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APPENDIX

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MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF INDIA'S POSSIBLE FUTURE STATUS

APPRECIATION BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

We examine below the military implications of three possibilities regarding the future status of India. These are:-

(a) that India remains a member of the Commonwealth, though owing no

allegiance to the Crown; or

(b) that India becomes a foreign State in a specially close treaty relationship

with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries; or (c) that India becomes a foreign State with no such close treaty relationship.

2. From the military point of view the prime necessity is that we should have the friendly co-operation of India in both peace and war. This is obviously more likely to be the case under alternatives (a) and (b) above than under (c).

Pakistan

3. Militarily it is necessary that India and Pakistan should have a common policy for defence against external aggression. The relationship between India and the United Kingdom cannot therefore be considered in isolation. We believe that, irrespective of the policy pursued by India, Pakistan will continue as a member of the Commonwealth, and we have based our paper on this assumption.

Strategic Importance of India in War

4. The strategic value of India and Pakistan taken together is-

(a) India possesses large potential resources of all kinds, including man-power

and industry, and is thus the only are in South-East Asia capable of supporting a major military effort.

(b) Bases in India and Pakistan dominate sea and air communications in the

Indian Ocean.

(c) Pakistan and India could provide strategic air bases for attacking Russia. Even if India and Pakistan are both friendly to us, we cannot hope to make full use of the above unless they are prepared to afford each other mutual support.

Rôle in War

5. Should the Soviet Union attack India or Pakistan, the attack would be of purely preventive nature. Such an attack would therefore be unlikely unless the Soviet Union were convinced of the Anglo-American intentions of using air bases in India or Pakistan. Owing to the logistic difficulties of land attack every form of pressure will be used to prevent the use of bases there by the Anglo- American Powers. Should these measures prove unsuccessful, military attacks on India or Pakistan would probably be limited to air attacks. These attacks would necessarily have to be delivered by the Soviet long-range air force at the expense of high priority air operations in other campaigns. Both India and Pakistan would need considerable assistance to meet this threat.

6. It is obvious that the Allies' requirements would best be met by a strong India in full co-operation with Pakistan as an active ally providing not only the necessary forces for her own defence but making a contribution outside India. Under these conditions we could make use of the Pakistan and Indian air bases for our strategic air offensive.

7. We do not believe, however, that the Allies will, even by 1957, be able to make any significant contribution to help India in her defence. This fact is certain profoundly to affect India's defence policy, and may well-until such time as she herself raises adequate forces to meet the external threat-cause her to adopt an attitude in war which she appreciates is unlikely to provoke Russia into attacking her. For instance, under present circumstances we believe it unrealistic to assume that she will permit us to use bases for the strategic air offensive, as this must inevitably force the Russians to take preventive action, nor would she contribute any forges outside India. We

We believe however that she

of may grant us the facilities

e 2019 for set out below.

a

Our Requirements in War

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Page 997 refussments are that India should grant us the following facilities even though she is not actively engaged in hostilities against Russia:-

(a) She should make available to our war economy her resources in man-power,

industry and raw materials.

(b) She should grant us air transit facilities for military aircraft and the right to operate maritime aircraft from the Andamans, Nicobars and Laccadives.

(c) She should grant us fuelling and repair facilities for warships.

(d) She should allow us transit facilities for Gurkhas.

Our Requirements in Peace

9. Since India is the most powerful nation in South-East Asia, her effective resistance to the spread of communism in her own territory and the lead she can give to other countries in South-East Asia will be a major factor in resisting the spread of communism, following on recent developments in China.

We should also afford India such military assistance as we can to sustain her resistance to communism.

10. Further requirements in peace are:-

(a) India, in co-operation with Pakistan, should develop her defences, par- ticularly her air forces, so as to ensure the integrity of the Indian sub-continent.

(b) We wish to retain our transit rights and staging facilities for military

aircraft.

(c) India should develop and maintain to the greatest possible extent her industrial capacity, port, transport, airfield and communication facilities.

Military Implications of Future Possible Relationships with India

11. Our requirements can only be obtained if India will co-operate in peace and in war with the Commonwealth, especially Pakistan. This co-operation is most likely to be attained if India remains in the Commonwealth, or is bound to us by a satisfactory treaty.

12. The position of India as a foreign country without close treaty relation- ship with the Commonwealth suggests that India would consider that her interests were not in harmony with those of the Commonwealth, or indeed with those of the Western Powers. India cannot develop or maintain her present industrial and war potential without external assistance. It would, therefore, be difficult for her to maintain an independent neutrality and she might tend to align herself with Russia and Russian satellites.

If this premise is correct the implications would be :---

(a) We should obtain none of our strategic requirements in India in either

peace or war.

(b) India's relations with Pakistan, assuming the latter remains within the Commonwealth, might well worsen, thus weakening the combined defence of the sub-continent. Pakistan's position as a member of the Commonwealth would therefore be gravely threatened.

Conclusions

13. We conclude that :—

(a) Our strategic requirements in India cannot be considered in isolation from those in Pakistan. They remain the same whatever the final relationship between India and the Commonwealth may be and are as set out in paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 above.

(b) Our strategic requirements cannot be met unless India is friendly both

to the Commonwealth as a whole and to Pakistan.

(c) The best way of ensuring this is for India to remain a member of the Commonwealth; failing this she must enter into close treaty relations with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries.

(d) It is unlikely that our requirements would be met if India became a foreign State with no close treaty relationship. In fact, there is a possibility that India might then drift towards Russia. Page 207 of 488