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48hchnocive sign to be work age 233efb488 (see which had informed the Occupying Power of the 8distinctive

(c)(ii) below);

(ii) which has declared its existence to the enemy;

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(iii) whose headquarters have effective control of all the

lower formations and units;

Pagli)4 whose headquarters are capablepoto being comicated

with effectively and of replying to communications;

(v) which complies with the rules of war and treats

members of the Armed Forces of the Occupying Power captured by them in accordance with the Prisoners of War Convention;

and

(0) individually and at all times whilst operating as "Partisans":-

(i)

are commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

(ii) display a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance and of which the Occupying Power has been previously informed (see (b)(i) above);

(iii) oarry arms openly;

(iv)

comply with the rules of war and treat members of the Armed Forces of the Occupying Power captured by 'them in accordance with the Prisoners of War Convention;

and that it should firmly resist any attempt to widen this definition, and should avoid any wording which might enable the protection of the Prisoners of War Convention to be claimed for: -

42.

(a) persons using armed force who do not wear a recognisable

uniform or carry arms openly;

(•) spies and the like;

(L) persons attacking regular troops treacherously or under conditions where the troops have no reason to apprehend hostilities and take reasonable precautions to defend themselves;

(8)

(h)

(j)

persons who take subversive action against a legally

sons constituted government unless such subversive action becomes a state of civil war (see paragraphs 32 to 36 above);

a person who uses arms against occupying forces entirely on his own individual initiative;

bodies who do not conform to the rules and usages of war and of the Prisoners of War Convention.

(C. R. G. J. Aï (48)4, Item 32)

This recommendation would, I think, be accepted by the "Partisan" countries judging from the views they expressed at the 1947 Geneva Conference of Government Experts. It substitutes for the condition of "being in control of a region" in the Phillimore formula (see paragraph 38(b) above) the conditions set out in paragraph 41(b) (i) to (iv) above. A copy of the Report of the Sub-Committee on Partisans is at Appendix C.

43. It will be observed from paragraph 354 below that my Committee recommend approval for the recommendation of the 1947 Geneva Conference of Government Experts that the Red Cross Convention should in future apply to the same classes of persons, as would be entitled to the protection of the Prisoners of War Convention if captured.

Shown

44. Surrendered hemy Personnel. The International Red Cross Committee have not disguised their view that the areation of a bategory own as "surrendered enemy personnel" was a retrograde step undermining the whole Prisoners of war Convention; and their desire to prevent similar

9.

action in future by strengthening the Convention so that it would apply not only to personnel "captured" but to all "who fall into enemy hands' was shared, at the 1947 Geneva Conference of Government Experts, by the delegatRage 2 he&untries occupied by thePagman5auringothe Second World War. It may be recalled that Germany took somewhat similar action, in principle, in relation to the surrendered French Army in 1940. It is fair to add that it was tacitly admitted at Geneva that treatment of Surrendered Enemy Personnel by the United Kingdom was always satisfactory; the position was very different in the case of those who surrendered to the Germans.

45. My Committee were advised by the Foreign Office that they had found it inoreasingly difficult to refute the persistent arguments advanced by the International Red Cross Committee in support of the view that it was not proper to escape from the obligations of the Convention in this way; and that, if the Committee felt that the oategory of Surrendered Enemy Personnel must be preserved, it would be desirable to provide specifically for such in the Prisoners of War Convention.

46. Having carefully considered the matter at some length, my Committee are convinced that the acceptance of surrenders on the scale experienced in 1945 would impose on military Commanders and victorious Powers, obligations impossible of fulfilment, if the Prisoners of War Convention had to be applied in full to all the personnel surrendering; nor indeed would it be equitable that a Commander of a victorious army should have imposed on him such obligations, towards large numbers of surrendered enemies, as could be fulfilled perhaps only by imposing much lower standards on his own forces and/or on the local civilian population.

47. My Committee have necessarily examined this question largely in the light of what is desirable from the point of view of a United Kingdom military Commander faced with large scale surrenders of enemy forces; but they have not lost sight of the fact that whatever provisions may be inserted in the Prisoners of War Convention, may at some future date, affect British personnel. The definition of surrendered enemy personnel recommended by them could have been applied to the British surrenders at Dunkirk and Singapore, etc. We have, therefore, considered whether it would be possible to fix a period beyond which surrendered enemy forces should not be treated as surrendered enemy personnel but should be converted into prisoners of war; but my Committee have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the conditions following mass surrenders are such that it would not be possible, in advance, to fix any time limit beyond which surrendered personnel would not be retained in this new category.

48. The text suggested to implement my Committee's recommendations (see C. R. G. C./P(48)56) endeavours to secure that the standards of food, clothing, medical treatment and accommodation are brought up to the standards laid down in the Convention for prisoners of war as rapidly as may be possible; but if provisions on the lines of this text are ultimately adopted by an International Conference, it would still be possible for an unscrupulous enemy to avoid fulfilling the obligations of the Prisoners of War Convention for much longer periods than are necessary, without being guilty of a breach of the letter of the Convention. 49. From the point of view of large scale surrenders of British foroes into enemy hands the oreation of this new category of surrendered enemy personnel with formal recognition in International Law, cannot be described as anything but dangerous and my Committee desire to place this fact on record. They have, however, felt bound to recommend the creation of such a category in view of the policy deliberately adopted by the United Kingdom Government and its Allies in relation to the German and Japanese surrenders in the Second World War, and of the considerations which led to that policy being adopted.

150. 50. My Committee recommend that the United Kingdom delegation to a future International. Conference should press for provisions to be embodie pan any futang Prisoners of war Convention to the effect that:-