CAB129-33 — Page 239

Page 239

68. It was generally agreed at the 1947 Conference that it would be in conflict with the honourable status of prisoners of war that they should be compelled to do work designed to bring direct harm to their own country; but the use of prisoners of war on work not affecting their own country, directly or adversely, could be defended on the ground that the existence of prisoners of war imposes certain positive handicaps on a Detaining Power (e.g. in the provision of guards, food, clothing, accommodation, etc); and that it is, therefore, reasonable than, so far as possible, a-Detaining Power should be able to use prisoners of war to make good the cost of their keep.. The possibility of producing an Article which would categorise either the types of work which could be permitted or the types of work to be prohibited was explored at great length at the 1947 Geneva Conference; but, apart from the difficulties of deciding the category of particular forms of work, the difficulty of detailed definition in terms which would have substantially the same meaning in all countries, seems insuperable.

.

عر

69. The real stumbling block was, however, the desire of the United Kingdom delegation to keep the right to employ prisoners of war on such tasks as mine-liiting and bomb-disposal; whilst preserving and, if possible, strengthening the prohibition against work having a direct connection with war operations, or the production or use of weapons

or war.

70. The civil user departments in the United Kingdom would be content for prisoners of war to be limited to agriculture, forestry, and civil engineering (as labourers) but a definition on these lines would rule out most employments by the Service Departments. The United States delegation at the 1947 Conference took the view that, as practically all work in total war had a direct connection with the war, it was essential, in any case, to revise the 1929 wording.

to revise the 1929 wording. Informal contacts with the United States have since produced a new suggestion from them in the following terms:-

"Prisoners of war may be employed in all those occupations which are normally necessary for the feeding, sheltering, clothing and health of human beings, even though such work may be performed for, or result in, benefits to the members of the Military Establishment. A prisoner of war should not be employed in work which is otherwise of value in assisting the conduct of active belligerent operations" (C.R.G.C./P(48)36)

My Committee regard this wording to be objectionably vague because

"occupations which are normally for.... ....human beings" might cover almost anything or nothing. It would seem to exclude the use of prisoners of war on such tasks (which all would agree are legitimate) as road making and land drainage, or in Prisoners of War Information Bureaux.

171. My Committee recommend that the United Kingdom delegation to an

International Conference should propose that prisoners of war be allowed to be employed:-

(a) on agriculture, forestry and oivil engineering;

and (b)

by military forces on any work not directly connected with operations against an enemy or the production or handling of weapons or ammunition;

but (c) in any case, not in a zone of active operations.

(C. R. G. C. /M(48)7, Item 49).

72. Joint Responsibility for Transferred Prisoners of War. At the 1947 Geneva Conference of Government Experts, two proposals were made regarding the transfer of prisoners of war from one Detaining Fower to anothPage 239 of 488

Page 239

(a) that such transfers to a Power not adhering to the

Prisoners of War Convention should be prohibited;

14

(b) that, in the event of a transfer to another Party to the

Prisoners of War Convention, the two Powers should be "jointly responsible" that the Convention weg opary ed Page 4 of such prisoners of war.

116

73. The proposal in paragraph 72(a) above was unanimously approved by the 1947 Conference and my Committee recommend that the United Kingdom delegation to a future International Conference should support it; though it should be pointed out that it might create difficulties if United Kingdom forces were operating with forces of a Power, which was not a Party to the Convention, in circumstances where captured personnel could * be evacuated only to that Ally. (C.R.G.C./M(48)11, Item 86)

74. The proposal in paragraph 72(b) above was supported by the majority of the delegations at the 1947 Conference, including that from the United States. The main argument was that a Party to the Convention, having captured prisoners of war, should not be able to escape from its obligations towards them under the Convention, by handing them over to another Power.

75. This problem faced the British Commonwealth of Nations during the Second World War, and experience then showed how difficult it was for a Power which had transferred prisoners of war to another Power, to exercise any control over their treatment. There would, as a general rule, be no effective sanction which the first Detaining Power could apply to the second, if treatment by the latter did not satisfy the former.

76. This was illustrated, in practice, when after the termination of hostilities in the Second World War, certain German prisoners of war were transferred by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (in North-west Europe) to France, on conditions which practically amounted to the United States and the United Kingdom being jointly responsible with France for them. Though their treatment, in some respects, fell below that which the United States and the United Kingdom regarded as right, no effective action to improve it materially proved possible.

1

77. Moreover, prisoners of war may be transferred more than once, and the complications which would arise if three or more Powers were jointly responsible for the same prisoners of war need no description; to say nothing of the difficulty which would arise, where, in a particular camp where complaints arose, there were prisoners of war for which the Power concerned was solely responsible, and others, for whom it was jointly responsible with one or more other Powers.

78.

My Committee came to the conclusion that it would be wrong to accept responsibility in circumstances where the United Kingdom Government would have no effective means of discharging it; but that at a future International Conference a merely negative attitude would not be likely to receive support.

79.

They were also advised by the representative of the Legal Department of the Foreign Office that if the Prisoners of War Convention remained silent on this point, it might be difficult in a future war for a United Kingdom Government to maintain that it had no further responsibility for prisoners of war transferred by it to another Power.

80.

For these reasons my Committee recommend that the United Kingdom delegation to a future International Conference

(a) should oppose any proposal to embody in the Prisoners of War

Convention any provision making a Power transferring prisoners of war to another signatory to the Convention, jointly responsible with the new Detaining Power for observing the Convention in relation to such prisoners of war;

(b) should propose the inclusion in the Prisoners of War

Convention of a provision specifically relieving a "capturing" Power of responsibility, from the date of transfer, for the treatment of prisoners of war transferred to another

Paginatory 48 the Convention.

(C.R.G.U./M (48)11, Itehage 240 of 488

·15-81. Transfer of prisoners of war if "fighting front" approaches their garm. The 1947 Geneva Conference of Government Experts recommended that the Prisoners 8 War Convention should provide that "when the

or combat zone draws near a camp, the prisoners of way may be moved only under normal conditions of security, or if their own safety demands" (C. R. G. C. /P(47)1, page 78).

82.

During the later stages of the Second World War, movements of prisoners of war often took place under conditions of hardship and at short notice, because the Detaining Power wanted to prevent their liberation by the advancing forces of the Power in whose forges the prisoners had served or of its Allies. The object of the recommendation referred to in paragraph 81 above (the word "security" is not used in its technical sense) is to prohibit that kind of movement and to allow movements of prisoners of war designed to keep them from liberation only

(a) if they can be carried out under normal conditions

involving no serious risk to the prisoners themselves;

or (b) if removal is necessary to take them out of exposure to

danger (e.g. from bombardment.

83. My Committee recommend the proposal referred to in paragraph 81 above should be brought to the notice of the Chiefs of Staff, and, subject to no adverse advice from them, the United Kingdom delegation to a future International Conference should support the recommendation that, in the 0.0.Sevent of the combat zone approaching a prisoners of war camp, the prisoners

therein should be moved only

>

84

(a) under normal humane conditions and if they can be moved

under reasonably safe conditions;

or (b) if the move is necessary in the interests of their own safety.

(C. R. G. C. /M (48)9, Item 64).

Repatriation on termination of hostilities.

:

There was strong pressure at the 1947 Geneva Conference of Government Experts in favour of strength- ening the provisions of the Prisoners of War Convention to ensure that prisoners of war are not held by a Detaining Power for long periods after all hostilities with their own country have ceased. The argument runs that prisoners of war are detained only to prevent them continuing aotively in the fight and that there is, therefore, no justification for continuing to hold them once the, fighting with their country has ended, In particular, objection was taken to the insertion in armistice or surrender terms of provisions postponing the repatriation of the prisoners of war.

85% The United Kingdom delegation at the 1947 Conference argued, on the other hand, that it is impossible to foresee the conditions in which hostilities will cease and it may be that the condition (e.g. devastation) of their home country, or the need for olearing up war damage in the country of the Detaining Power, or the economic or security conditions in their own country, might be such that it would be unfair, and perhaps even disastrous, for the whole of the prisoners of war in enemy hands to be repatriated at once to a defeated country.

&

86. My Committee gave careful consideration to the arguments on both sides and were persuaded that some concession must be made to the pressure to strengthen the Artiole (Artiole 75). There is little doubt that its authors in 1929 intended that prisoners of war should be

• repatriated within a reasonable time after hostilities ended, though the wording they chose does not require this absolutely until a peace treaty has been concluded.

187. My Committee recommend that:-

(a) the Article should provide that prisoners of war will be

repatriated as soon as possible after the conclusion of hostilities unless there are adequate reasons to the