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SECRET

C.P. (49) 45

26th February, 1949

Printed for the Cabinet. February 1949

CABINET

Copy No.

31

ANTI-PARTITION CAMPAIGN IN EIRE

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS

I attach, for the information of my colleagues, the following two documents ::

(1) a note of 4th February by Lord Rugby, written at my request, to bring up to date a memorandum which he had submitted to me on 29th November, 1948, about the intensification of the anti-partition campaign in Eire (Appendix I); and

(2) á memorandum setting out the results of consideration by the Departments concerned of the possibilities of any discussion of Partition in an international forum (Appendix II).

2. In his earlier memorandum Lord Rugby had suggested that the United Kingdom might with advantage take the initiative in referring the question to some international body; recent statements by Eire Ministers have made it clear that they hope to do this themselves.

Commonwealth Relations Office, S: W. 1,

26th February, 1949

P. J. N.-B.

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APPENDIX I

THE ANTI-PARTITION: CAMPAIGN IN EIRE

Note by Lord Rugby dated 4th February, 1949

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.

I

The gist of a Memorandum headed "The Writing on the Wall" and sub- mitted by me to the Secretary of State on 29th November, 1948, is attached hereto. In my view measures to avert ugly developments in connexion with the anti- partition campaign call' for serious consideration; if it is found that nothing further can be done by the United Kingdom Government, that, too, is a decision the implications of which should be made quite clear to the Eire Government. The reaffirmation of the status of Northern Ireland in the Government of Ireland Bill- is a definite step in this direction. The Irish Nationalist view, justified by past: experience, is that it is only necessary to worry and harry the British long enough for them to throw up the job and clear out. Irish Nationalists do not realise that this technique gg longergapplies.

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pl have only two points to add to the appreciation of the situationgigen in the

enclosed memorandum:

(a) Mr. de Valera, with whom I had a long farewell interview on 25th January, said that in his view an outbreak of violence on the Border issue was becoming more and more certain and he asked me not to fail in bringing this danger to the notice of the United Kingdom Govern- ment. I have no doubt that this is his sincere belief, though I am not blind to the fact that it is not bad policy to frighten us with a bogy. Nor to the fact that, if passion should break loose, Mr. de Valera must bear a large share of the responsibility.

(b) Mr. Sean MacBride makes the practical suggestion that things might be easier if the leaders North and South met one another. He was most anxious that I should try and arrange for him to meet Sir Basil Brooke. Mr. MacBride said: "Even if nothing happens, still it would be a good thing to have a talk and discuss one another's point of view." I see no disadvantage in this and possibilities of great advantage. Agreement to differ about fundamentals and to collaborate more obviously in practical problems would bring the temperature down to some extent, possibly to a considerable extent. In accordance with Mr. MacBride's wish I am mentioning this to the Prime Minister. Mr. MacBride looks like being the man of the future and young Ireland looks to him. He is the best choice for a

contact."

Extract from Memorandum by Lord Rugby dated 29th November, 1948

The true rivalry in Irish politics used to be between a Commonwealth Party and the Separatists. All now, willy-nilly, are Separatists. Henceforth the only rivalry left to the parties in Irish politics is to outrival each other in the virulence of their anti-Partition campaign. This will embrace attempts to make Partition a live issue in British politics and to influence world opinion by the threat to abstain from joining Western Union. That is what Mr. Costello meant in his speech by saying that the repeal of the Act will enable him to raise the Partition question on the international plane. It is my view that this rivalry between the parties in an anti-Partition crusade will bring the gun-man back again.

On the surface there are here the same friendly people, for the most part generous admirers of England, cordial and helpful. But in the blood stream there is a malignant virus. People do not stop to analyse the trend or to read the symptoms and signposts. In the air there is a sense of coming climax and Mr. de Valera's stern admonitions are a portent. We go from celebration to celebration inspired by the half unconscious cult of hatred. The indoctrination of the younger generation by press, radio, platform and pulpit has been intense. My colleague, the Canadian High Commissioner, observes with growing alarm what is going on here.

Some people in England think that the repeal of the External Relations Act has automatically put the Partition question to sleep. There could be no greater mistake. All it has done is to destroy the best chance of a friendly solution. The establishment here of an independent Republic will stimulate national sentiment and inflame opinion about the Border on both sides of it. Anybody who has studied the course of Anglo-Irish history and particularly anyone who has observed the poisoning of young minds in recent years can recognise at once a familiar Irish pattern taking shape.

My forecast is that unless a move is made now on our side to anticipate and disperse the forces and influences now gathering we shall have bloodshed in Ireland, a grave state of disorder in the North, with world opinion once again only too ready to believe that England is misbehaving herself in Ireland. We know, or should know, by bitter experience what Irish opinion in the Common- wealth, in the United States and in the Catholic world can do. It may not take the first trick but it wins the rubber.

I am not suggesting that Mr. Costello would approve a violent solution of the Partition question. He and most of his colleagues are men of peace, though their oratory is a summons to battle. Indeed, all the best Irish opinion would deplore a renewal of violence. But Irish leaders are not free agents and they know it. This is the land of Frankenstein. 1798 is active in the streets to-day, Parnell did not want the Phoenix Park murders. His work was wrecked by the Invincibles. The rebels of 1916 were loudly cursed in Dublin, but in

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three months time they were heroes. The blood sacrifice worked its mystique ang changed or hastened the course of history. Mr. de Valera did not want to have bombs thrown in Coventry in 1939, but when two of the criminals were executed Dublin shops were forced to close and a Requiem Mass was held. We face the same developments to-day. They come by instinct rather than by intention. Indeed, the Partition issue is not a real issue. It is built up on emotion. Inexorably, inevitably, the Irish Republic now created will be pushed from behind to work out the destiny so long and so passionately preached. "Ireland shall be free from the centre to the sea.” The Government need not move, will not move. The murder of one policeman in the North is enough to bring the opposing emotions to a clash. Others will strike and the Government will be involved. The world is bloodier and more brutalised than it was. We may perhaps feel some sympathy for a Government which has to control a vendetta-minded people who have had no outlet for their tribal passions during the years of war.

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Unionists in the North, and perhaps elsewhere, may be tempted to say "Let them do their worst.": The forces of the Crown "will soon teach them a lesson." This view has no element of wisdom in it. It will be a day of triumph for Eire if the forces of the Crown are actively employed against patriotic elements in Ireland. British bayonets are Ireland's secret weapon.

APPENDIX II

POSSIBLE DISCUSSION OF PARTITION OF IRELAND IN AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM

1. Possible Action by the Eire Government at the United Nations

"?

The Eire Government, though not a Member, might raise the issue under Article 35 (2) of the United Nations Charter. Under this Article, it could be brought to the attention of either the Security Council or the General Assembly dispute." Alternatively, a mischief-making member of the United Nations might raise it as a "situation," presumably with Eire's support.

as a

(a) Security Council

It is perhaps unlikely to be raised here since it is by no means certain that the necessary seven votes would be forthcoming in support of a resolution favourable to Eire. If, however, such a resolution were passed on the issue as a dispute," the United Kingdom, as a party, would not have the right to vote or, therefore, to use its veto. The United Kingdom would have the right to veto if the issue were treated as a situation.

(b) General Assembly

It is more probable to be raised here, as Eire might well command the support of the Slavs and the Powers who are normally anti-colonial. A number of others would probably be neutral, and relations with other Common- wealth Governments on the issue might be difficult. But it is questionable whether Eire could procure a two-thirds majority. On the other hand, it is still less likely that a two-thirds majority could be obtained for a resolution favourable to the United Kingdom.

(c) Possible results

Any deliberations in the Assembly could only result in recommendations for a solution. Though the recommendations would not be legally binding, Eire or a potential mischief maker might succeed thereby in stirring up prejudice against His Majesty's Government. If a Commission of Enquiry was sent out by order of the Security Council or the General Assembly, the Government of Northern Ireland might refuse to admit it to its territory. The United Kingdom Government would then be placed in an embarrassing dilemma of either refusing to acquiesce in a United Nations recommendation or of having to coerce the Northern Ireland Government.

2. United Kingdom defence in the Security Council or the Assembly A strong case could, it seems, be made out on the grounds that:

(i) there is no general threat to the peace arising out of the position 85

Notthem eland;