioner- General's staff have been of assistance to them.

62. The Governor of Singapore and the High Commissioners at Kuala Lumpur administer territories at the meeting-place of three races, the Indian, the Chinese and the Malay-there has been age-long rivalry between Indian and Chinese in this area and it is not likely to be allayed, but, indeed, rather to be intensified in the present and prospective state of the world. Developments in both India and China may make this an international question of growing importance. Both territories have large Chinese populations, and the two Governors look on the communisation of China as a matter of intimate concern. One is conscious of India and of Pandit Nehru at Singapore and it is only when one gets round the corner to Bangkok that his shadow seems to grow less. Feeling between Malays and Chinese is strong. The Malayan Federation also has its difficulties with Siam, though there are encouraging signs of growing collaboration between the two administrations in the suppression of Chinese Communist banditry.

63. Singapore, at the crossing of the sea-ways, is also an indispensable link in communications with Australia. One feels oneself there within the sphere of Australian interest, and it seemed fitting to celebrate Australia Day in Singapore.

64. The focal point for the gathering together of all these strands-defence, foreign affairs, colonial administration, economics-is the Commissioner-General's office in Singapore. Though some have spoken of it with less enthusiasm than others, opinion is, I think, unanimous as to its utility. With the present rice shortage, the work done by the Economic Section to follow up and see to the fulfilment of the I.E.F.C. allocations is still quite indispensable. In the field of foreign affairs it performs a most valuable co-ordinating function and enables the view of the Foreign Office to be expressed and promoted in places which it would otherwise not so easily reach. The recent meeting of His Majesty's Representatives in foreign countries in South-East Asia under the presidency of Mr. MacDonald was most successful. It was hoped that the experiment would be repeated and it is for consideration whether the net should not be spread next time to bring in India, Ceylon, Pakistan and Japan by inviting the attendance of the High Commissioners at Delhi, Karachi and Colombo and the Head of the United Kingdom Liaison Mission at Tokyo. Sir A. Gascoigne told me that he would welcome this.

65. One of the most interesting functions I attended was a dinner given by Mr. MacDonald to which he had invited the Governor of Singapore, the Naval and Military Commanders-in-Chief, the Prime Ministers of five of the Malay States (including Dato Onn Bin Jaafar from Johore, President of the United Malay Nationalist Organisation), some prominent Chinese and official and unofficial Britage from Singapore. After dinner, at Mr. Macguld request, I gave a short talk on the world situation, as seen from Europe, and an interesting

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discussion followed. Even here, it was significant that the claws were out between Malaggan 6kines88

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